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For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the Anglo-American 
judge’s role in the administration of justice. The reason is clear: in a constitutional 
order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions ac-
cording to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest. Accordingly, 
upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to “faithfully and 
impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office. 1 Moreover, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been construed to guar-
antee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or impartial, judge. 2 Lastly, 
in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government depends on the 
consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the administration of 
justice is indispensable. It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must 
perceive them to be so. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges therefore 
admonishes judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety 
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” 3
When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to 
disqualify that judge from hearing further proceedings in the matter. In Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 4 a case concerning disqualification of a state supreme 
court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due process 
right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial bias 
is probable, due process requires disqualification. The Court noted, however, that 
disqualification rules may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process 
Clause requires. In the aftermath of Caperton, the House Judiciary Committee 
held a hearing on the state of judicial disqualification in the federal system. 5 
Disqualification requirements for federal judges require disqualification not just 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 453. Note: All cites to U.S. Code are to the most recent version unless otherwise 
indicated.
2. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
3. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2A.
4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
5. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
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when a judge is biased or probably biased, but also when a judge’s impartiality 
“might reasonably be questioned.” 6
This monograph describes its subject as “disqualification,” not “recusal,” ex-
cept when “recusal” is embedded in quoted material. In common parlance, “dis-
qualification” and “recusal” are sometimes used interchangeably. Other times, 
the two terms are distinguished, with “recusal” referring to withdrawal on the 
judge’s own initiative, and “disqualification” meaning withdrawal on the motion 
of a party. Applicable federal statutes—and the Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges—however, use “disqualification” broadly to embrace withdrawal both on 
motion and sua sponte. Because none of the primary sources of applicable law 
under study here refer to recusal, this monograph follows their lead.
Disqualification has ethical and procedural dimensions. The ethical dimen-
sion is governed by Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 7 
as construed by the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States. 8 Readers are encouraged to consult the Code of Conduct, 
the Published Advisory Opinions 9 of the committee, and the Compendium of 
Selected Opinions of the committee.
The procedural dimension, in contrast, is governed by four sections in Title 
28 of the U.S. Code: §§ 47, 144, 455, and 2106. Although the text of Canon 3C on 
disqualification is substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455, and both seek to promote 
public confidence in the judiciary, the focus of the two is different. Whereas the 
goal of the Code of Conduct—including Canon 3C—is to inform federal judges 
of their ethical obligations, to the end of advising them on conduct, § 455 is a 
procedural statute aimed at articulating disqualification standards, to the end of 
preserving the rights of litigants to impartial justice. This monograph focuses on 
the procedural dimension of federal judicial disqualification through an analysis 
of the applicable statutory law.
The two principal statutes governing judicial disqualification are 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455, “Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge” (discussed in sec-
tion II), and 28 U.S.C. § 144, “Bias or prejudice of judge” (discussed in section III). 
The relationship between the two has been a source of some confusion. Although 
the two sections provide overlapping remedies for bias, there are some important 
differences. First, § 144 aims exclusively at actual bias or prejudice, whereas § 455 
deals not only with actual bias and other forms of partiality but also with the 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
7. See appendix A for text of Canon 3C.
8. “The Code of Conduct is the law with respect to the ethical obligations of federal judges.” 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
9. Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies.
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appearance of partiality. Second, § 144 is triggered by a party’s affidavit, whereas 
§ 455 may be invoked in a motion by a party or sua sponte by the judge. Third, 
§ 144 applies only to district judges, while § 455 covers “[a]ny justice, judge, or 
magistrate judge of the United States.” 10
A third disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (discussed in section IV), 
provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision 
of a case or issue tried by him.” The statute applies to judges sitting on courts of 
appeals who were recently appointed from the district court or who are district 
judges sitting by designation, and directs their disqualification from appeals of 
cases they decided as trial judges. Given its limited applicability, this statute has 
been utilized infrequently, and for the most part uneventfully.
A fourth statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (discussed in section V), is not a 
disqualification statute as such but has been used to serve a comparable purpose. 
It authorizes the Supreme Court and circuit courts to “remand the cause 
and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances.” Section 2106 effectively enables an appellate court to disqualify a 
district judge by remanding a matter to a different judge for further proceedings 
if the appellate court doubts the original judge’s impartiality.
10. See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 544 n.10 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The District Court is 
thus ultimately responsible for the decision, including for the Magistrate’s report and recommendation 
if it is adopted in its entirety, but magistrate judges play an important role in the operation of the 
federal courts and must take care to word their published recommendations accordingly. Indeed, it is 
equally applicable to District Judges and Magistrates that ‘[w]henever a judge’s impartiality “might 
reasonably be questioned” in a proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) commands the judge to disqualify 
himself sua sponte in that proceeding.’”).
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IJudicial Disqualification  History and Policy
 A. History
Disqualification standards in the United States have been a work in progress, 
gaining in complexity and strength over time. In 1792, Congress enacted legisla-
tion that was the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 455. This legislation codified the com-
mon law by calling for disqualification of a district judge who was “concerned in 
interest” but added that a judge could also be disqualified if the judge “has been 
of counsel for either party.” 11 The statute was expanded in 1821 to require disqual-
ification when relatives of the judge appeared as parties. 12
In 1891, Congress enacted legislation, later codified as 28 U.S.C. §  47, for-
bidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that the judge tried. 13 In 1911, 
the precursor to § 455 was further amended to require disqualification when the 
judge was a material witness in the case. 14 That same year, Congress also enacted 
legislation—the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 144—entitling a party to secure the 
disqualification of a judge by submitting an affidavit that the judge has “a person-
al bias or prejudice” against the affiant or for the opposing party. 15 A decade later, 
in Berger v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute to prohibit 
a judge from ruling on the truth of matters asserted in such an affidavit and to 
require automatic disqualification if the affidavit was facially sufficient.
11. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 279.
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643.
13. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090.
14. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090.
15. Id. § 21.
16. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
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In 1927, the Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to the law of dis-
qualification. In Tumey v. Ohio, 17 the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, an 
Ohio statute that authorized a judge to preside over cases in which the judge would 
receive court costs assessed against convicted (but not acquitted) defendants.
By the mid-twentieth century, common-law aversion to judicial bias as 
grounds for disqualification continued to exert considerable influence. Section 455 
remained silent as to bias. Section 144—although ostensibly enabling a party to 
disqualify a district judge simply by submitting an affidavit alleging personal 
bias—had been construed exactingly by the courts of appeals. As Professor John 
Frank explained at the time, “narrow construction of the phrase ‘bias and preju-
dice’” had allowed frequent evasion of the statute. 18 Courts would find affidavits 
“not ‘legally sufficient’” because the “specific acts mentioned” did not “indicate 
‘bias and prejudice,’” thereby “emasculat[ing] the Berger decision by transferring 
the point of conflict.” 19 Frank warned that “[u]nless and until the Supreme Court 
gives new force and effect to the Berger decision, the disqualification practice of 
the federal district courts will remain sharply limited.” 20
In 1948, § 455 was further amended to disqualify judges who were related to 
a party’s lawyer (not just related to a party, as had been the case since 1821). As 
amended, the statute then provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has, 
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with a party or his 
attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, 
appeal, or other proceeding therein. 21
In 1964, the Fifth Circuit articulated a so-called duty to sit. 22 “It is a judge’s 
duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when 
there is no valid reason for recusation.” 23 In context, this created a duty to preside 
notwithstanding obvious appearance problems—problems that did not warrant 
disqualification under existing law. By 1972, Justice William Rehnquist reported, 
in Laird v. Tatum, 24 that the duty to sit had been accepted by all circuit courts.
17. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
18. John Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 629 (1927).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 630. See also United States v. Malinsky, 153 F. Supp. 321, 324–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (relying 
on Frank’s discussion in support of trend justifying court’s rejection of § 144 claim).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 455, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 908 (1948).
22. United States v. Edwards, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. Id. at 362 n.2.
24. 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
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In 1972, the American Bar Association published the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct to replace the Canons of Judicial Ethics it had promulgated fifty years 
earlier. The Model Code sought to encapsulate the ethics of disqualification into 
a unified rule. 25 Under the new rule, a judge was subject to disqualification “in a 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including 
but not limited to” cases in which the judge had an actual bias concerning a party, 
had served as a lawyer in the matter (or was still with his former firm when the 
matter was being handled by another lawyer in that firm), had an interest in the 
case, or was related to the parties or their lawyers.
In 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges, based on the 1972 Model Code. The Code of 
Conduct applies to appellate and district judges, judges on the Courts of Inter-
national Trade and Federal Claims, and bankruptcy and magistrate judges. The 
Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct is authorized to render advi-
sory opinions about the code when requested by a judge to whom the code applies.
In 1974, Congress adopted, with some variations, the Model Code’s disqual-
ification rule in an amendment to § 455, which—by virtue of its requirement 
that judges disqualify themselves whenever their impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned—was generally seen as qualifying, if not ending, the “duty to sit.” 26
 B. Policy
The history of judicial disqualification, discussed in the preceding section, re-
veals at least three policies at work, all of which are oriented toward preserving 
and promoting an impartial judiciary. First is fair process. To guarantee litigants 
their day in court before an impartial judge, we need a mechanism to disqualify 
judges who may be biased against a party or otherwise closed-minded. This is, in 
effect, the due process justification for disqualification—a means to protect the 
rights of litigants to a fair hearing before an impartial judge. 27
25. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972).
26. See Charles Gardner Geyh, James J. Alfini, Steven Lubet & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial 
Conduct and Ethics § 4.03 (5th ed. 2013).
27. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (Due Process Clause guarantees parties “right to have 
an impartial judge”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process”). See also Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 2007) (defining “impartial” as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular 
parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 
come before a judge”).
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Second is court legitimacy. To reassure the general public that its courts can 
be trusted to administer justice impartially, we must exclude judges whose con-
duct calls their impartiality into question. This focus on public confidence is what 
led lawmakers to amend § 455 in 1974 to disqualify judges whose impartiality 
“might reasonably be questioned.” 28
Third is civic virtue. Disqualification rules are embedded in the Code of Con-
duct for United States Judges as a means to promote ethical and virtuous judging 
by exhorting judges to live up to the ideals of the judicial role and step aside when 
their impartiality is in doubt. 29
Taken in isolation, these three justifications for disqualification rules—fair 
process, court legitimacy, and civic virtue—would seem to favor a robust disqual-
ification regime. But there are three countervailing concerns to be weighed in the 
balance. First, an unduly rigorous system of disqualification could be counter-
productive. If the goal is to promote public and litigant confidence in the impar-
tiality of the judiciary, a system in which judges are forever being challenged and 
removed could engender the perception that the judiciary is awash with bias. So 
there is something to be said for disqualification rules establishing a meaningful 
threshold that must be met before the time-honored presumption of impartiality 
is rebutted. Chief Justice Roberts made this point in his dissent in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co. 30 He argued that reading the Due Process Clause to require 
disqualification for probable bias “will inevitably lead to an increase in allega-
tions that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end 
result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an 
isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.” 31 The Caperton majority was mind-
ful of the Chief Justice’s concern but concluded that “[a]pplication of the consti-
tutional standard implicated in this case will . . . be confined to rare instances.” 32
Second, an unduly rigorous disqualification regime can put a strain on the 
judicial workforce that jeopardizes the expeditious administration of justice. 
To the extent that justice delayed is justice denied, the need for meaningful 
28. “If we are concerned, as most of us are with the need to shore up public confidence in our 
public institutions, we need to remove any scintilla of doubt that the public might have that that judge 
would be prejudiced in his decision. And that is why the criteria that we establish in S. 1886 is rather 
strict.” Judicial Disqualification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 14 (1971 & 1973) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, 
cosponsor).
29. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble, para. 3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011).
30. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
31. Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., opinion of the court).
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History and Policy
disqualification standards must be weighed against the concern that “over-
disqualification” depletes the supply of judges available to adjudicate cases. 33
Third, unduly rigorous disqualification standards enable litigants and their 
lawyers to game the system. If disqualification is made too easy to obtain, liti-
gants can exploit disqualification strategically, to remove judges who are unlikely 
to be receptive to a party’s arguments on the merits, for reasons having little to do 
with the judges’ “impartiality,” as properly understood. 34
These policy considerations are of limited relevance to the interpretation of 
unambiguous rules requiring judges to disqualify themselves for clearly defined 
conflicts of interest, such as when the judge owns stock in a corporate party or 
the judge’s daughter enters an appearance before the court as counsel of record. 
But they can play a role when the court is called on to decide whether a judge’s 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” This is particularly true in grey-
area cases that present a novel set of facts, where these policy implications can help 
strike a balance that promotes the purposes served by a rigorous disqualification 
regime without being so rigorous as to raise countervailing concerns.
33. Canon 3A(2) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (see appendix A) provides that 
“A judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” Commentary accompanying 
a similar rule in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct explains that “judges must be available 
to decide matters that come before the courts,” and that “unwarranted disqualification” is at odds 
with “the judge’s respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that 
may be imposed upon the judge’s colleagues.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.7, cmt. (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 2014).
34. Justice Breyer made this point in an opinion he wrote on behalf of the court when he was a 
circuit judge, emphasizing that the disqualification standard must be crafted “to prevent parties from 
too easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for 
strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking.” In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 
970 (1st Cir. 1989).

11fjc.dcn • fjc.gov
IIDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455
 A. Overview
 1. The text of § 455
The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system is 
28 U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:
§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. 
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concern-
ing the proceeding; 
(2) Where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter 
in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced 
law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the 
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 
concerning it; 
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in 
such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material wit-
ness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion con-
cerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; 
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse 
or minor child residing in his household, has a financial in-
terest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
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(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of rela-
tionship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding. 
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself 
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor chil-
dren residing in his household. 
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases 
shall have the meaning indicated:
(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other 
stages of litigation;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil 
law system; 
(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable in-
terest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or 
other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that 
holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such secu-
rities unless the judge participates in the management of 
the fund; 
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, frater-
nal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in 
securities held by the organization; 
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual 
insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings 
association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “finan-
cial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of 
the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the 
interest; 
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial inter-
est” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding 
could substantially affect the value of the securities. 
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(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties 
to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enu-
merated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification 
arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided 
it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for 
disqualification. 
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any 
justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a 
matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial 
judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the ap-
pearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, 
that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse 
or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial 
interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if 
the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or 
minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the 
interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification. 
Subsections (a) and (b) occupy the core of § 455 and should be read together. 
The two subsections divide the universe of disqualification into two categories: 
the general catchall of § 455(a), which requires disqualification from any pro-
ceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”; and a 
list of more specific grounds for disqualification in § 455(b).
The rest of § 455 is directed at implementing subsections (a) and (b):
 • Subsection (c) admonishes judges to keep abreast of their financial in-
terests to ensure that they know when to disqualify themselves under 
§ 455(b)(4).
 • Subsection (d) defines the terms used in subsections (a) and (b).
 • Subsection (e) provides parties with a limited opportunity to waive dis-
qualification otherwise required by the catchall subsection (a), typically 
where the judge is poised to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte. It 
does not, however, permit the parties to waive disqualification required 
by the more specific provisions of subsection (b).
 • Subsection (f) provides a limited opportunity for judges to avoid the 
need to disqualify themselves for financial interest under subsection 
(b)(4) through divestiture.
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 2. Interpretive ground rules
 a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b)
As embodied in § 455, subsections (a) and (b) are conceptually separate. Subsec-
tion (a) compels disqualification for the appearance of partiality, while subsection 
(b) “also” compels disqualification for bias, financial interest, and other specif-
ic grounds. In contrast, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct—after which 
§ 455 was originally modeled—and the current Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges unify the two halves conceptually by characterizing the specific grounds 
for disqualification in subsection (b) as a nonexclusive subset of circumstances in 
which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned in subsection (a). 35 
In other words, § 455 says that judges must disqualify themselves under subsec-
tion (a) when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned and when one 
of the specific scenarios enumerated in subsection (b) applies. The ABA Model 
Code, in contrast, declares that judges must disqualify themselves when their im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned, which includes but is not limited to the 
conflict-of-interest scenarios enumerated in subsection (b).
For the most part, this may be a distinction without a difference—disqualifi-
cation is required if the specific or general provisions are triggered, regardless of 
whether the specific provisions are characterized as a subset of or separate from 
the general. On the other hand, by conceptualizing them separately, § 455 can 
require disqualification under specific circumstances enumerated in subsection 
(b) that might not reasonably be characterized as calling a judge’s impartiality 
into question under subsection (a). For example, subsection (b)(4) requires judg-
es to disqualify themselves for “financial interest” (defined in subsection (d) as 
“however small”)—which necessarily includes an interest so small that it could 
not reasonably call the judge’s impartiality into question. 36
Any circumstance in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned under § 455(a) requires disqualification, even if the circumstance is not 
enumerated in § 455(b). 37 At the same time, when § 455(b) identifies a particular 
situation requiring disqualification, it will tend to control any §  455(a) analy-
sis with respect to that specific situation. For example, § 455(b)(5) requires dis-
qualification when one of the parties is within the third degree of relationship to 
the judge. Consequently, a fourth-degree relationship to a party does not by itself 
create an appearance of partiality requiring disqualification under § 455(a). As 
35. Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.11(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011); Canon 3C, Code of Conduct 
for United States Judges (2019).
36. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 n.8 (1988).
37. Id.
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the Supreme Court explained, “[s]ection 455(b)(5), which addresses the matter 
of relationship specifically, ends the disability at the third degree of relationship, 
and that should obviously govern for purposes of § 455(a) as well.” 38 That said, 
disqualification under §  455(a) might still be appropriate if, for example, the 
judge’s personal relationship with the fourth-degree relative was so close as to call 
the judge’s impartiality into question. In that situation, disqualification would be 
required not because the party is a remote blood relative of the judge but because 
of the close personal relationship between the two. As a practical matter, however, 
when a litigant seeks disqualification under both §§ 455(a) and (b), and the court 
is satisfied that disqualification is required under § 455(a), it will frequently avoid 
the complexities of interpreting the sections in relation to each other by conclud-
ing that it need not address the § 455(b) claim. 39
 b. Balancing the duty to decide with the duty to disqualify
Prior to 1974, the courts of appeals applied a judicial “gloss” to § 455 that created a 
“duty to sit,” 40 whereby judges resolved close questions against disqualification—
including cases in which a judge’s impartiality was in doubt, as long as an 
enumerated conflict of interest requiring disqualification did not apply. The 1974 
amendments to § 455, however, shifted the balance by requiring disqualification 
whenever a judge’s impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned, and the 
legislative history made clear that in revising the statute, Congress sought to end 
the “duty to sit.” 41 The First, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have since 
said that close questions should be decided in favor of disqualification, 42 while 
the Seventh Circuit has remarked that “[a] judge may decide close calls in favor 
of recusal.” 43 Justice Scalia, in declining a request for his own disqualification, 
cited the proposition that judges should err on the side of disqualification with 
apparent approval as applied to the lower courts, but opined that the absence of 
38. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(ruling that judge should have recused under § 455(a), rendering § 455(b) analysis unnecessary); In 
re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 781 (3d Cir. 1992) (allegations relating to §§ 455(a) and (b)(1), 
but decided on basis of § 455(a) alone); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995-96 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(involving § 144 and § 455(b)(1) but decided on basis of § 455(a)); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 
1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988) (ordering recusal under § 455(a) and declining to rule on § 455(b)(5)(iii)).
40. See section I.A.
41. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
42. See In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998); Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco 
Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Chevron, 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997)); United 
States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989).
43. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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a mechanism to replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court renders it 
inapplicable there. 44
Even though the “duty to sit” ended with the adoption of § 455, Canon 3A(2) 
of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges nonetheless declares that “a 
judge should hear and decide matters assigned, unless disqualified.” The point is 
simply to underscore that judges have a duty to decide the cases that come be-
fore them and that disqualification should not be used as an excuse to shirk that 
duty by dodging difficult or unpleasant cases. As a result, most circuits have said 
“there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion 
for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” 45
 c. The rule of necessity
Rooted in common law dating back to the fifteenth century, the rule of necessity 
states that “where all are disqualified, none are disqualified.” 46 In United States 
v. Will, 47 the Supreme Court ruled that the adoption of § 455 was not intended to 
abridge the rule of necessity. 48
Will involved a class action brought by thirteen federal district judges challeng-
ing an act of Congress that stopped or reduced previously authorized cost-of-living 
increases for certain federal employees, including judges. The district court grant-
ed summary judgment for the plaintiffs (judges). On appeal, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the Court itself was disqualified from hearing the case since all 
of its members had a direct financial interest in the outcome. Invoking the rule of 
necessity, the Court held that disqualification could not be required because then 
no federal judge would be able to entertain this federal constitutional challenge.
Courts have used the rule of necessity to reject disqualification in a variety of 
situations. 49 In In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability 
44. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).
45. Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987). Accord Nakell v. Attorney Gen. of N.C., 
15 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1988); Suson v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 763 F.2d 304, 308–09 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 664 F.2d 
10, 12 (1st Cir. 1981).
46. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
47. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
48. Id. at 217.
49. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 
185 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1999); Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 467 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1062 (1998); Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1583 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1261 (1997), aff’d, 137 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d on 
other grounds, 527 U.S. 423 (1999); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Litigation, 50 for example, four of seven members of the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation (JPML) assigned to hear the matter held stock interests in one 
or more of the parties. The JPML determined that the rule of necessity precluded 
disqualification under § 455(a) because there was no statutory provision for sub-
stituting panel members, and disqualification would result in fewer than the four 
judges required by statute to hear the case.
In Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 51 
the pro se plaintiff sought to disqualify the entire circuit from hearing his case, 
on the grounds that all of the Ninth Circuit judges had conspired to dismiss his 
previous suits. In denying the motion, the court explained that “a judge is not 
disqualified to try a case because of a personal interest in the matter at issue if 
‘the case cannot be heard otherwise.’” 52 The Ninth Circuit held that the rule of 
necessity applies when a litigant “indiscriminately sues all of the judges” in a 
circuit. 53 Quoting the axiom that “where all are disqualified, none are disquali-
fied,” 54 the court found that disqualification was “not necessary” because all of 
the Ninth Circuit judges would have been eliminated, making it impossible to 
hear the case. 55
 d. Special concerns in bench trials
The question has arisen as to whether the standard for disqualification differs 
in a bench trial, where the judge’s role is even more pivotal than in a jury trial. 
In Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 56 the Third Circuit said, “We cannot 
overlook the fact that this is a non-jury case . . . . When the judge is the actual 
trier of fact, the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality is especially 
pronounced.” 57
50. 170 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2001).
51. 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006).
52. Id. at 1163 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980)).
53. Id. at 1164.
54. Id. at 1165 (quoting Pilla v. ABA, 542 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Haase v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., 838 F.3d 665, 666 (5th Cir. 2016) (rule of necessity authorized court to hear case 
in which plaintiff brought suit against entire Fifth Circuit); Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 509 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (where plaintiff sued all district court’s judges, none were required to recuse, citing rule 
of necessity); Zaleski v. Burns, 606 F.3d 51, 53 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (rule of necessity enabled court 
to address claim against entire federal judiciary alleging conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his 
constitutional rights).
55. Ignacio, 453 F.3d at 1165.
56. 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 163, 166.
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Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. 58 involved an alleged ex parte commu-
nication. The Sixth Circuit held that “where a suit is to be tried without a jury, 
sending a law clerk to gather evidence is so destructive of the appearance of im-
partiality required of a presiding judge” that a remand was necessary to deter-
mine the truth of the allegation. 59 The D.C. Circuit has stated that “recusal might 
well be prudent when a perjury bench trial involves testimony from a proceeding 
over which the same judge presided,” although § 455(a) “does not require it.” 60
Even though disqualification issues may be of special concern in bench trials, 
it does not follow that a different disqualification standard is justified in jury 
trials. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[S]ection 455 properly makes no distinction between jury and nonjury 
trials. The district judge in a jury trial must still make numerous pretrial 
rulings, including crucial summary judgment rulings, and will doubtless 
be called on to make numerous rulings on the qualification of witnesses 
and on evidentiary matters, not to mention post-trial motions. 61
 e. Standing
Parties who file disqualification motions claim, in effect, that they will be ag-
grieved if their cases are decided by judges who are partial or appear to be so. 
In the usual case, a movant alleges that the judge has a real or perceived bias or 
interest against the movant or in favor of the movant’s opponent. For example, a 
plaintiff may seek to disqualify a judge on the grounds that the defendant is the 
judge’s close friend. In that scenario, however, may the judge’s friend likewise 
move for disqualification? Although it might seem that the friend lacks standing, 
insofar as the friend stands to be helped rather than injured by the allegedly dis-
qualifying bias, the friend could harbor an understandable concern that the judge 
might err in favor of his friend’s opponent to appear fair.
Does a party have standing to challenge a refusal to disqualify when the 
judge’s alleged partiality would be in that party’s favor? In Pashaian v. Eccelston 
Properties, Ltd., 62 the judge’s sister-in-law was married to a partner in the law firm 
of a defendant’s attorney. Even though any potential bias would seem to favor the 
defendants, multiple defendants moved to disqualify the judge, who granted the 
motion, but not before ordering a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. 
58. 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 446 (emphasis added) (finding harmless error on remand, 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981)).
60. United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Parker, 742 
F.2d 127, 128–29 (4th Cir. 1984) (disqualification not required in same circumstance).
61. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992).
62. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
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The movants challenged the judge’s failure to disqualify earlier, and the Second 
Circuit raised the standing issue sua sponte:
[A party] has standing to challenge the judge’s refusal to recuse even if 
the alleged bias would be in the moving party’s favor. Such a party might 
legitimately be concerned that the judge will “bend over backwards” to 
avoid any appearance of partiality, thereby inadvertently favoring the op-
posing party. The possibility of this compensatory bias by an interested 
judge is sufficiently immediate to constitute the “personal injury” neces-
sary to confer standing under Article III. 63
A different standing issue has arisen with respect to nonparty witnesses who 
seek a judge’s disqualification. In United States v. Sciarra, 64 the Third Circuit 
concluded that nonparty witnesses lacked standing to seek the disqualification of 
a judge in the context of a posttrial investigation. In that case, the United States 
government filed a civil complaint against a local union and twelve individuals, 
including the two petitioners who were members of the union’s executive 
board. After holding a bench trial, the district judge found the executive board 
culpable of aiding and abetting corruption. After the trial court’s judgment was 
affirmed on appeal, the government moved to depose the petitioners about the 
union’s operations during the intervening period. 65 The petitioners, who had 
been removed from their executive board positions as part of the trial court’s 
final judgment, filed a cross-motion to disqualify the presiding judge. The judge 
declined to disqualify himself. In reviewing that decision, the Third Circuit 
construed § 455(a)’s “proceeding” requirement to mean any stage of litigation 
in which a judge’s decision affects the “substantive rights of litigants to an actual 
case or controversy.” 66 Because there was no pending action in which the rights of 
the litigants were at issue, the petitioners had no standing, as nonparty witnesses, 
to invoke § 455 to disqualify the judge. The Third Circuit reserved judgment on 
the question whether, in the context of a case or controversy, a nonparty witness 
can move for the disqualification of a judge. 67
63. Id. at 83. See also United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989). When the district judge is 
placed in the “awkward position” of ruling one way and appearing to indulge his or her perceived bias, 
or ruling the other way and appearing to bend over backward to avoid perceived bias, disqualification 
is necessary. Id. at 745.
64. 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 624.
66. Id. at 635.
67. Id. at 636.
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 B. Grounds for disqualification
 1. General standard: when impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned—§ 455(a)
 a. Framework for analysis
Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of partiality (i.e., when a 
judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). Unlike § 455(b)(1)—which 
requires disqualification for actual partiality (i.e., when a judge “has a personal 
bias or prejudice toward a party”)—whether the judge is, in fact, impartial is not 
dispositive of disqualification under subsection (a). The justification for mak-
ing perceived partiality a ground for disqualification is at least twofold. First, re-
gardless of whether judges are partial in fact, public perceptions of partiality can 
undermine confidence in the courts. Second, disqualifying judges for outward 
manifestations of what could reasonably be construed as bias obviates the need 
to make subjective judgment calls about what is actually going on inside a judge’s 
heart and mind.
Section 455(a) makes clear that judges should apply an objective standard 
in determining whether to disqualify. Judges contemplating disqualification 
under § 455(a), then, should not ask whether they believe they are capable of 
impartially presiding over the case. Rather, the question is whether a judge’s 
impartiality might be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable person. 
Every circuit has adopted some version of the “reasonable person” standard to 
answer this question. 68 In the context of denying a motion for his disqualification 
from Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 69 Justice 
Scalia noted that this reasonable person is aware “of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.” 70 The Second Circuit has characterized the reasonable person 
as an “objective, disinterested observer” who is privy to full knowledge of the 
68. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981); SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 
29 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995); United States 
v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137 (1999); Vieux Carre Prop. 
Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1448 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 
1990); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 902 F.2d 1289, 
1290 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 
F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013); In re Barry, 
946 F.2d 913, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 557 
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
69. 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).
70. Id. at 924 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).
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surrounding circumstances. 71 The Fourth Circuit has clarified that the hypothet-
ical reasonable observer is not a judge because judges, keenly aware of the obli-
gation to decide matters impartially, “may regard asserted conflicts to be more 
innocuous than an outsider would.” 72 The Seventh Circuit has likewise noted that 
an outside observer is “less inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental dis-
cipline than the judiciary.” 73 And relying on the Supreme Court’s observation in 
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 74 the Fifth Circuit commented that 
“[p]eople who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge 
suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges.” 75
At the same time, this hypothetical “reasonable” observer “is not a person 
unduly suspicious or concerned about a trivial risk that a judge may be biased.” 76 
The reasonable observer must be “thoughtful” and “well-informed.” 77 The First 
Circuit has emphasized that a reasonable person does not draw conclusions on 
the basis of groundless suspicion:
[W]hen considering disqualification, the district court is not to use the 
standard of “Caesar’s wife,” the standard of mere suspicion. That is be-
cause the disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to se-
cure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but 
also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the disqualifica-
tion of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strategic 
reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking. 78
Numerous cases have rejected disqualification under circumstances in which 
calling a judge’s impartiality into question would require suspicion or speculation 
beyond what a reasonable person would indulge. The Second Circuit upheld a 
refusal to disqualify where the defendant alleged that the judge, a personal 
acquaintance, had grown unfriendly to him because of the defendant’s public 
71. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Scrushy, 721 F.3d at 1303 
(disqualification under § 455(a) is determined with reference to whether “an objective, disinterested, 
lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would 
entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality”).
72. DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287. See also Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297, 1310 
(10th Cir. 2015) (“The reasonable observer is not the judge or even someone familiar with the judicial 
system, but rather an average member of the public.”)
73. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). See also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 
F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2001).
74. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
75. In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864–65). See also 
United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287.
77. Mason, 916 F.2d at 386. See also Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156; O’Regan, 246 F.3d at 988.
78. In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (citation omitted).
Judicial Disqualification
22 Federal Judicial Center
opposition to the Gulf War. The court reasoned that “a disinterested observer 
could not reasonably question [the judge’s] impartiality based upon his alleged 
failure to return the plaintiff ’s greetings.” 79
Uninformed speculation and criticism—even if widely reported in the media—
do not trigger disqualification under § 455(a). In United States v. Bayless, 80 a district 
judge was criticized in the media for granting a motion to suppress in a drug case, 
culminating in members of Congress calling for the judge’s impeachment. The 
judge subsequently reversed his earlier ruling, and the defendant argued that the 
judge should have disqualified himself. Although it was widely speculated that 
the judge had reversed his earlier ruling in response to the threats and criticism, 
the Second Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary. The need 
for disqualification “is to be determined ‘not by considering what a straw poll of 
the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show[,] but by examining the 
record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing 
and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.’” 81
Explaining his decision not to disqualify himself in Cheney, Justice Scalia 
rejected the assertion that newspaper editorials calling his impartiality into 
question were dispositive. The reasonable observer must be “informed of all the 
surrounding facts and circumstances,” 82 and, in Scalia’s view, the editorials in 
question were not only factually inaccurate, but lacked recognition and under-
standing of relevant precedent. 83
Section 455 also requires disqualification if a reasonable person might believe 
that the judge was aware of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, 
even if the judge was in fact unaware. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition 
Corp., 84 the trial judge was a member of the board of trustees of a university that 
had a financial interest in litigation before the judge. But the judge stated that he 
was unaware of the financial interest when he conducted a bench trial and ruled 
in the case. The court of appeals, nevertheless, vacated the judgment under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the judge failed to disqualify himself pursuant to § 455(a). 
The Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the purpose of § 455(a) is to promote 
public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, the Court observed 
that such confidence “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually 
79. Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1998).
80. 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
81. Id. at 127 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
82. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) 
(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).
83. Id.
84. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might 
reasonably believe that he or she knew.” 85
The Supreme Court addressed a related issue in São Paulo State of Federa-
tive Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co. 86 The respondents sought the dis-
qualification of the district judge because his name had been associated with an 
earlier, similar suit prior to his appointment to the bench. In the earlier case, the 
judge was erroneously named in an amicus curiae brief as the president of the 
association that submitted the brief, although he had retired from that position 
six months before filing. The respondents argued that the inclusion of the judge’s 
name created an appearance of partiality on the part of the judge in the later 
case, even though the judge was unaware that his name was on the earlier brief, 
he played no part in preparing the brief, and he was only “vaguely aware” of the 
case. 87 The judge declined to disqualify himself. The court of appeals reversed. 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the court of appeals had misap-
plied the “reasonable person” standard and overlooked the requirement that the 
reasonable person be aware of all relevant facts when determining the need for 
disqualification. In the Court’s view, the fully informed, reasonable person would 
not believe that the erroneous use of the judge’s name could call into question the 
judge’s impartiality.
Courts of appeals have likewise required disqualification when a reasonable 
observer might think that judges were aware of events or information that could 
impair their impartiality—even if they were not so aware. The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, remanded a habeas case directing the judge to whom the case had been 
reassigned to provide the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the dismissal of 
four claims by the previously assigned district judge. 88 That judge had ruled on 
the habeas petition without realizing that he, as a state court judge years earlier, 
had been on the panel whose decision was now challenged.
85. Id. at 860.
86. 535 U.S. 229 (2002).
87. Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted).
88. Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989). See also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 
967 F.2d 1280, 1295 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating district judge’s lack of actual knowledge of his former 
firm’s involvement in the litigation is irrelevant).
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 b. Recurring scenarios
 i. Judge’s prior relationship with parties, witnesses, 
or lawyers
Prior relationship with a party. The First Circuit has observed that “[f]ormer affil-
iations with a party may persuade a judge not to sit; but they are rarely a basis for 
compelled [disqualification].” 89 Judges often cannot avoid some acquaintance with 
the underlying parties or events that give rise to litigation, particularly in smaller 
communities. Acquaintance, by itself, will not require disqualification. The Second 
Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify where the judge had a social relationship with 
a shareholder in a company victimized by the defendants. The judge’s relationship 
with the shareholder “ended seven or eight years prior to sentencing[,] . . . he had 
no specific knowledge of the contested facts[,] and . . . the . . . allegations [re-
garding the judge’s friend’s restaurant] were not outcome-determinative in these 
proceedings.” 90 The Second Circuit also upheld a refusal to disqualify where the 
defendant had a remote (but adversarial) business relationship with the judge’s 
husband. “[I]t requires too much speculation to convert [the husband’s] alleged 
past frustrated dealings with [the defendant] into any interest, financial or other-
wise, in the outcome of [the defendant’s] unrelated criminal trial.” 91
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that a judge’s penchant for strip 
clubs required him to disqualify himself from a case in which a strip club was a 
party. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the judge did not frequent the club 
in question. 92 In a related vein, the D.C. Circuit ruled that disqualification was 
unnecessary where the judge and a party shared an interest in glass art and were 
co-donors (with others) of a glass sculpture to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 93
Some personal relationships, however, are so friendly or antagonistic as to 
require disqualification. The Sixth Circuit reversed a failure to disqualify in a 
sex discrimination suit where, in pretrial proceedings, the judge stated that he 
personally knew one of the people accused of discrimination and that “he is an 
honorable man and I know he would never intentionally discriminate against 
anybody.” 94 “Once the district court expressed his ardent sentiments . . . the 
objective appearance of impartiality vanished.” 95 Similarly, the Second Circuit 
89. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).
90. United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
91. United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 47–49 (2d Cir. 1998).
92. Curves, LLC v. Spalding Cty., 685 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2012).
93. Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
94. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 129.
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found disqualification necessary when the judge admitted to a prior relationship 
with the defendant that influenced his decision making. 96
In In re Faulkner, 97 the Fifth Circuit concluded that although there was no 
actual bias, the judge’s close, familial relationship with his cousin, who was inte-
gral to a number of transactions giving rise to the indictment, was sufficient to 
establish an appearance of bias. Both the judge and his cousin “describe[d] their 
relationship as more like that of ‘brother and sister’; she is the godmother to one 
of his children.” 98
In another Fifth Circuit case, the court reversed a failure to disqualify where 
there was a publicized history of “bad blood” between the defendant and a close 
personal friend of the judge. 99 While noting that friendship between the judge and 
a person with an interest in the case need not be disqualifying, here the judge’s 
friend and the defendant “were embroiled in a series of vindictive legal actions 
resulting in a great deal of publicity,” some of which involved the judge’s spouse. 100
A recurring issue has arisen with respect to litigants who stand accused of 
threatening, attacking, or killing federal judges. The cases are in general accord 
that if the presiding judge is among those targeted by the alleged assailant, 
disqualification is appropriate under § 455(a). Thus, where the alleged assailant 
targeted a courthouse (rather than an individual judge) the Seventh Circuit 
determined that all judges presiding in the circuit where the courthouse was 
situated at the time of the attack should disqualify themselves. 101 Likewise, where 
the alleged assailant targeted judges within the circuit generally, the Eleventh 
Circuit decided that all judges presiding in the circuit when the attack occurred 
would disqualify themselves. 102
On the other hand, when the assigned judge is not among those targeted, dis-
qualification may be unnecessary. A defendant was accused of threatening three 
California district judges who handled his pro se cases. The Ninth Circuit de-
clined to disqualify the district judge assigned to hear the case because he was not 
96. United States v. Toohey, 448 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2006).
97. 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1998).
98. Id. at 718.
99. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 157.
101. In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(mandating recusal where federal judge’s chambers were damaged by Oklahoma City bombing of 
federal building a block away).
102. United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992).
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among the defendant’s intended victims. 103 Similarly, in a habeas petition filed 
twenty years after the attack at issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that disqualifica-
tion was necessary only for those judges who were on the bench and in the circuit 
at the time of the attack. 104 These cases are distinct from the cases (discussed in 
Section II.B.1.b.iv) in which a party threatens a judge in a strategic move to force 
disqualification.
Courts distinguish personal or otherwise direct relationships between judg-
es and parties—which sometimes give rise to a need for disqualification—from 
shared affiliations or characteristics among judges and parties, which, by them-
selves, are insufficient to warrant disqualification. Shared religious affiliation, for 
example, is insufficient to justify disqualification. In Bryce v. Episcopal Church in 
the Diocese of Colorado, 105 the Tenth Circuit rejected the assertion that disqualifi-
cation was necessary simply because the judge was a member of the same religion 
as the defendants. The court found that the plaintiff ’s argument that the judge’s 
subscription to the same belief system as the defendant was tenuous and mere 
“associational bias,” rendering it insufficient to necessitate disqualification. 106
Likewise, shared political affiliation is not enough, by itself, to require disqual-
ification. In Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 107 the Tenth Circuit rejected the plain-
tiff ’s argument that disqualification was necessary because the judge and a litigant 
shared a partisan affiliation in a politically charged case. The court explained, “an 
inescapable part of our system of government [is] that judges are drawn primarily 
from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs.” 108
Similarly, a judge’s sexual orientation is not enough to disqualify a judge from 
hearing cases in which a party is advocating in support of rights that could inure 
to the benefit of people who share the judge’s orientation. The Ninth Circuit held 
that a district judge was not disqualified from ruling on the constitutionality of a 
state ban on same-sex marriage simply because he was in a long-term, same-sex 
relationship (the Supreme Court, however, subsequently vacated the decision on 
the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing). 109
103. Clemens v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179–80 
(9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2016) (district judge and 
magistrate judge were not required to disqualify on grounds that they belonged to the same court as 
the magistrate judge whom the defendant attempted to have murdered).
104. In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2014).
105. 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 660.
107. 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003).
108. Id. at 645.
109. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
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Courts have reached the same conclusions when confronted with requests to 
disqualify on the basis of the judge’s race or gender. In MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group 
Equipment Financing, Inc., 110 a defendant moved for an Asian judge to disqualify 
himself because the defendant had been publicly critical of a prominent Asian 
man. The Second Circuit opined that “it is intolerable for a litigant, without any 
factual basis, to suggest that a judge cannot be impartial because of his or her 
race and political background.” 111
In a district court case where the judge’s impartiality was challenged because 
of her gender, the judge denied the motion for disqualification.
The assertion, without more, that a judge who . . . happens to be of the 
same sex as a plaintiff in a suit alleging sex discrimination on the part of 
a law firm, is, therefore, so biased that he or she could not hear the case, 
comes nowhere near the standards required for [recusation]. Indeed, if 
background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient 
grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case. 112
There is authority for declining to disqualify when the judge’s friend is a 
public official who is sued in an official (as opposed to a personal) capacity. In 
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 113 Justice Scalia 
declined to disqualify himself from hearing a case in which Vice President Dick 
Cheney was a named party after Justice Scalia went on a hunting trip with the 
vice president while the case was pending before the Supreme Court. Justice 
Scalia emphasized that the suit in question was filed against the vice president 
in his official, as distinguished from his personal, capacity, and explained the 
importance of that distinction:
[W]hile friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where the personal 
fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditional-
ly not been a ground for recusal where official action is at issue, no matter 
how important the official action was to the ambitions or the reputation 
of the Government officer. 114
On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which the ties between 
the judge and the public official are so close, and the consequences of a ruling 
adverse to the official are so dire, that disqualification is appropriate regardless 
of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued. In United States v. Bobo, 115 
an Alabama district judge disqualified himself from hearing a case of interest 
110. 157 F.3d 956 (2d Cir. 1998).
111. Id. at 963.
112. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
113. 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.).
114. Id. at 916.
115. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
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to the governor because the judge had previously attended private functions 
endorsing the governor’s candidacy. Although the governor was not a party in 
the case, the outcome of the case could have affected the governor’s reelection. 
To avoid an appearance of bias, the district court concluded that disqualification 
was appropriate.
Prior relationship with a witness. As with parties, a judge’s mere acquaintance or 
familiarity with a witness does not require disqualification. In Fletcher v. Conoco 
Pipe Line Co., 116 the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary even though 
the judge maintained a thirty-six-year friendship with a fact witness for the 
plaintiff and remained a client of the witness’s law firm in an unrelated, ongoing 
matter. The court found this relationship insufficient to overcome a presumption of 
impartiality. In In re Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 117 the Federal Circuit ruled, 
in the context of a mandamus action, that the movant “had not met its burden of 
showing that the judge clearly abused his discretion in not disqualifying” 118 when a 
close personal friend of the judge testified as a witness. The court emphasized that 
“we are not reviewing the matter de novo. We do not review to determine whether 
we would recuse in such circumstances. Instead, we are only to review whether the 
judge abused his discretion in declining to disqualify himself.” 119
On the other hand, in some cases disqualification may be necessary. In 
United States v. Kelly, 120 the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge improperly 
failed to disqualify himself when, among other things, a close personal friend was 
a key defense witness. The judge had expressed concern on the record that he 
might “bend over backwards to prove he lacked favoritism” toward the witness, 
and that a guilty verdict might “jeopardize his wife’s friendship” with the witness’s 
wife. 121 These “profound doubts about the propriety of continuing . . . on the case 
. . . should have been resolved in favor of disqualification.” 122
Prior relationship with an attorney. While a judge’s acquaintance with one of the 
attorneys does not ordinarily require disqualification, there are cases where the 
extent of intimacy, or other circumstances, renders disqualification necessary. 
In United States v. Murphy, 123 the Seventh Circuit concluded that a judge should 
have disqualified himself where he and the prosecuting attorney were close 
116. 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003).
117. 166 F. App’x 490 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 492.
119. Id.
120. 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 738.
122. Id. at 745.
123. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
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friends and planned to vacation together immediately after the trial. The court 
noted that “friendships among judges and lawyers are common” and “a judge 
need not disqualify himself just because a friend—even a close friend—appears 
as a lawyer.” 124 Yet here the extent of intimacy was “unusual,” and an objective 
observer might reasonably doubt the judge’s impartiality where the judge “was 
such a close friend of the prosecutor that the families of both were just about to 
take a joint vacation.” 125
By the same token, a judge’s antipathy toward a lawyer is not enough, by itself, 
to require disqualification, unless it casts doubt on the judge’s impartiality toward 
the lawyer’s client. As the Tenth Circuit opined in United States v. Ritter, 126 “bias 
in favor of or against an attorney can certainly result in bias toward the party. 
Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned in relationship to the party.” 127 Even then, however, circumstances 
can change. In Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 128 the district judge 
had previously disqualified himself from prior cases “because of his feeling that 
he might be biased against counsel.” 129 When the judge declined to disqualify 
himself from a later case in which the attorney entered an appearance, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling: “Tempers do cool, and anger does dissipate. 
Prior recusals, without more, do not objectively demonstrate an appearance of 
partiality.” 130
The Eleventh Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified himself 
where his law clerk’s father—who himself had been the judge’s law clerk—was a 
partner in the law firm representing one of the parties. 131 The court nevertheless 
found the failure to disqualify harmless error in this case. 132
Similarly, the First Circuit held that refusal to disqualify was “probably” 
improper where, during pendency of the action, the judge was represented in an 
unrelated matter by a partner in a firm that was involved in the case before the 
124. Id. at 1537.
125. Id. at 1538. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit chose not to reverse because the defendant’s 
disqualification motion was inexcusably untimely. Id. at 1541.
126. 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976).
127. Id. at 463.
128. 949 F.2d 382 (11th Cir. 1991).
129. Id. at 384.
130. Id.
131. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988). See also First Interstate Bank of Ariz. 
v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that when firm representing party 
hires law clerk of presiding judge, judge must make sure law clerk ceases further involvement in case).
132. Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527.
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judge. 133 Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court did not resolve 
the question on the merits, but remarked:
Most observers would agree that a judge should not hear a case argued by 
an attorney who, at the same time, is representing the judge in a personal 
matter. Although the appearance of partiality is attenuated when the law-
yer appearing before the judge is a member of the same law firm as the 
judge’s personal counsel, but not the same individual, many of the same 
cautionary factors are still in play. This principle would seem to have par-
ticular force where, as here, the law firm is small and the judge’s lawyer is 
a name partner. 134
Problems concerning a judge’s relationship with counsel become acute when 
personal and financial relationships are entangled. As a state judge, G. Thomas 
Porteous, Jr., often solicited friends and former colleagues in the Louisiana Bar 
for money to pay personal gambling and other debts, and received monies from 
two of those same lawyers in exchange for court-appointed “curatorships.” 135 
After becoming a federal judge, Porteous declined to disqualify himself from a 
case in which a party was represented by one of those same two lawyers from 
whom he had received thousands of dollars over the years. While that case was 
under advisement, Porteous solicited that lawyer for additional money. Although 
there is no indication that Judge Porteous was soliciting a bribe, his refusal to 
disqualify himself from hearing the case under these circumstances gave rise 
to the first of four articles of impeachment voted against him by a unanimous 
House of Representatives. The Senate convicted him on the same article—
Article I: engaging in a pattern of conduct incompatible with the trust and 
confidence placed in him as a federal judge.
Likewise, problems arise when judges explore postjudicial employment with 
lawyers or law firms that enter an appearance before the judge. In In re Continen-
tal Airlines Corp., 136 a law firm representing one of the parties appearing before 
the judge was considering the judge for employment but did not communicate 
its interest to the judge until the day after the judge awarded the firm’s lawyers 
$700,000 in legal fees. The Fifth Circuit, quoting from Liljeberg, acknowledged 
that § 455(a) “does not call upon judges to perform the impossible;” 137 hence, the 
judge was not “required to stand recused before discovering that he was being 
133. In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 1260 n.4 (citations omitted).
135. See John Conyers, Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, H.R. Rep. No. 111-427 (2010); and John Conyers, 
Impeaching G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1031, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010).
136. 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 1262 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988)).
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considered for employment.” 138 Once the judge received an offer of employment 
and became aware of the firm’s interest, however, he was “required to take the 
steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.” 139 In this case 
that meant “either . . . reject[ing] the offer outright, or, if he seriously desired to 
consider accepting the offer, st[anding] recused and vacat[ing] the rulings made 
shortly before the offer was made.” 140
In Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillan, 141 a federal district judge who was contemplating 
resigning from the bench and returning to private practice spoke to a recruiter 
who agreed to contact law firms on the judge’s behalf. Although the recruiter did 
not use the judge’s name, it was generally known in the legal community that this 
was the only judge who was contemplating resignation. Two of the firms that were 
contacted represented opposing parties in an action pending before the judge, but 
the judge denied a motion to disqualify. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ruled that 
the judge had acted improperly in denying the motion. According to the court, 
although there was no indication of actual bias or favoritism toward either of the 
law firms, there was, to an objective observer, an appearance of partiality that was 
disqualifying. 142 The court explained that disqualification is necessary whenever 
a judge is in negotiations—even preliminary and tentative negotiations—for 
employment with a lawyer or law firm appearing before the judge. 143 The Judicial 
Conference subsequently issued an advisory opinion admonishing judges to 
refrain from negotiations if the firm’s cases before the court are “so frequent and 
so numerous that the judge’s recusal in those cases (which would be required) 
would adversely affect the litigants or would have an impact on the court’s ability 
to handle its dockets.” 144
Disqualification questions sometimes arise when a party is represented 
by a lawyer from the judge’s former firm. Disqualification is automatic under 
138. Continental Airlines, 901 F.2d at 1262.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1262–63. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the violation of §  455(a) constituted 
harmless error. But see In re Continental Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1461–64 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling, on 
different order in same litigation, that failure to disqualify was not harmless error; explaining that 
prior order was subject to de novo review, which enabled appellate court to protect parties from 
injustice resulting from failure to disqualify, whereas here, order was subject to “abuse of discretion” 
standard, which did not afford parties adequate safeguards).
141. 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985).
142. Id. at 461.
143. Id. Cf. Anderson v. United States, 754 A.2d 920 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000) (disqualification 
unnecessary when news article mentioned that judge was potential candidate for federal prosecutor’s 
position; no showing that judge had sought position).
144. Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 84 (June 2009).
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§  455(b)(2) only if the judge was affiliated with the firm at the time the firm 
was handling the matter now before the court. But relationships between judges 
and lawyers at judges’ former firms can remain close long after matters pending 
during the judge’s tenure at the firm have been resolved. For that reason, some 
judges choose to disqualify themselves from hearing matters argued by lawyers 
at their former firms for a period of years. 145 With the exception of isolated, 
unusually close friendships discussed above, however, relationships between 
judges and lawyers at their former firms naturally dissipate over time. In Patterson 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 146 the plaintiffs moved for disqualification because the judge 
had previously been employed by the law firm that represented the defendants. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary because the 
judge had terminated his relationship with the firm thirty years earlier. 
When relatives rather than friends appear as counsel, the issue is ordinarily 
resolved by § 455(b)(5). Sometimes § 455(a) is used to fill gaps. In In re Hatcher, 147 
the Seventh Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the judge’s son, a third-
year law student, had assisted the government in the prosecution of a defendant 
in a case arising from the same circumstances as that of the present defendant. 
Although the cases were formally separate proceedings, “they are both compo-
nent parts of one large prosecution of the continuing criminal enterprise. . . . 
Outside observers have no way of knowing how much information the judge’s son 
acquired about that broader prosecution while working on the . . . case.” 148 The 
court emphasized that a judge whose son is an assistant U.S. attorney need not 
disqualify himself from all cases in which the United States is a party, or even 
those cases where the son prosecuted a case bearing some relationship to the case 
before the judge. “This is instead the rare case where the earlier proceedings were 
so close to the case now before the judge that disqualification under § 455(a) was 
the only permissible option.” 149
145. See Financial Settlement and Disqualification on Resignation from Law Firm, Advisory Op. 
No. 24 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009) (recommending that judges 
consider a recusal period of at least two years, recognizing that there will be circumstances where a 
longer period is more appropriate).
146. 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003).
147. 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
148. Id. at 638.
149. Id.
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Former clerks appearing as counsel before judges for whom they worked 
presents a recurring issue. The First Circuit has noted that this issue is often 
addressed by the imposition of moratoriums:
It is common knowledge in the profession that former law clerks practice 
regularly before judges for whom they once clerked. Courts often have 
prophylactic rules that forbid a former law clerk from appearing in that 
court for a year or more after the clerkship. 150
When the judge’s current law clerk has a possible conflict of interest, the Elev-
enth Circuit notes that “it is the clerk, not the judge who must be disqualified.” 151 
In a case involving medical malpractice, the plaintiff had moved to disqualify the 
judge because the judge’s law clerk used to work for the law firm representing 
some of the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that disqualification was not 
required under § 455(a) since the judge had screened the law clerk from the case 
and assigned the matter to another law clerk. 152 The court reasoned that since 
“precedent approves the isolation of a law clerk who has accepted future employ-
ment with counsel appearing before the court[,] it follows that isolating a law 
clerk should also be acceptable when the clerk’s former employer appears before 
the court.” 153 If a disqualified clerk is screened from substantive responsibilities 
but performs ministerial tasks in relation to the case, the Eighth Circuit and the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia have ruled that the judge’s disqual-
ification is unnecessary. 154
 ii. Judge’s conduct in judicial proceedings
“Extrajudicial source” doctrine and its limits. The authority for the extrajudicial 
source doctrine started with United States v. Grinnell Corp., 155 which predated the 
1974 amendments to § 455. The Supreme Court said that “[t]he alleged bias and 
prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source . . . other 
150. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir. 1997).
151. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. American Bank & 
Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)).
152. Id. at 1100.
153. Id. at 1102 (internal citation omitted). See also Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 
1297, 1312–13 (10th Cir. 2015) (§ 455(a) satisfied by prompt screening of law clerk whose husband 
was hired by defendant’s insurance company to watch the trial); Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of 
Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 612-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (§ 455(a) satisfied by screening clerk who attended bible 
study with important witness).
154. United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Cabrera, 134 F. Supp. 3d 
439, 451-52 (D.D.C. 2015).
155. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” 156 The Court 
ruled that disqualification was unnecessary because “[a]ny adverse attitudes 
that [the judge] evinced toward the defendants were based on his study of the 
depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to make.” 157 This 
so-called “extrajudicial source” doctrine is born of the common-sense view that 
ordinarily the circumstances suggesting or creating the appearance of partiality 
cannot reasonably be derived from information revealed in the normal course 
of litigation because it is natural for judges to form attitudes about litigants 
and issues before the court as the facts unfold, and no reasonable person would 
question the impartiality of judges who do. As the Supreme Court explained later, 
in Liteky v. United States:
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be 
exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be 
a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable 
for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced 
were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, 
and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion 
of the judge’s task. 158
The Liteky Court added, however, that “[i]t is wrong in theory, though it may 
not be too far off the mark as a practical matter,” 159 to say that disqualification 
for bias requires an extrajudicial source. Rather, an extrajudicial source “is the 
only common basis [for disqualification], but not the exclusive one.” 160 The Court 
referred to two different scenarios when disqualification follows from remarks 
made during judicial proceedings: when the remarks reveal an extrajudicial bias, 
and when the remarks reveal an excessive bias arising from information acquired 
during judicial proceedings. Comments judges make during trial—even remarks 
that are hostile toward “counsel, the parties, or their cases[—]ordinarily do not 
support a bias or partiality challenge.” 161 Such judicial remarks, however, can “re-
veal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if 
they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judg-
ment impossible.” 162 The Court emphasized that bias that arises from what the 
judge learns in the courtroom must be truly excessive to warrant disqualification: 
“A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized 
156. Id. at 583.
157. Id.
158. 510 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1994).
159. Id. at 551.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 555.
162. Id.
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as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice,’” the Court reasoned, “because, even though it springs from 
the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display 
clear inability to render fair judgment.” 163
Comments on parties or issues in the pending case. The general rule is that re-
marks a judge makes in the course of ongoing judicial proceedings—remarks 
that are in the nature of reactions to what the judge has observed—do not war-
rant disqualification. 164 This rule is consistent with Liteky and the extrajudicial 
source doctrine.
In In re Huntington Commons Associates, 165 the district court had stated that 
“any predisposition this court has in this matter is a result of things that have 
taken place in this very courtroom.” 166 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the dis-
trict court’s acknowledgment of a “predisposition” was not “remotely sufficient 
evidence of the required ‘deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would 
render fair judgment impossible.’” 167
Similarly, in In re Marshall, 168 a bankruptcy court ruled that the media’s 
characterization of the court’s remarks from the bench as hostile to the creditor’s 
claims was insufficient to require disqualification. The court noted that in litiga-
tion, courts are likely to form opinions about parties and that an adverse ruling 
in a prior, related case is insufficient to require disqualification. While the court 
made some negative comments about the creditor, the court concluded, consis-
tent with Liteky, that the comments were not so antagonistic as to show that the 
judge was unable to judge the matter fairly. 169
In In re Mann, 170 disqualification was again unwarranted where, during a sta-
tus hearing with the petitioner, the judge “expressed skepticism about the likeli-
hood that a Rule 60(b) motion, filed fourteen years after entry of an order, would 
163. Id. at 551.
164. See, e.g., In re City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2015) (comments critical of 
police in stop-and-frisk case not enough to warrant disqualification); In re Steward, 828 F.3d 672, 
682 (8th Cir. 2016) (party not entitled to recusal merely because a judge is “exceedingly ill disposed” 
toward them, where judge’s “knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily 
acquired in the course of the proceedings’”); United States v. McChesney, 871 F.3d 801, 808 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“[J]ocular comments are no basis for recusal.”).
165. 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).
166. Id. at 158.
167. Id. at 159 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556).
168. 291 B.R. 855 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003).
169. Id. at 860.
170. 229 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
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be granted.” 171 The Seventh Circuit held, “That comment, standing alone, is not 
enough to prove an improper motive.” 172 The judge had also told the petitioner 
“he harbored no animosity towards her and would therefore consider the merits 
of her claim.” 173
In re Chevron U.S.A. 174 was a more difficult case, in which the district judge 
made race-related remarks in the courtroom, including a statement rejecting a 
study as illegitimate because it was conducted by Caucasians. The Fifth Circuit 
characterized the remarks as “unfortunate, grossly inappropriate, and deserving 
of close and careful scrutiny.” 175 While the court found that the district judge’s 
comments created “a reasonable perception of bias or prejudice,” it also found 
that they did not “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as 
to make fair judgment impossible,” 176 which, in its view, was required by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky before in-court statements would require 
disqualification. Observing that the litigation was near completion, the court 
declined to issue a writ of mandamus. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit did not appear 
to distinguish between in-court statements in which a judge arguably acquired an 
excessive bias from information received during judicial proceedings (to which 
the quoted passage from Liteky pertained) and in-court statements that revealed 
extrajudicial bias, arguably at issue here.
It is not uncommon for judges, at sentencing, to express outrage at defen-
dants’ conduct or at defendants themselves, or a desire to see defendants severely 
punished. Ordinarily, none of this is grounds for disqualification. 177 Although de-
cided before Liteky, United States v. Barry 178 illustrates the relevant principle. At 
sentencing, the trial judge claimed that jurors who voted to acquit the defendant 
171. Id. at 658.
172. Id. at 659.
173. Id. at 658.
174. 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997).
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id. at 165 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Minard, 856 F.3d 555, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2017) (disqualification not 
required when judge commented on victim impact statement: “It happened to me, too, when my kids 
were little, so I know exactly what you’re talking about”); United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 62–63 
(1st Cir. 2009) (judge’s statement, made prior to defendant’s sentencing and in different but related 
case, that defendant was a thoroughly corrupt police officer did not require judge to recuse himself 
because opinion was based on facts introduced in proceedings); United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 
1243, 1277–78 (10th Cir. 2000) (disqualification not required where district judge made remarks about 
defendant’s character during sentencing); United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(disqualification not necessary despite judge’s “unfortunate comment” that he wanted defendant to 
“die in prison”).
178. 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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on several charges “will have to answer to themselves and to their fellow citi-
zens.” 179 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “this statement may indicate that the 
court thought appellant was guilty of more counts than he was convicted of” but 
“there is no indication that the court reached this conclusion based on anything 
other than its participation in the case.” 180
The Tenth Circuit upheld a refusal to disqualify, even though the trial judge 
opined pretrial that “the obvious thing that’s going to happen . . . is that [the 
defendant is] going to get convicted.” 181 The court believed the judge merely ex-
pressed a view of what was likely to happen from what he had observed in the 
case: “Nothing in the remark indicates that the judge was unable or unwilling to 
carry out his responsibilities impartially.” 182
In a Ninth Circuit case, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying a motion to disqualify based on his criticism of the government’s initial 
failure to charge the defendant with carrying a weapon during the commission of 
a robbery. At a status conference, the judge had commented that the government’s 
omission of the gun count was “absurd” and “asinine,” and told counsel to “[s]
hare that with your head of [the] criminal [division].” 183 The Ninth Circuit found 
that the judge’s comments did not rise to the level required for disqualification 
under § 455(a), stating that “[a] judge’s views on legal issues may not serve as the 
basis for motions to disqualify.” 184
As the Supreme Court’s opinion in Liteky notes, there are times when the 
comments a judge makes in court are so excessive as to trigger the need for 
disqualification. 185 In Unites States v. Whitman, 186 the Sixth Circuit remanded the 
sentencing of a criminal defendant to a different trial judge after the original 
judge engaged in a “lengthy harangue” of the defense attorney that “had the 
unfortunate effect of creating the impression that the impartial administration of 
the law was not his primary concern.” 187 However, there was no evidence that the 
judge was actually biased in this case.
179. Id. at 1341.
180. Id.
181. United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995).
182. Id. at 1416. See also United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding no abuse 
of discretion in denying motion to disqualify where, during sentencing hearing, district judge became 
frustrated with defendant and counsel, and made “testy” remarks about defendant’s credibility). 
183. United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000).
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 882 (9th Cir. 1980)).
185. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
186. 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 626–27.
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In United States v. Antar, 188 the trial judge commented during a sentencing 
hearing on the amount of restitution he might award: “My object in this case from 
day one has always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a 
result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others.” 189 The Third Circuit 
held that the judge’s remark reflected a mindset that required disqualification. 
The district judge “told the parties that his goal in the criminal case, from the 
beginning, was something other than what it should have been and, indeed, was 
improper.” 190 
It is difficult to imagine a starker example of when opinions formed 
during the course of judicial proceedings display a high degree of antag-
onism against a criminal defendant. After all, the best way to effectuate 
the district judge’s goal would have been to ensure that the government 
got as free a road as possible towards a conviction, which then would give 
the judge the requisite leverage to order a large amount of restitution. 191
The court noted the trial judge’s reputation for fairness and acknowledged 
the perils of focusing on one sentence out of volumes of transcripts. Yet “in 
determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify him or herself, our focus 
must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer. If there is an appearance of 
partiality, that ends the matter.” 192
In United States v. Franco-Guillen, 193 the district judge withdrew the defen-
dant’s guilty plea and set the matter over for trial after the defendant objected to 
certain information in the presentence report. In the course of the hearing, the 
judge said, “I will not put up with this from these Hispanics or anybody else, any 
other defendants”; 194 and again,
I’m not putting up with this. I’ve got another case involving a Hispanic de-
fendant who came in here and told me that he understood what was going 
on and that everything was fine and now I’ve got a 2255 from him saying 
he can’t speak English. And he is lying because he told me he could. 195
The Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded the case for reas-
signment to a different judge, with the explanation, “The judge’s statements on the 
record would cause a reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality, 
188. 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
189. Id. at 573.
190. Id. at 576.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision).
194. Id. at 717.
195. Id. at 718.
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without regard to whether the judge actually harbored bias against Franco-Guillen 
on account of his Hispanic heritage.” 196
Finally, in United States v. Bergrin, 197 the Third Circuit ordered a district judge’s 
disqualification under § 455(a) after the judge repeatedly expressed “discomfort” 
with the indictment, which combined an array of witness tampering counts un-
der the umbrella of a RICO charge and which the Third Circuit noted “is exactly 
what” RICO allows. 198 The Third Circuit concluded that “in light of the District 
Court’s statements—both before and after the earlier appeal in this case—about 
a perceived unfairness in trying the various witness-tampering counts together, 
we believe that the Court’s ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]’” 199
Comments on parties or issues in prior judicial proceedings. The general rule that 
bias or prejudice must be derived from an extrajudicial source and that com-
ments based on a judge’s observations in pending proceedings will not ordinarily 
form the basis for disqualification applies equally to comments a judge makes in 
earlier proceedings. In Liteky v. United States, 200 the Supreme Court made two 
relevant observations. First, it stated that in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 201 it 
“clearly meant by ‘extrajudicial source’ a source outside the judicial proceeding at 
hand—which would include as extrajudicial sources earlier judicial proceedings 
conducted by the same judge.” 202 This observation, however, must be understood 
in the larger context of the opinion as a whole, in which the Court rejected rigid 
adherence to an extrajudicial source doctrine (which it characterized not as a 
“doctrine” but as a “factor” 203). 
The Court’s second, and ultimately more important, observation—regardless 
of whether prior proceedings are characterized as an “extrajudicial source”—was 
that for purposes of disqualification analysis, a judge’s comments in pending and 
past proceedings are on equal footing:
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceed-
ings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they 
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible. 204
196. Id. at 719.
197. 682 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2012).
198. Id. at 284.
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 226 (3d Cir. 2007)).
200. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
201. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
202. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 545.
203. Id. at 555.
204. Id.
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In Liteky, the defendant moved to disqualify the judge on the ground that, 
during an earlier criminal trial, the judge displayed “impatience, disregard for 
the defense and animosity” 205 toward the defendant. He cited various comments 
by the judge, including admonitions of defense witnesses and counsel as well as 
certain trial rulings. The Court rejected the contention that disqualification was 
in order: “All occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied 
upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated 
and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” 206
In Frey v. EPA, 207 the Seventh Circuit observed that “information a judge has 
gleaned from prior judicial proceedings is not considered extrajudicial and sim-
ply does not require recusal.” 208 Similarly, in United States v. Pulido, 209 the First 
Circuit concluded that a judge’s statement—made prior to the defendant’s sen-
tencing and in a different but related case—that the defendant was a “thoroughly 
corrupt police officer” did not require the judge to recuse himself, since that 
opinion was based on facts introduced in the proceedings. 210 In Town of Norfolk 
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 211 a district judge had overseen compli-
ance with a city plan to clean up the Boston Harbor. In a subsequent case about 
locating a landfill pursuant to the Clean Water Act, a party moved for the judge’s 
disqualification, and the judge refused. The First Circuit upheld the refusal, not-
ing that “a judge is sometimes required to act against the backdrop of official 
positions he took in other related cases. A judge cannot be replaced every time a 
case presents an issue with which the judge’s prior official decisions and positions 
may have a connection.” 212
Ex parte communications. Trial courts should be wary of ex parte contacts, which 
can result in reversals and disqualification. Ex parte contacts contributed to the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision to remand a case to a different trial judge in United States 
v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I). 213 The court was “concerned by the district judge’s 
205. Id. at 542.
206. Id. at 556.
207. 751 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2014).
208. Id. at 472.
209. 566 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2009).
210. Id. at 62–63.
211. 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992).
212. Id. at 1462.
213. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (contacts included argumentative letters and a redacted exhibit). 
See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding judge’s secret interviews 
with reporters during course of trial violated Code of Conduct, Canon 3A(4), which prohibits “ex parte 
communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending . . . proceeding”).
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acceptance of ex parte submissions” and indicated that “the appropriate course 
would have been simply to refuse to accept any ex parte communications.” 214
In a Sixth Circuit case, the appellant alleged that the trial judge had sent his 
law clerk to gather evidence and that therefore the judge should have disqualified 
himself. The court observed that while “not every ex parte communication to the 
trial court requires reversal,” 215 the allegation here was sufficiently serious as to 
require a remand to determine its truth.
Where the trial judge met ex parte with a panel of experts and prohibited 
counsel from discovering the contents of the meeting, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed a refusal to disqualify. 216 In a similar situation, however, the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a refusal to disqualify because the judge had “explained to Plaintiffs’ coun-
sel the ministerial nature of these ex parte discussions before they took place” 
and “personally extended to Plaintiffs’ counsel an invitation to attend all of these 
meetings.” 217 Counsel chose not to attend and “failed to register any objection to 
the meetings at that time.” 218
Conduct in relation to guilty pleas. In Halliday v. United States, 219 the First Cir-
cuit implied that disqualification is sometimes appropriate when a judge faces a 
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate a conviction with respect to which they 
imposed the sentence. In a postconviction motion, the defendant argued that a 
different judge should have conducted the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 
plea agreement hearing. Since the § 2255 challenge would have forced the same 
judge to evaluate his own actions, the First Circuit found it preferable (but not re-
quired) for a different judge to conduct the § 2255 evidentiary hearing. The First 
Circuit has clarified that Halliday is limited to cases in which the § 2255 motion 
accuses the sentencing judge of violating Rule 11. 220
Where a judge’s conduct during plea negotiations violated Rule 11, and a de-
fendant subsequently pled not guilty and was convicted, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial but was entitled to resentencing 
214. Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at 1464.
215. Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1980).
216. Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996). See also In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d 
Cir. 2004). The judge had assembled an asbestos advisory panel. The panel members represented 
clients—in unrelated asbestos bankruptcy proceedings—who would likely have claims against the 
companies involved in the consolidated litigation. The Third Circuit ordered disqualification in light 
of the judge’s ex parte communication with the panel.
217. Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 468 (6th Cir. 1999).
218. Id.
219. 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).
220. See, e.g., Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989).
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before a new judge. 221 The Eighth Circuit concurred that when cases are remand-
ed after a court of appeals finds a Rule 11 violation, judges need not disqualify 
themselves from the subsequent trial, though disqualification might be in order 
for sentencing if a defendant is convicted. 222
Similarly, the Third Circuit required resentencing before a new judge when 
the trial judge had communicated his preference to defense counsel that the 
defendant plead guilty and indicated that the defendant would receive a lighter 
sentence if he did. 223 After the defendant went to trial and was convicted, the 
Third Circuit vacated the sentence because a reasonable person might conclude 
that “the judge’s attitude as to sentence was based at least to some degree on the 
fact that the case had to be tried, an exercise which the judge seemed anxious 
to avoid.” 224
Conduct reflecting that the judge took personal offense. In assorted cases, disqual-
ification has been deemed necessary where trial judges took unusual actions, or 
made comments, that indicated they took personal offense. In In re Johnson, 225 a 
bankruptcy trustee had been held in contempt because the trial judge thought 
the trustee had misrepresented the judge’s conduct to another judge in order to 
obtain a favorable court order. At the contempt proceedings, the judge declared 
that he was “prejudiced in this matter,” had “all but made up his mind,” was “not 
in the least inclined to be neutral,” and would serve as “complaining witness, 
prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.” 226 The Fifth Circuit held that the judge 
clearly “considered [the party’s] actions to be a personal affront to his authority” 
such that a reasonable person would doubt his impartiality. 227
Trial judges occasionally appear insulted when their rulings are challenged 
by litigants. The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify when the judge had 
responded to the petitioners’ mandamus motion for disqualification by writing a 
lengthy letter. The judge, “in responding to the mandamus petition . . . has exhib-
ited a personal interest in the litigation.” 228 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reversed 
a conviction when the judge remarked in court that the defendant had “broken 
faith” with him by raising a certain issue on appeal following his earlier trial. 229
221. United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835–43 (5th Cir. 1981).
222. In re Larson, 43 F.2d 410, 416 (8th Cir. 1994).
223. United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989).
224. Id. at 583.
225. 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991).
226. Id. at 587.
227. Id.
228. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 1993).
229. United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981).
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On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found disqualification unnecessary 
where the judge called the motion for his disqualification by a lawyer–litigant 
“offensive,” claimed it “impugned” his integrity, and directed the party to testify 
under oath about the judge’s alleged bias because, the judge claimed, the motion 
reflected unethical behavior. 230 The judge was reacting, “albeit strongly,” to a mo-
tion brought on the eve of trial, and the Seventh Circuit believed that his com-
ments did not “reflect a bias or prejudice gained from outside the courtroom.” 231
 iii. Judge’s extrajudicial conduct
As explained in Section ii, “Extrajudicial Source” Doctrine and Its Limits, a judge 
is subject to disqualification for apparent partiality evidenced by extrajudicial 
conduct. The focus here, however, is on extrajudicial conduct that impugns im-
partiality or perceived impartiality. “Impartiality” subsumes a lack of bias toward 
a party, and perhaps open-mindedness toward the issues before the court, but it 
does not require the absence of preexisting views on the legal questions that the 
judge must decide. 232 The fact that a judge comes to a case with preexisting views 
on the legal questions presented, based on prior, extrajudicial learning, is no 
grounds for disqualification. As the Court observed in Liteky v. United States, 233 
“some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, 
the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice” to war-
rant disqualification. 234
What will require disqualification is conduct manifesting bias or prejudg-
ment. Such conduct can arise in a variety of settings.
Extrajudicial comments on pending or impending cases. The general rule against 
disqualification for in-court comments on pending cases, discussed in Section 
II.B.1.b.ii, does not apply to out-of-court comments on pending cases, for two 
related reasons. First, judges are expected to comment in open court on pending 
cases—it is an unavoidable part of the job. There is no comparable need for 
judges to opine to the media. Second, when judges take the unnecessary step 
of commenting on the merits of pending cases outside of court, they appear 
personally invested in their rulings and the outcome of the case, which is 
incompatible with their role as indifferent and impartial adjudicators. For that 
reason, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides that “[a] judge 
should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending 
230. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996).
231. Id. at 356.
232. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
233. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
234. Id. at 554.
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in any court,” subject to the exception that this prohibition “does not extend to 
public statements made in the course of the judge’s official duties.” 235
In United States v. Cooley, 236 the Tenth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify 
when the defendants were abortion protesters and the trial judge had appeared 
on national television and stated that “these people are breaking the law.” 237 The 
court observed that the judge’s TV appearance conveyed two messages. The first 
“consisted of the words actually spoken.” 238 The second “was the judge’s expres-
sive conduct in deliberately making the choice to appear in such a forum at a 
sensitive time to deliver strong views on matters which were likely to be ongoing 
before him.” 239 In the court’s view, when taken together, 
these messages unmistakably conveyed an uncommon interest and de-
gree of personal involvement in the subject matter. It was an unusual 
thing for a judge to do, and it unavoidably created the appearance that the 
judge had become an active participant in bringing law and order to bear 
on the protesters, rather than remaining as a detached adjudicator. 240
In re Boston’s Children First 241 was a case that challenged an elementary 
school’s student-assignment process on grounds of racial discrimination. Seeking 
to correct misinterpretations in press accounts unfavorably comparing her action 
in the pending matter with her action in a previous case, the district judge told 
a newspaper reporter in a phone interview—the content of which was later 
published— that the pending case was “more complex.” 242 The plaintiffs moved 
for disqualification, and the judge denied the motion. The First Circuit held that 
disqualification was necessary and granted the petitioners’ writ of mandamus 
pursuant to § 455(a). Although it found the media contact “less inflammatory 
than that in Cooley,” the court saw “the same factors at work” for three reasons. 243 
First, because the school-assignment program was a matter of significant local 
concern, the public attention and rarity of such public statements by a judge 
made it “more likely that a reasonable person [would] interpret such statements 
as evidence of bias.” 244 Second, like Cooley, the “‘appearance of partiality’ at 
issue here . . . stems from the real possibility that a judge’s statements may be 
235. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(6).
236. 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).
237. Id. at 990.
238. Id. at 995.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).
242. Id. at 166.
243. Id. at 169.
244. Id. at 170.
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misinterpreted because of the ambiguity of those statements.” 245 Finally, a judge’s 
defense of her own orders before the resolution of appeal could also create the 
appearance of partiality. 246 The court noted that its holding was “based on the 
particular events” of a “highly idiosyncratic case.” 247
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify in a case in 
which, while a jury trial was pending against an automobile company, the judge 
gave a speech at an auto torts seminar that expressed hostility toward defendants 
and defense counsel in such cases. 248
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 249 the district judge had given “secret in-
terviews to select reporters” throughout the course of the trial, requiring “that 
the fact and content of the interviews remain secret until he issued the Final 
Judgment.” 250 The interviews began to appear in press accounts immediately af-
ter the final judgment was entered. Some interviews were conducted after the 
final judgment was entered. Because the full extent of the judge’s actions did not 
become apparent until the case was on appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided to adju-
dicate Microsoft’s disqualification request even though the published interviews 
had not been admitted into evidence and no evidentiary hearing had been held 
on them. The D.C. Circuit held that the judge “breached his ethical duty under 
Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to a reporter about the merits of the case.” 251 The 
judge’s comments did not fall into one of “three narrowly drawn exceptions” un-
der the canon because the judge did not discuss “purely procedural matters” but 
actually “disclosed his views on the factual and legal matters at the heart of the 
case.” 252 The fact that the judge “may have intended to ‘educate’ the public about 
the case or to rebut ‘public misperceptions’” was not an excuse for his actions, 
and his “insistence on secrecy . . . made matters worse” because it prevented the 
245. Id.
246. Id. “Canon 3A(6) does not bar comment in final, completed cases, so long as judges refrain 
from revealing the deliberative processes and do not place in question their impartiality in similar 
future cases.” Compendium of Selected Opinions § 3.9-1(d) (2009).
247. Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 171. After receiving a petition for rehearing en banc from 
the district judge, the appeals panel sought the opinions of the three nonpanelist active judges. The 
nonpanelists agreed that the judge’s comment was “particularly unwise,” but disagreed that it required 
mandatory disqualification. Id. The panel acknowledged that this difference of view among the active 
judges indicated “the continuing need for a case-by-case determination of such issues.” Id.
248. Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 (4th Cir. 1995).
249. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
250. Id. at 108.
251. Id. at 112. Canon 3A(6), explained in Section II.B.1.b.iii, Extrajudicial Comments on Pending 
or Impending Cases, applies to cases pending before any court—state or federal, trial or appellate.
252. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 112.
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parties from raising objections or seeking disqualification before the judge issued 
a final judgment. 253
The D.C. Circuit noted that other courts of appeals had found violations of 
§ 455(a) “for judicial commentary on pending cases that seems mild in compar-
ison to what we are confronting in this case.” 254 “[W]e have not gone so far as to 
hold that every violation of Canon 3A(6) . . . inevitably destroys the appearance 
of impartiality and thus violates § 455(a).” 255 “In this case, however, . . . the line 
has been crossed,” and the judge’s comments “would lead a reasonable, informed 
observer to question the District Judge’s impartiality.” 256 Because Microsoft “nei-
ther alleged nor demonstrated that [the judge’s conduct] rose to the level of ac-
tual bias or prejudice,” the court found “no reason to presume that everything 
the District Judge did [was] suspect.” 257 The court concluded that there was no 
reason to set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law and that the appro-
priate remedy was disqualification of the judge “retroactive only to the date he 
entered the order breaking up Microsoft.” 258
In Ligon v. City of New York, 259 a racial profiling case that challenged the New 
York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” policy, the district judge agreed to 
several media interviews and made a number of public statements while the case 
was pending, “purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District Court.” 260 
The Second Circuit reassigned the case to a different judge, concluding that the 
district judge’s statements gave rise to an appearance of impropriety. 261 The 
court was criticized for its decision and issued a second opinion explaining the 
reassignment. The circuit panel referenced one article that quoted the judge as 
saying of city officials, “I know I’m not their favorite judge[,]” and other articles 
reporting that the judge “describes herself as a jurist who is skeptical of law 
enforcement, in contrast to certain of her colleagues, whom she characterizes as 
inclined to favor the government.” 262 The court explained that “interviews in which 
253. Id.
254. Id. at 114 (citing In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001) and United States v. 
Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993)).
255. Id. at 114.
256. Id. at 115.
257. Id. at 116.
258. Id.
259. 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).
260. Id. at 131.
261. Id. at 129–30.
262. Id. at 127.
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the presiding judge draws such distinctions between herself and her colleagues 
might lead a reasonable observer to question the judge’s impartiality.” 263
In contrast, disqualification has been deemed unnecessary if the judge’s ex-
trajudicial comments are sufficiently balanced to belie claims that they manifest 
bias. In United States v. Pitera, 264 the judge gave a videotaped lecture to a govern-
ment drug enforcement task force seven months before a narcotics case was tried 
but after the case had already been assigned to her. In the lecture, the judge urged 
the assembled agents and prosecutors to take certain steps to increase prospects 
for conviction in narcotics cases. The Second Circuit nevertheless upheld the re-
fusal to disqualify because the judge’s lecture “included several emphatic criti-
cisms of prosecutors that would lead a reasonable person not to question, but to 
have confidence in the [j]udge’s impartiality.” 265 In addition, the judge partici-
pated in various programs for criminal defense lawyers, and she “commendably 
lectures to a variety of trial practice seminars.” 266
Similarly, in United States v. Barry, 267 an extrajudicial comment on a pending 
case did not give rise to a perception of partiality sufficient to warrant disqualifi-
cation. After sentencing the defendant, the judge addressed a forum at Harvard 
Law School in which he spoke of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt. When the sentence was vacated on unrelated grounds and the case re-
manded for resentencing, the defendant moved for disqualification, claiming the 
judge’s remarks at Harvard created an appearance of partiality. The D.C. Circuit 
ruled, however, that because the judge’s remarks were “based on his own obser-
vations during the performance of his judicial duties,” disqualification was not 
required. 268
Attendance at party-sponsored educational seminars on issues in litigation. For 
years, educational institutions and other organizations have hosted expense-
paid educational seminars for judges on a range of issues that come before the 
courts. When seminar sponsors later appear as parties before those judges in 
cases raising issues covered in the seminars, it brings up questions of ethics and 
disqualification. As to the ethics of participating in expense-paid seminars, the 
263. Id.
264. 5 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 1993).
265. Id. at 626.
266. Id. at 627.
267. 961 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
268. Id. at 263. See also In re Wilborn, 401 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (judge’s speech at CLE 
seminar, which explained the basis of his prior decisions and those of other judges concerning the 
disclosure obligations of mortgage lenders, did not provide a basis for his disqualification).
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Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct has opined at length and 
in considerable detail. 269 As to the need to disqualify, the answer is: it depends.
The Third Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify where the trial judge in a 
mass tort asbestos case attended a scientific conference on the dangers of asbes-
tos. 270 The conference was funded in part by $50,000 from the plaintiffs’ settle-
ment fund. The request to use these funds for this purpose was approved by the 
judge. 271 The Third Circuit, in reversing, offered the following explanation:
We are convinced that a reasonable person might question [the judge’s] 
ability to remain impartial. To put it succinctly, he attended a predomi-
nantly pro-plaintiff conference on a key merits issue; the conference was 
indirectly sponsored by the plaintiffs . . . and his expenses were largely de-
frayed by the conference sponsors. . . . Moreover, he was, in his own words, 
exposed to a Hollywood-style “pre-screening” of the plaintiffs’ case. 272
The court declined to address whether any of these facts alone compelled 
disqualification because “together they create an appearance of partiality that 
mandates disqualification.” 273
The Second Circuit, in contrast, upheld a refusal to disqualify in a case 
involving a trial judge’s attendance at an expense-paid environmental seminar 
funded indirectly by Texaco. 274 After the judge attended the seminar, a lawsuit 
against Texaco that he had previously dismissed was remanded to him. The 
Second Circuit agreed with the district judge that his presence at the seminar 
did not warrant disqualification under § 455(a) because Texaco provided only a 
minor part of the funding to one of two nonprofit organizations that conducted 
the seminar and because the organizations had no connection to the case. Also, 
there was no showing that any aspect of the seminar touched on issues material 
to any claims or defense in the litigation. 275
 iv. Parties’ conduct toward judge
Parties and their lawyers sometimes behave in ways that predictably engender a 
judge’s animus, but such behavior does not trigger the need for disqualification. 
269. See Participation in a Seminar of General Character, Advisory Op. No. 3 (Judicial Conference 
Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009); Attendance at Independent Educational Seminars, 
Advisory Op. No. 67 (Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct June 2009).
270. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
271. Id. at 779.
272. Id. at 781–82.
273. Id. at 782.
274. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
275. Id. at 202.
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To hold otherwise would be to create an opportunity for parties to exhibit hostile 
behavior strategically, as a means to force disqualification. Upholding a refusal to 
disqualify where the litigant had verbally attacked the judge in public, the First 
Circuit said, “[a] party cannot force disqualification by attacking the judge and 
then claiming that these attacks must have caused the judge to be biased against 
[her].” 276 Indeed, when a party argued that the judge’s ongoing hostility toward 
him required disqualification, the Third Circuit held that the party’s own public 
hostility toward the judge (including writing a letter to a Supreme Court justice 
urging punishment of the judge) counseled against disqualification, “lest we 
encourage tactics designed to force recusal.” 277 For the same reason, the filing of a 
collateral lawsuit or other adversarial legal action against the judge will generally 
not require disqualification. 278
In upholding a refusal to disqualify when the plaintiff had sent a letter to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee opposing the judge’s nomination to the bench, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that disqualification was necessary: 
“Such a letter is probative of [the plaintiff ’s] dislike for [the judge], not the other 
way around.” 279
The courts have taken a similar approach to threats against the judge. In 
United States v. Mosby, 280 the respondent moved for disqualification on the 
grounds that he had previously threatened the judge, that the judge was made 
aware of these threats through a motion filed with the court, and that the judge 
was thus incapable of approaching the case impartially. The Eighth Circuit 
found that the judge was previously unaware of these threats and that therefore 
276. FDIC v. Sweeney, 136 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3542 at 577–78 (2d ed. 1984)). 
277. United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1414 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 
1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 992 (2018) (“[A] rule that would require recusal 
any time a litigant has been critical of a judge would create perverse incentives and enable judge 
shopping.”); United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (judge did not commit clear error 
in denying disqualification because of media and political attacks on him; to read § 455 to allow such 
disqualification “would create a moral hazard by encouraging litigants or other interested parties to 
maneuver to obtain a judge’s disqualification”).
278. See, e.g., In re Bush, 232 F. App’x 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2007) (recusal not required on grounds 
that debtor had filed civil claim against district judge, who had entered adverse ruling against debtor 
in prior case); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (recusal not required when judge was 
one of the numerous federal judges against whom plaintiff had filed suit). See also Jones v. Pittsburgh 
Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1355–56 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 
1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1976).
279. DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992).
280. 177 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 1999).
Judicial Disqualification
50 Federal Judicial Center
disqualification was unnecessary. In another Eighth Circuit case, 281 a district 
judge did not disqualify himself after a letter threatening his life was sent to a 
local newspaper. Because the judge believed the threat was an attempt to have the 
case removed to a different court with a more favorable judge and the defendant 
was incapable of carrying out the threat, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
judge properly denied the motion for disqualification. And in a case where the 
judge told the press that he was not intimidated by a party’s threats, the Second 
Circuit concluded that disqualification was unnecessary, observing that the 
judge’s statement evinced his capacity to separate his personal interests from the 
facts of the case. 282
It bears emphasis, however, that this line of cases seeks to thwart the efforts 
of parties or their counsel to engage in strategic behavior aimed at forcing dis-
qualification. Cases in which a party is independently discovered to have threat-
ened the judge’s life stand on different footing. 283 In United States v. Greenspan, 284 
the Tenth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify in the face of a threat to the 
trial judge. The court concluded that the judge should have disqualified himself 
because he “learned of the alleged threat from the FBI, and there is nothing in 
the record to suggest the threat was a ruse by the defendant in an effort to obtain 
a different judge.” 285 Moreover, the trial court had expedited sentencing in order 
to “‘get [the defendant] into the federal penitentiary system immediately, where 
he [could] be monitored more closely.’” 286 Under the circumstances, the court’s 
impartiality could reasonably be questioned. But the Tenth Circuit clarified, in 
dicta, that threats against a judge will rarely be a ground for disqualification:
[I]f a death threat is communicated directly to the judge by a defendant, 
it may normally be presumed that one of the defendant’s motivations is to 
obtain a recusal, particularly if he thereafter affirmatively seeks a recusal. 
. . . [I]f a judge concludes that recusal is at least one of the defendant’s 
objectives (whether or not the threat is taken seriously), then section 455 
will not mandate recusal because that statute is not intended to be used 
as a forum shopping statute. . . . Similarly, if a defendant were to make 
281. United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008).
282. LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Beale, 574 
F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2009) (recusal not required when threats were clearly an attempt to manipulate 
the judicial system); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (disqualification 
unnecessary when defendants repeatedly raised their aborted attempt to kill an unnamed judge in an 
effort to harass and force disqualification).
283. See Charles Gardner Geyh, James J. Alfini, Steven Lubet & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial 
Conduct and Ethics (5th ed. 2013).
284. 26 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994).
285. Id. at 1006.
286. Id. at 1005 (Appellant’s Appendix 358–59).
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multiple threats to successive judges or even to multiple judges on the 
same court, there might be some reason to suspect that the threats were 
intended as a recusal device. 287
Cases in which parties are being prosecuted for having threatened, attempt-
ed to murder, or murdered, the judge or the judge’s colleagues, ordinarily require 
disqualification and are discussed in Section II.B.1.b.i.
Judges have likewise been loath to disqualify themselves from cases in which 
a party or that party’s lawyer has been complimentary of the judge. In Sullivan v. 
Conway, 288 the defendant (a lawyer) wrote a letter to his client praising the judge. 
Sullivan, a lawyer representing himself as plaintiff, inadvertently received a copy 
of the letter, submitted it to the court, then moved for disqualification on the 
ground that the praise could influence the judge. “[T]he praise would not have 
come to [the judge’s] attention . . . had not the lawyer wishing to disqualify him 
brought it to his attention.” 289 Rejecting the argument that the judge should have 
disqualified himself, the Seventh Circuit observed that “it is improper for a lawyer 
or litigant (Sullivan being both in this case) to create the ground on which he seeks 
the recusal of the judge assigned to his case. That is arrant judge-shopping.” 290
 2. Specific grounds: § 455(b)
 a. Personal bias, prejudice, or knowledge: § 455(b)(1)
Disqualification under § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification when the judge “has 
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disput-
ed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 291
 i. Bias and prejudice
As a practical matter, parties rarely seek disqualification under § 455(b)(1) alone 
for two reasons. First, relief for actual bias may be easier to obtain under § 144 
than § 455(b)(1). 292 Section 144 requires disqualification whenever a timely and 
287. Id. at 1006. See also United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (disqualification 
not required when judge concluded there was no active threat against him; defendant had taken no 
affirmative steps toward carrying out threat).
288. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).
289. Id. at 1096.
290. Id. Accord United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990). See also In re Mann, 229 
F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2000).
291. The corollary to § 455(b)(1) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(a). 
See Appendix A.
292. This is not to imply that obtaining relief under § 144 is easy. Section 144 is discussed in section III.
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facially sufficient affidavit alleging bias is filed, whereas § 455(b)(1) requires 
disqualification “only if actual bias or prejudice is ‘proved by compelling evi-
dence.’” 293 If courts analyze a claim under § 144 and it fails, there will not be suffi-
cient evidence to meet the higher burden of proof under § 455(b)(1); if the claim 
is valid, disqualification is required under § 144, and an analysis of § 455(b)(1) 
becomes unnecessary. As a consequence, litigants often argue for disqualification 
under both statutes when alleging actual bias. Courts often conflate the analysis 
of bias under the two statutes, deciding to “view judicial interpretations of ‘per-
sonal bias or prejudice’ under § 144 as equally applicable to § 455(b)(1).” 294
Second, most litigants who file motions for disqualification for actual bias 
or partiality under § 455(b)(1) also argue that the judge’s impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned under § 455(a). Because demonstrating an appearance of 
partiality under § 455(a) is easier (and implicitly less critical of the subject judge) 
than demonstrating actual bias or prejudice, courts again often decide the issue 
on § 455(a) grounds without ever reaching § 455(b)(1).
The issue of disqualification for bias, while not a common occurrence, still 
arises occasionally. Disqualification under §  455(b)(1) requires that a litigant 
present evidence of a “negative bias or prejudice [which] must be grounded in 
some personal animus or malice that the judge harbors against him.” 295 The stan-
dard for determining if such bias exists is “whether a reasonable person would be 
convinced the judge was biased.” 296 The Fifth Circuit noted that the standard for 
finding actual bias is objective and that “it is with reference to the ‘well-informed, 
thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical and 
suspicious person’ that the objective standard is currently established.” 297
293. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779 
F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985)). The court concluded that the judge’s statement that a motion for 
disqualification was “offensive” and “‘impugn[ed]’ his integrity” was not sufficiently compelling 
evidence of an extrajudicial source of actual bias against the defendant. Id. at 355–56.
294. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d at 1202.
295. Id. at 1201.
296. Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. See also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2011); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th 
Cir. 2005); In re Community Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel 
Corp., 320 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2003); Ocasio v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 9 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2001); In re 
American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hale 
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884 (1st 
Cir. 1983).
297. Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 
F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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In Mann v. Thalacker, 298 the Eighth Circuit was unwilling to imply actual bias 
or prejudice from the judge’s own personal history. After his conviction for sexual 
abuse of a child, the defendant argued, in the context of his habeas petition, that 
the state trial judge’s own history of sexual abuse at the hands of his father should 
have caused him to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal bias. Although 
§ 455(b)(1) does not apply to the actions of a state trial judge, the court used it 
as a standard in this case. The court held that reference to the judge’s personal 
history was insufficient to establish actual bias, although it stated that the defen-
dant’s argument would have been stronger “if the abuse the judge suffered as a 
child bore a closer resemblance to the conduct with which [the defendant] was 
charged.” 299
 ii. Extrajudicial source of bias
Most circuits have adopted the requirement, based on the Supreme Court’s use of 
the extrajudicial source doctrine for § 455(a), 300 that “[b]ias against a litigant must 
. . . arise from an extrajudicial source” for disqualification under § 455(b)(1). 301 
Adverse contempt orders and other judicial rulings in the same case, for exam-
ple, are thus not, by themselves, sufficient for establishing bias for disqualifica-
tion under § 455(b)(1). 302 Explaining the application of the extrajudicial source 
doctrine to § 455(b)(1), one district court noted: “In every lawsuit, judges make 
rulings adverse to one or the other party. That these rulings may be unwelcome 
is simply too commonplace a circumstance to support an allegation of bias.” 303
The Fifth Circuit held, in Andrade v. Chojnacki, 304 that opinions formed in 
the course of the current proceedings, as well as those based on prior judicial 
proceedings, are “nearly exempt from causing recusal” and can only do so if they 
“reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 
impossible.” 305 The judge’s off-the-record insults and expressions of distaste 
for several of the parties were not enough to meet this high standard because 
298. 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2001).
299. Id. at 1097.
300. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554–55 (1994). See Section II.B.1.b.ii for a discussion of 
Liteky and the extrajudicial source doctrine as it applies to § 455(a).
301. Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. See also United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820, 831 (7th Cir. 1996).
302. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
303. Marion v. Radtke, No. 07-cv-243-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41031, at *14–15 (W.D. Wis. May 14, 
2009) (holding defendant’s motion to disqualify, which was based wholly on motions the judge made 
that were not in defendant’s favor, lacked sufficient evidence of actual bias for disqualification under 
§ 455(b)(1)).
304. 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003).
305. Id. at 462 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56).
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“expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, and even anger” will not establish the 
bias or prejudice required by § 455(b)(1). 306
In Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 307 the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the disqualification arguments of an attorney whom the trial judge had 
found in contempt several times. The attorney had repeatedly violated court or-
ders, including a confidentiality agreement, and he had misrepresented himself 
as a party’s counsel after that party had dismissed him. The Seventh Circuit found 
his argument for disqualification without merit because the attorney made “no 
attempt to establish any bias stemming from a personal relationship or prior liti-
gation,” instead relying exclusively on “rulings during the litigation, which absent 
extraordinary circumstances, are not grounds for recusal.” 308 No such extraordi-
nary circumstances were enumerated, and the court made clear that “efforts at 
courtroom administration and enforcing compliance with a court order do not 
amount to an inability to render fair judgments.” 309
Although establishing disqualifying bias on the basis of a judge’s statements 
made during judicial proceedings is difficult, it is not impossible. As the foregoing 
discussion suggests (and the Supreme Court has opined), disqualification is re-
quired in those rare circumstances in which a judge’s comments “reveal such a high 
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” 310 Thus, for 
example, in Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 311 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a judge’s 
comments during proceedings rose to the level of pervasive bias when, without a 
trial, the judge suggested that he believed the allegations against the defendant. 312
306. Id. See also United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 807 (7th Cir. 2009) (recusal not required 
when judge referred to defendant, convicted as leader of drug-trafficking street gang, as a kingpin; 
expressed doubts about defendant’s capacity to produce the briefs he submitted without help; and 
called defendant’s briefs “rude”).
307. 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002).
308. Id. at 640.
309. Id. See also United States v. Lanza-Vázquez, 799 F.3d 134, 143 (1st Cir. 2015) (judge’s pattern of 
interceding to assist with prosecution’s questions “skirted near the line,” but was ultimately a proper 
exercise of trial management, because judge generally intervened only to expedite trial after defense 
counsel’s repetitive and technical objections unnecessarily slowed pace of trial); Burley v. Gagacki, 
834 F.3d 606, 617 (6th Cir. 2016) (recusal not required for instructing plaintiffs’ counsel to use the 
question-and-answer format during cross-examination, reminding a witness to testify truthfully, 
refusing to allow a witness without personal knowledge of a document to testify about the document, 
and questioning merits of plaintiffs’ case-in-chief).
310. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56.
311. 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
312. Id. at 1192. See also Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying 
exception to extrajudicial source doctrine and finding judge’s comments in judicial context showed no 
ill will, and thus no bias or prejudice).
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 iii. Bias against nonparties
Actual bias for or against an attorney, witness, or other participant is not ordinari-
ly enough to warrant disqualification under § 455(b)(1), unless it is so extreme 
as to engender bias for or against a party. In Dembowski v. New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 313 a part-time magistrate judge was allowed to continue his rep-
resentation of a party involved in a suit in the same district in which the magis-
trate judge served his judicial function. The party seeking disqualification of the 
magistrate judge from his role as advocate alleged that the judge and jury would 
be inclined to favor the arguments of the magistrate judge because of his status as 
a member of the judiciary. In reaching its decision denying the motion to disqual-
ify, the district court held that, in the context of § 455(b)(1), “potential ‘bias for or 
against an attorney, who is not a party, is not enough to require disqualification 
unless it can also be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate bias for 
or against the party itself.’” 314 The court further held that “a judge’s acquaintance 
with a party, an attorney, or a witness without some factual allegation of bias or 
prejudice, is not sufficient to warrant recusal.” 315
The Second Circuit held that a judge’s comment on the possibility of dis-
barment proceedings against a party’s attorney does not establish the personal 
bias required by §  455(b)(1). In LoCascio v. United States, 316 the trial judge, in 
a hearing not attended by the attorney threatened with disbarment, mentioned 
the possibility of disbarment proceedings should the attorney testify as planned. 
The Second Circuit found that, when read in context, the judge’s comment could 
not “reasonably be construed as exhibiting personal animosity towards [the at-
torney or the defendant],” nor could it be seen as “displaying hostility towards 
[the defendant’s] claim.” 317 The court went on to hold that personal bias was not 
established because the judge’s comment did not derive from an extrajudicial 
source or reveal the requisite favoritism or antagonism, making disqualification 
unnecessary.
313. 221 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D.N.J. 2002).
314. Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 (M.D. La. 1999)).
315. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Broder, No. 94, 1997 WL 73717, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1997)).
316. 473 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2007).
317. Id. at 496–97. See also Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1146 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(disqualification under § 455(b)(1) unnecessary, despite judge repeatedly calling attorney 
incompetent, making sarcastic comments about attorney’s incompetence, urging client to proceed 
pro se, and encouraging party to file a malpractice claim against counsel). 
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 iv. Knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification when judges have prior knowledge of 
disputed facts. The Fifth Circuit reversed a refusal to disqualify when a relative of 
the judge was a major participant in transactions relating to the defendant’s in-
dictment and “had communicated to the judge . . . material facts and her opinions 
and attitudes regarding those facts.” 318
In United States v. Alabama, 319 the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge 
should have disqualified himself from a lawsuit against Alabama and its state uni-
versities when the judge had been a state legislator involved in legislative battles 
germane to the litigation. The judge was “forced to make factual findings about 
events in which he was an active participant.” 320
Alabama can be reconciled with Easley v. University of Michigan Board of Re-
gents, 321 in which the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that knowledge gained 
by the judge while serving on a law school’s “committee of visitors” required 
him to disqualify himself from a discrimination suit against the law school. In 
Easley, the judge’s position did not give him knowledge of the events at issue in 
the litigation.
In United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 322 the D.C. Circuit remand-
ed a case to a different trial judge when, among other things, the original judge 
appeared to be influenced in his handling of a case by his private reading of a 
book related to the case. While the court did not explicitly cite § 455(b)(1), the 
facts and holding of the case suggest the relevance of this subsection. The court 
noted that “[t]he book’s allegations are, of course, not evidence on which a judge 
is entitled to rely.” 323
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge’s decision to revoke the bail bonds 
of bank robbery defendants after the U.S. attorney informed the judge about 
threats to the witnesses’ safety could not constitute a disqualifying fact with re-
gard to the subsequent trial. 324 The fact that the judge was made aware of the 
information in private rather than in open court was irrelevant, considering the 
defense counsel’s refusal of an offer to review the information in camera.
318. In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988).
319. 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987).
320. Id. at 1545.
321. 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990).
322. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
323. Id. at 1463.
324. United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1970).
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In Edgar v. K.L., 325 the Seventh Circuit extended § 455(b)(1) to information 
acquired in off-the-record briefings and held that § 455(b)(1) required disqual-
ification when a judge who was briefed privately by a panel of experts declined 
to inform the parties about the briefing’s contents. The court acknowledged that 
§ 455 is primarily concerned with knowledge gained “outside a courthouse”; how-
ever, knowledge acquired in a judicial capacity typically “enters the record and 
may be controverted or tested by the tools of the adversary process . . . in the 
record—and in this case the judge has forbidden any attempt at reconstruction. 
. . . This is ‘personal’ knowledge.” 326 In Rupert v. Ford Motor Co., 327 in contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit ruled that disqualification was unnecessary under § 455(b)(1) 
when the judge became privy to facts underlying the plaintiff ’s loss of consortium 
claim at a status conference, because “[a]ll information exchanged during the 
conference was inadmissible at subsequent proceedings.” 328 
When the judge simply possesses information generally available to the public, 
disqualification is unnecessary. In In re Hatcher, 329 the judge’s son had assisted in 
the prosecution of a defendant in a case related to the case before the judge, and 
the judge had sat in on the trial to observe his son’s performance. The Seventh 
Circuit noted that the district judge
was present only as a spectator in the courtroom. He therefore learned 
nothing . . . that any member of the public could not also have learned by 
attending the trial or reading a good newspaper account of its progress. 
This limited exposure is simply not the kind of personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts with which § 455(b)(1) is concerned. 330
The Seventh Circuit nonetheless concluded that disqualification was required 
under § 455(a) because the cases were so closely related.
 b. Prior association with matter as private practitioner or 
witness: § 455(b)(2)
Subsection 455(b)(2) requires disqualification under the following circumstance:
[w]here in private practice [the judge] served as lawyer in the matter in 
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served 
325. 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
326. Id. at 259.
327. 640 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2016).
328. Id. at 209.
329. 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
330. Id. at 635.
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during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or 
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it[.] 331
In In re Rogers, 332 the Fourth Circuit defined the “matter in controversy” 
quite broadly. The defendants were charged with using unlawful means to secure 
passage of a bill in the state legislature. A former law partner of the trial judge 
had represented a company in its own efforts to get the bill passed. The defen-
dants planned to argue that their conduct was no more culpable than that of the 
company represented by the judge’s former partner, whom they planned to call 
as a witness. Holding that disqualification was required under § 455(b)(2), the 
Fourth Circuit observed that “the actual case before the court consists of more 
than the charges brought by the government. It also includes the defense asserted 
by the accused. Here, this defense, in part at least, will consist of matters in which 
the judge’s former partner served as lawyer.” 333
In United States v. DeTemple, 334 the Fourth Circuit distinguished Rogers and 
held disqualification unnecessary when the judge had represented a creditor of 
the defendant several years before the current charges of bankruptcy fraud. The 
creditor “played no role in either the defense or the prosecution of the case. . . . 
The connection between the judge’s prior professional associations and the case 
before him is far more tenuous here than in Rogers.” 335
In Little Rock School District v. Armstrong, 336 the district judge (Wilson)—
when he was a private practitioner decades earlier—had defended a judge 
(Woods) in a mandamus proceeding that sought Woods’s disqualification from 
a case that came before Wilson twenty years later in the context of a motion for 
release from court supervision. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Judge Wilson’s 
prior representation of Judge Woods was irrelevant to the merits of the under-
lying dispute and thus that “there is not a sufficient relationship between the 
recusal proceedings with respect to Judge Woods and the issues now before us on 
the merits to make them the same ‘matter in controversy.’” 337
331. The corollary to § 455(b)(2) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(b). 
See Appendix A.
332. 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976).
333. Id. at 1198.
334. 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998).
335. Id. at 284.
336. 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004).
337. Id. at 961.
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 c. Prior association with matter as governmental 
employee: § 455(b)(3)
Subsection 455(b)(3) requires disqualification when the judge has “served in gov-
ernmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or 
material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning 
the merits of the particular case in controversy.”
The Eighth Circuit has held that “[i]f an indictment or investigation leading 
directly to the indictment began after a former prosecutor took office as a judge, 
he or she is not considered to have been ‘of counsel’ and is not required by § 455 
to disqualify himself or herself.” 338
In United States v. Arnpriester, 339 the Ninth Circuit held that a judge who was 
formerly a U.S. attorney when the case at hand was under investigation should 
have disqualified himself from ruling on the appellant’s motion for a new trial. 
The court noted that its analysis “imputes to the United States Attorney the 
knowledge and acts of his assistants.” 340
In United States v. Silver, 341 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial judge who had 
served as U.S. attorney for the preliminary investigation of the defendant’s prior 
offense need not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(3). The judge had served as 
U.S. attorney during the first two years of a five-year mail fraud investigation of 
the defendant, conducted more than ten years before the indictment that led to 
the current case. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit said, “There is no fac-
tual connection or relationship between the current case and the 1982 mail fraud 
case.” 342 It further noted that the previous case was referenced only “for purposes 
of sentencing” and that the judge “was not asked to make any determinations or 
to render an opinion on the mail fraud conviction.” 343 Distinguishing Arnpriester, 
the court explained that here the trial judge had not initiated the current case 
and only happened to have been U.S. attorney at the beginning of an investigation 
of a factually unrelated case involving the same defendant. 344
In Murray v. Scott, 345 the Eleventh Circuit held that a district judge who had 
served as counsel of record in prior litigation for one of the current parties should 
338. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 908 (8th Cir. 1985).
339. 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994).
340. Id. at 467. The court held that both § 455(a) and (b) required disqualification in this case.
341. 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).
342. Id. at 1079.
343. Id. at 1080.
344. Id. at 1079–80.
345. 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).
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have disqualified himself under §§ 455(b)(1) and (b)(3). In 1970, while serving 
as a U.S. district attorney, the judge appeared as counsel of record for the defen-
dant, a sporting association, the status of which was the subject of the current 
litigation. He had filed a brief that the party now seeking disqualification claimed 
would likely be used as evidence in the current proceeding. The Eleventh Circuit 
found that the judge “may have knowledge of facts in dispute in the present case” 
and that disqualification was thus required because “the record is strong enough 
to presume personal knowledge.” 346
The Seventh Circuit held that disqualification was not required when the 
judge presiding over a tax evasion case had previously served as an assistant U.S. 
attorney (AUSA) at the same time when, and in the same district where, the de-
fendant had been indicted. 347 The court stated: “As applied to judges who were 
formerly AUSAs, § 455(b)(3) requires some level of actual participation in a case 
to trigger disqualification.” 348 Absent evidence of actual participation, the judge 
did not commit plain error in not disqualifying himself. 349
In Clemmons v. Wolfe, 350 decided in 2004, the district judge denied a habeas 
petition filed by a petitioner over whose trial that same judge, before his ap-
pointment to the federal bench, had presided in state court. The Third Circuit 
concluded that the district judge erred in declining to disqualify himself, on the 
grounds that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a). 
The court went further, however, taking the unusual step of exercising its broad 
supervisory authority over federal proceedings to require that all federal district 
judges disqualify themselves from habeas corpus proceedings that raise issues 
concerning trials or convictions over which the judges presided in their former 
capacities as state judges. Clemmons was decided under § 455(a), not § 455(b)(3). 
The corollary to § 455(b)(3) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges—
Canon 3C(1)(e)—was amended in 2009 to make its applicability to former judi-
cial service explicit. 351
346. Id. at 1313.
347. United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2001), overruled in part by Fowler v. Butts, 829 
F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Several of this circuit’s decisions hold that failure to file a [§ 455(a)] 
motion in the district court waives the right to present the contention on appeal.”).
348. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d at 695 (citing cases).
349. Id. at 696. Because the defendant didn’t request disqualification at trial and raised the issue 
for the first time on appeal, the Seventh Circuit could only review for plain error. Id. at 695.
350. 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004).
351. For the text of Canon 3C(1)(e), see Appendix A.
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 d. Financial interest in matter: § 455(b)(4) and § 455(f)
 i. Disqualification for financial interest
Subsection 455(b)(4) requires disqualification when a judge
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter 
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding[.] 352
Section 455(d)(4) defines “financial interest” for the purposes of § 455(b) 
and provides specific exemptions, such as investment in a mutual fund or own-
ership of government securities. Apart from such exemptions, even the smallest 
financial interest (e.g., ownership of a single share of stock) requires disquali-
fication. Under § 455(c), it is a judge’s duty to keep abreast of all of his or her 
financial interests. 353
Courts of appeals have interpreted “financial interest” to refer to a direct 
interest, not a “remote or contingent” interest. 354 In a case involving the consti-
tutionality of a “privilege” tax as applied to federal judges working within Jeffer-
son County, Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit raised the issue of disqualification 
sua sponte when “nine of the en banc panel’s twelve judges [had] sat in Jeffer-
son County at least one day—and some a few days more.” 355 Because the city 
had never tried to collect the privilege tax from a federal judge who did not have 
chambers in the county, and none of the Eleventh Circuit judges had chambers 
in Jefferson County, the court held that any possible interest the judges may have 
was too remote and contingent to constitute a financial interest. 356
Similarly, in an antitrust case alleging price-fixing by oil companies, all of the 
trial judges in the district were residents of New Mexico, whose future utility bills 
could have been affected by the outcome of the litigation. The Tenth Circuit held 
that this was too remote and contingent to qualify as a “financial interest” under 
352. The corollary to § 455(b)(4) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(c). 
See Appendix A.
353. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1, Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 require a nongovernmental 
corporate party to a proceeding to file a statement identifying any parent corporation or publicly held 
corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock. This disclosure is meant to aid judges in decisions 
about disqualification under Canon 3C(1)(c) and § 455(b)(4). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.4, the 
government must also file a statement identifying an organizational victim of a crime and providing 
the same information on a corporate victim that a nongovernmental corporate party must file.
354. See, e.g., In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366–67 (4th Cir. 1976).
355. Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561, 1581 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing appendix).
356. Id. at 1582. The court also held that disqualification would be contrary to the rule of necessity. 
Id. at 1583–84.
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§ 455(b)(4). 357 In each case, the courts considered the potential benefit to the 
judges of an “other interest” under the statute, which meant, under § 455(b)(4), 
that disqualification was required only if this “other interest” would be “substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”
Contributions by a judge’s spouse have not been considered a financial in-
terest. In a Second Circuit case involving an attack on an abortion clinic, the de-
fendant moved for disqualification on the grounds that the judge’s wife had made 
financial contributions to the victim clinic and so had created a financial interest 
under § 455(b)(4). 358 The court noted that “[r]ecusal is not required . . . when the 
alleged interest or bias on the part of the judge or his spouse is ‘not direct, but is 
remote, contingent, or speculative.’” 359 In affirming the trial judge’s denial of the 
disqualification motion, the court explained that the clinic in question, although 
named as the victim, was not a party to the litigation, and that “contributions 
made by [the judge’s] wife to [the clinic] did not constitute a financial interest in 
the organization.” 360
In Draper v. Reynolds, 361 a civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
plaintiff sought to disqualify the trial judge on the grounds that the judge owned 
property in the same county in which the defendant was deputy sheriff. The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that the judge, who previously 
filed a zoning application in the county, would likely side with his own financial 
interests and hence the county in violation of § 455(b)(4). It held that a property 
interest in a given county is grounds for disqualification only if “[that county and 
its commissioners] are parties to the case and . . . [the judge’s] zoning application 
is currently pending before [that county and its commissioners].” 362
The Fifth Circuit held that when the judge or someone in his family is a mem-
ber of a class seeking monetary relief, § 455(b)(4) imposes a “per se rule” requir-
ing disqualification. 363 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, held that a trial judge who, 
as a rate-paying customer of a utility company involved in the case before him, 
could have received a $100 refund as a putative member of the class of plaintiffs, 
357. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980).
358. United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999).
359. Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 48 (2d Cir. 1998)). See also Sensley v. 
Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 600 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that trial judge was not disqualified even though 
his wife’s position at district attorney’s office might conceivably be affected indirectly by outcome of 
case, because such an interest was “remote, contingent or speculative”).
360. Arena, 180 F.3d at 398.
361. 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).
362. Id. at 1280.
363. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1998).
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should not have disqualified himself under § 455(b)(4). 364 The court classified 
the potential refund as an expectancy interest, and as such it was not a “financial 
interest” but rather “some other interest” under the language of § 455(b)(5). It 
further explained that the words “however small” apply only to financial interests 
under subsection (b)(4) and that in addressing other interests a judge “must nec-
essarily consider the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree.” 365 The 
Fourth Circuit held that the possible refund was “de minimis” and therefore not 
grounds for disqualification. 366
In a class action arising from the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, 
a New Orleans district judge refused to disqualify himself on the grounds 
that possible inconvenience experienced by the judge and his family gave 
him a potential financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings under 
§ 455(b)(4). 367 In its disqualification analysis, the district court referred to the 
Fifth Circuit’s statement that “[a] remote, contingent, or speculative interest is 
not a disqualifying financial interest under the statute.” 368 Because the judge and 
his family had suffered no financial loss or property damage as a result of Katrina, 
any interest or potential class membership based on possible inconvenience was, 
at best, “ephemeral, inchoate, and bordering on the metaphysical,” and so could 
not justify disqualification. 369
In United States v. Rogers, 370 a mail fraud case, the trial judge was “one of mil-
lions of stockholders” in a defrauded bank. 371 Holding that disqualification was 
not required under § 455(b)(4), the Ninth Circuit explained that the bank, which 
was the victim of the crime, is not a party to the proceeding under § 455(b)(4). 372 
Moreover, “stock ownership in the corporate victim of a crime cannot be deemed 
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy” under § 455(b)(4). 373
364. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976).
365. Id. at 368.
366. Id. But see Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043–44 (S.D. Cal. 2001) 
(holding that disqualification was required of a judge who, as wholesale customer of defendant/
electric company, had “legal claims identical to those raised by plaintiffs,” which qualified both as 
financial and other claims under language of § 455(b)(4)).
367. Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. La. 2006).
368. Id. at 648 (citing In re Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786–87 (5th Cir. 1986)).
369. Id. at 649–50.
370. 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997).
371. Id. at 1384.
372. Id. See also United States v. Aragon, No. 99-50341, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15423, at *5 (9th Cir. 
June 29, 2000).
373. Rogers, 119 F.3d at 1384. Disqualification was not required under §  455(a) either, the 
court ruled.
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 ii. Divestiture as a cure for “financial interest” disqualification
The conflicts enumerated in § 455(b) require automatic disqualification—even 
if judges believe they are capable of impartial judgment; even if they believe 
that a reasonable person would not question their impartiality; and even if the 
parties are willing to waive any objections. Section 455(f), however, provides an 
opportunity for the judge to “cure” certain § 455(b) conflicts. 
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, 
judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been 
assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been 
devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the 
matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fidu-
ciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, 
has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if 
the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor 
child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that 
provides the grounds for disqualification. 374
A number of courts of appeals have upheld and applauded the use of subsec-
tion (f) to prevent disqualification. 375 In Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy 
Corp., 376 the judge sold stock as soon as he learned that the corporation in which 
he owned stock held a large percentage of the stock of one of the parties. The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that the judge’s curative action pursuant to § 455(f) prevent-
ed the waste of “three years of the litigants’ time and resources and substantial 
judicial efforts.” 377
In United States v. Lauersen, 378 an insurance fraud case, the trial judge dis-
closed his ownership of a small number of shares in one of the victimized insur-
ance companies eligible to receive monetary restitution as a result of the judge’s 
ruling in the case. Because the recovery of restitution would affect the price of the 
374. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).
375. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(criticizing Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998)) (denying defendants’ motion for 
disqualification and holding that, under § 455, “a judge . . . assigned a case in which she has a financial 
or other curable conflict . . . may continue to preside if she promptly eliminates it”); Key Pharm., Inc. 
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480, 484 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (judge divested stock in parent corporation 
and declined to disqualify himself, noting that disqualification would be mandatory except for the 
provisions of § 455(f)). But see Gordon v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (S.D. Cal. 
2001) (relying on Tramonte) (both cases holding disqualifying interests incurable even if discovered 
and removed at beginning of case).
376. 925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1991).
377. Id. at 561.
378. 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003).
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shares in question, the company agreed to waive its right to monetary recovery 
so the judge could continue on the case with no financial conflict. The Second 
Circuit held that what otherwise would have provided a basis for disqualification 
under § 455(b)(4) was not a financial interest in this case because the company’s 
decision to “forgo its restitution claim” served to “eliminate such a basis” under 
§ 455(f). 379 
In In re Certain Underwriter, 380 the district judge discovered—after being as-
signed to hear a class-action antitrust suit—that she owned shares in two of the 
defendant corporations, making her a putative class member. The judge imme-
diately informed the parties of the conflict, divested herself of the shares, and 
opted out of the class. She denied the subsequent §  455(b)(4) disqualification 
motion. The Second Circuit affirmed, stating that § 455(f) was created to allow 
the continued participation of a “district judge with a minor interest in a class 
action lawsuit discovered after assignment, who quickly divested herself of the 
conflicting interest.” 381
In a class-action copyright case, two of the reviewing Second Circuit judges 
declined to disqualify themselves despite their membership in the relevant class 
for five months during their work on the case. 382 The class included anyone with 
copyrighted material posted on the electronic databases LexisNexis and West-
law, among others. Having promptly divested themselves of any legal or financial 
claim as soon as they realized that they were members in the class, the judges 
relied on § 455(f) to justify their decision not to disqualify themselves. As they 
explained, “a reasonable person would not have known that we were class mem-
bers” before the date on which they discovered—and promptly divested them-
selves of—the interest. 383 Also relevant to their refusal to disqualify was the fact 
that “many—if not most—other judges are similarly situated,” including all but 
one of the other members of the Second Circuit, as well as (presumably) all the 
members of the Supreme Court. 384
Some courts, however, have construed the “divestiture cure” strictly. The 
Sixth Circuit held that disqualification was required in a case in which the trial 
judge’s daughter was employed by the law firm representing a party before the 
judge, even though the daughter resigned from the law firm. 385 It observed that 
379. Id. at 338.
380. 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002).
381. Id. at 304.
382. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
383. Id. at 142.
384. Id. at 142–43.
385. In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).
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§ 455(f) refers to the judge himself or herself, his or her spouse, or a minor child 
residing with the judge. This “suggests that Congress intended to exclude the 
types of cure not permitted by this provision, for Congress had the opportunity to 
enact a broader amendment than it devised with section 455(f).” 386
The Second Circuit held that a district judge who had unknowingly possessed 
a substantial financial stake in one of the plaintiffs (a bank) during a bench trial 
could not cure this conflict by divesting himself of the interest on remand. 387 
Although the court based its decision on an “appearance of partiality” problem 
under § 455(a), its analysis is relevant to the divestment cure of a § 455(b)(4) 
conflict. The court held that “where an earlier ‘appearance’ of a potentially 
disqualifying interest mandated recusal under Section 455(a), a divestiture years 
later cannot cure a judge’s presiding over significant proceedings in a case—here 
rendering a decision after a bench trial—in the intervening years.” 388
 e. Other interests of judge and judge’s family: § 455(b)(5)
Section 455(b)(5) requires a judge’s disqualification when
He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to 
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 
proceeding. 389
 i. When judge or relatives are parties or associated 
with parties
Under § 455(b)(5)(i), judges shall disqualify themselves when they or a close 
family member is a party to the proceeding. Based on this subsection, the Tenth 
Circuit held that a trial judge should have disqualified himself from hearing 
habeas claims challenging state court cases in which his uncle had participated 
386. Id. at 1147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
387. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003).
388. Id. at 131.
389. The corollary to § 455(b)(5) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3C(1)(d). 
See Appendix A.
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as a criminal appeals judge. 390 The judge’s uncle, who had since died, was none-
theless a named defendant in the claims, thus requiring disqualification pursuant 
to § 455(b). 391
The District Court of Puerto Rico held that § 455(b)(5) did not reach the 
father of the judge’s son-in-law, who was on the board of directors of one of the 
named parties. 392 The Checklist for Financial and Other Conflicts contained with-
in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges identified “the following blood 
relatives as falling within the third degree relationship: parent, child, grandchild, 
great grandparent, great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and neph-
ew.” 393 Regarding this as an exclusive list of possible third-degree relationships, 
the court concluded that a judge could not disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5) 
without establishing the existence of such a relationship. 394
 ii. When judge or relative acts as lawyer
The Seventh Circuit held that a judge’s attendance at a related trial, to watch his 
son act as assistant counsel, did not require disqualification under § 455(b)(1). 395 
The defendant also sought disqualification under § 455(b)(5)(ii). Although the 
son, who was a third-year law student, “acted as a lawyer,” the court held that 
disqualification was not required under subsection (b)(5)(ii) because the pro-
ceeding was not the same as that involving the defendant. It involved a defendant 
charged with conduct arising from the same conduct as the defendant in the case 
at bar, but the two men were not codefendants. “No matter how closely related the 
two cases were factually or legally . . . the fact remains that they were separate 
‘proceedings.’” 396
In similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit required disqualification. In In re 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 397 seven claims against an insurance company were 
consolidated for trial, and the trial judge initially disqualified himself because his 
daughter’s law firm represented four of the claimants. The judge later separated 
the cases and planned to try the three claims in which his daughter’s firm was not 
390. Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
391. Id. at 1571.
392. Oriental Fin. Group, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.P.R. 2006).
393. Id. at 179.
394. Id.
395. In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
396. Id. at 637. The court found that disqualification was required under § 455(a), which illustrates 
that the appearance of impropriety may require disqualification even absent grounds for disqualifica-
tion specifically enumerated in § 455(b).
397. 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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involved. On mandamus petition, the court reversed because the cases remained 
intimately connected: “A decision on the merits of any important issue in any of 
the seven cases . . . could . . . constitute the law of the case in all of them, or involve 
collateral estoppel, or might be highly persuasive as a precedent.” 398 The court did 
not specify whether it based its decision on § 455(a) or § 455(b)(5)(ii), but a con-
curring opinion, joined by seven judges, emphasized that there was an actual con-
flict of interest pursuant to § 455(b)(5), as well as an appearance of partiality. 399
A proposed substitution or addition of counsel by one of the parties may 
create a conflict of interest requiring disqualification of the judge under § 455(b). 
The Eleventh Circuit held that, in such a case, the court may deny the request 
for new counsel, even apart from evidence or suspicion that it is made to spark 
disqualification, if it would cause undue delay. 400 However, a showing of “overrid-
ing need” for the new counsel “would trump both time delay and the loss of prior 
judicial activity.” 401 Where the defendants retained the judge’s brother-in-law six 
years after the complaint was filed, the Fifth Circuit remanded for a determi-
nation of whether the primary motive in his hiring had been to disqualify the 
judge. 402 The court held that “a lawyer may not enter a case for the primary pur-
pose of forcing the presiding judge’s recusal.” 403 Otherwise, it observed, “a litigant 
could in effect veto the allotment and obtain a new judge by the simple expedient 
of finding one of the judge’s relatives who is willing to act as counsel.” 404
 iii. When judge or relatives have an interest that could be 
substantially affected
A recurring problem implicating subsection 455(b)(5)(iii) arises when relatives 
of the judge are employed by a law firm that represents a party in litigation 
before the judge. In 1993, seven members of the Supreme Court, each with 
relatives employed by law firms, issued a letter responding to this concern. 405 
The justices noted that in a case in which a relative appears before the judge as 
counsel, § 455(b)(5)(ii) requires disqualification. Since Congress could have, but 
did not, broaden this subsection to require disqualification whenever a relative 
is affiliated with a law firm that appears before a judge, the justices opined that 
398. Id. at 1143.
399. Id. at 1147.
400. Robinson v. Boeing Co., 79 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 1996).
401. Id. at 1056.
402. McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).
403. Id. at 1265.
404. Id. at 1264.
405. Supreme Court of the United States, Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1, 1993).
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Congress must not have regarded so broad a disqualification as necessary. 406 That 
conclusion, in turn, refuted categorical assertions under § 455(a) that a judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned whenever a firm that employs one of 
the judge’s relatives appears before him or her. And in the minds of the justices, it 
likewise refuted categorical claims that any lawyer–relative at the firm possessed 
an interest in the case under § 455(b)(5)(iii) sufficient to require disqualification. 
The signatories to the letter nonetheless indicated that they would disqualify 
themselves from any case in which a relative held a partnership interest in a 
firm appearing before the Court, unless the Court received assurances from the 
firm that the relative would not share in profits derived from the case. Salaried 
employees, in contrast, did not share in the profits of the firm and so had no 
significant interest in the outcome of cases heard by the Court.
The courts of appeals appear to concur that disqualification is unnecessary 
when a relative is simply a salaried employee of the firm that appears before 
the court. For example, the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary in 
a case in which a law firm representing a party before the judge had hired the 
judge’s daughter, who worked for the firm as a law clerk and later accepted a 
permanent job offer as associate starting in the fall. 407 The court said, “an em-
ployment relationship between a party and a judge’s son or daughter does not per 
se necessitate a judge’s disqualification.” 408 The issue is fact-dependent, and the 
facts in this case didn’t show an actual conflict under § 455(b)(iii). 409 The daugh-
ter was not, and would not—as a future employee of the law firm—be involved in 
the present litigation. She “was to be a salaried employee . . . not a partner whose 
income is directly related to the profit margin of the firm and could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of this case.” 410 Finally, the firm was only one of 
many firms representing the parties, and its share of any damages almost cer-
tainly would not affect the salary or benefits of a first-year associate. Similarly, in 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 411 a court of appeals judge found that his 
son’s employment as a nonmanagement entry-level computer programmer for an 
intervenor in the case on appeal did not require the judge’s disqualification from 
the panel hearing the appeal.
406. Id. at 53.
407. In re Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1996).
408. Id. at 1364.
409. Id. The court also held that there was no appearance of a conflict of interest in violation of 
§ 455(a). Id. at 1365.
410. Id. at 1364.
411. 153 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 1998).
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The circuits are divided, however, on whether a relative of the judge who is 
a partner at a firm in litigation before the judge has an interest in the outcome 
that is sufficient to trigger the need for disqualification. In Potashnick v. Port City 
Construction Co., 412 the Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule requiring disqualifica-
tion when a relative of the judge is a partner in a law firm representing a party in 
the case. The judge will always know that the partner has “‘an interest that could 
be substantially affected by the outcome of ’ a proceeding involving the partner’s 
law firm.” 413
The Second Circuit, however, explicitly rejected this per se approach in Pashaian 
v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd. 414 It found disqualification unnecessary when a partner 
in the law firm representing the defendant was married to the sister of the judge’s 
wife. “It would simply be unrealistic to assume . . . that partners in today’s law firms 
invariably ‘have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 
of ’ any case in which any other partner is involved.” 415 The trial court had noted 
that the law firm in question had sixty partners and gross revenue in excess of 
$100 million. Moreover, the case was not likely to affect the firm’s reputation. The 
judge had concluded that his sister-in-law’s interest would not be “substantially 
affected” by the outcome of the case, and the court of appeals agreed.
In a Fifth Circuit false advertising case, 416 the district judge was not dis-
qualified even though her father-in-law was a retired partner in the firm rep-
resenting the defendants. The judge’s alleged interest in the proceeding under 
§ 455(b)(5)(iii) was connected to the fact that since her father-in-law’s death, 
the firm had been paying her husband death benefits that were adjustable based 
on the salaries of partners within the firm. The Fifth Circuit held that this inter-
est was too remote to constitute a disqualifying financial interest because “the 
Consumer Price Index always served as a ceiling on the adjustment to which [the 
judge’s father-in-law] was entitled,” making any interest the judge had in the out-
come of the case so small as to be insignificant. 417
In Sensley v. Albritton, 418 the trial judge’s wife was employed as an assistant 
district attorney in the office representing the defendants, though she herself was 
in no way involved in the case. The plaintiffs moved to disqualify. Relying on 
§ 455(b)(5)(iii), they alleged that the outcome of the case might have an indirect 
412. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
413. Id. at 1113 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).
414. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
415. Id. at 83 (quoting § 455(b)(5)(iii)).
416. IQ Prods. Co. v. Pennzoil Prods. Co., 305 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2002).
417. Id. at 378.
418. 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004).
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effect on the judge’s wife’s ongoing employment in the office, in the event that 
the district attorney lost political popularity by losing the case. The Fifth Cir-
cuit found the plaintiffs’ allegations unconvincing because “they are only able 
to make this argument by layering several speculative premises on top of one 
another to reach a speculative conclusion.” 419
In a case about the constitutionality of state taxation practices, 420 the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that § 455(b)(5) did not require disqualification even though 
the father-in-law of the trial judge’s son was state governor. It found that the 
governor was not within the third degree of relationship required by § 455(b)(5). 
In addition, the court rejected the idea that the governor had an interest in the 
outcome of the suit because it was not “alleged that [the governor] has a personal 
or financial interest in the outcome of this litigation,” and “[a]ny political interest 
that [the governor] may have in the outcome of this case is filtered through 
the State.” 421
 iv. When judge or relative is likely to be material witness
In United States v. Robinson, 422 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the trial judge’s 
failure to disqualify himself under § 455(b)(5)(iv) when his nephew was one of 
thirty-four witnesses testifying on the same subject was harmless error. The court 
declined to reach the issue of whether the nephew was a material witness, hold-
ing that even if he was, the judge’s failure to disqualify was harmless. The court 
explained that, “[a]s in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harm-
less error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook disqualifying 
circumstances.” 423
 C. Disqualification procedure
By its terms, § 455 simply states that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself” under 
the circumstances specified. It obligates disqualification regardless of whether a 
motion to disqualify has been filed. Accordingly, the disqualification process may 
be triggered by a judge on his or her own initiative or by a party on motion.
419. Id. at 600.
420. Higganbotham v. Oklahoma, 328 F.3d 638 (10th Cir. 2003).
421. Id. at 645.
422. 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006).
423. Id. at 779 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988)).
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 1. Investigating disqualification claims
United States v. Morrison 424 addressed the question of whether a trial judge, asked 
to disqualify herself based on conflict of interest, may investigate the matter. 
When the defendant sought disqualification based on an alleged adverse business 
relationship between himself, the judge’s husband, and a friend of the judge, the 
judge asked her husband and friend to review the materials submitted in the de-
fendant’s motion. Both the judge’s husband and friend stated that the allegations 
were false and denied any relationship with the defendant. Accordingly, the judge 
declined to disqualify herself. The Second Circuit noted that “it was not irregular 
for [the judge] to ascertain her husband’s and friend’s possible involvement with 
the defendant simply by asking them, in a reasonable effort to confirm that [the 
defendant’s] incredible claims were indeed not factual.” 425
Conversely, when the trial judge does not adequately investigate and disclose 
potential grounds for disqualification, the judge’s ignorance of those grounds 
does not eliminate the potential conflict. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated 
FM Insurance Co., 426 Chemical Bank merged with The Chase Manhattan Bank 
just before the case was assigned to the district judge. The newly merged entity 
used the Chase name, while counsel and the court used the Chemical Bank name 
to refer to the plaintiff. As a consequence, the district judge was unaware that his 
stock in Chase actually meant he had a financial interest in the plaintiff. 427 Three 
years later and on remand, the judge became aware of the interest and immedi-
ately divested himself of his stock. Although it could not be established that the 
judge was in fact aware of his financial interest, the Second Circuit concluded 
that “a reasonable person knowing the pertinent facts” would conclude the judge 
was aware, which created the appearance of partiality under § 455(a). 428 The ap-
propriate remedy was the vacatur of the district court’s judgment awarding dam-
ages to Chemical Bank. 429
In a variation on this theme, the Sixth Circuit clarified that a litigant has 
no obligation to investigate possible bases for disqualification. 430 After learn-
ing of a conflict of interest, the trial judge transferred the case to another judge. 
The second judge—faced with deciding whether a prior dispositive ruling by the 
424. 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998).
425. Id. at 48 n.4.
426. 343 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2003).
427. Id. at 123.
428. Id. at 130.
429. Id. at 132–33.
430. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 1999).
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first judge should be allowed to stand—noted that the disqualification motion 
had been filed after the judge’s adverse ruling. Refusing to “reward [the movant] 
or encourage this trend,” 431 the judge observed that “litigants have a duty to in-
vestigate and inform the court of any perceived biases before the court and the 
parties invest time and expense in a case.” 432 Rejecting this analysis, the Sixth 
Circuit said: 
We believe instead that litigants (and, of course, their attorneys) should 
assume the impartiality of the presiding judge, rather than pore through 
the judge’s private affairs and financial matters. Further, judges have an 
ethical duty to “disclose on the record information which the judge be-
lieves the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question 
of disqualification.” Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995). 
. . . [The judge] possibly did not consider the matter sufficiently relevant 
to merit disclosure, but his nondisclosure did not vest in [the party] a 
duty to investigate him. 433
 2. Waiver of disqualification: § 455(e)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), waiver of a ground for disqualification based on § 455(a) 
“may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis 
for disqualification”; waiver of disqualification under § 455(b) is not permissible. 434
Some courts of appeals have recognized waivers pursuant to § 455(e). 435 In 
Perkins v. Spivey, 436 the trial judge fully disclosed the potential conflict arising from 
his law clerk accepting an employment offer from a firm that occasionally repre-
sented one of the parties to the lawsuit. Counsel for both parties elected to proceed, 
expressing no concern about the law clerk’s continued participation. 437 The Eighth 
Circuit found that when counsel expressly assented to the clerk’s participation and 
failed to seek the judge’s disqualification in a timely manner after disclosure, the 
parties effectively waived the grounds for the judge’s disqualification. 438
431. Id. at 742.
432. Id.
433. Id. See also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that when facts are undisputed, expert opinion on a disqualification motion is not 
acceptable). See also United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
434. The corollary to § 455(e) in the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is Canon 3D. See 
Appendix A.
435. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 
1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 236–37 (3d Cir. 1982).
436. 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990).
437. Id. at 33.
438. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that “[w]hile it is . . . permissible for 
a judge to accept a waiver of recusal, we believe this option should be limited to 
marginal cases and should be exercised with the utmost restraint.” 439 The court 
found that the defendant did not validly waive his disqualification claim, even 
though he was apprised of the potential disqualifying circumstance and did not 
seek disqualification. The Eleventh Circuit held that:
as a general rule, “‘a federal judge should reach his own determination 
[on recusal], without calling upon counsel to express their views. . . . The 
too frequent practice of advising counsel of a possible conflict, and asking 
counsel to indicate their approval of a judge’s remaining in a particular 
case is fraught with potential coercive elements which make this practice 
undesirable.’” 440
Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for disclosure under 
§ 455(e) for waiver of disqualification can result in reversal. 441 In Barksdale 
v. Emerick, 442 the district court rejected a “belated” disqualification motion, 
explaining that it had initially “disclosed . . . that one of its law clerks was related 
to a Defendant party . . . at the . . . status conference and counsel . . . voiced no 
objections.” 443 Quoting § 455(e), the Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that “[t]here is 
no disclosure ‘on the record’ and therefore no properly obtained ‘waiver.’” 444 The 
court went on to say that § 455(e)’s disclosure and waiver requirements “must be 
strictly construed.” 445
 3. Timeliness of disqualification motion
Unlike § 144, § 455 has no explicit requirement for a “timely” affidavit. Most 
circuits, however, require that a motion for disqualification be brought “at the 
earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such 
439. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989).
440. Id. at 745–46 (quoting In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Resolution L, Judicial Conference of the United States, Oct. 1971)).
441. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding § 455(e) waiver 
not valid when magistrate judge “failed fully to disclose the basis on which a reasonable person might 
‘harbor doubts about the magistrate’s impartiality’” (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 
F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)); and vacating lower court’s judgment).
442. 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988).
443. Id. at 1361.
444. Id. (Contie, J., dissenting).
445. Id. Accord United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1538–39 (7th Cir. 1985) (disclosure must be 
on record).
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disqualification.” 446 And all the circuits that have considered the issue agree that 
a party may not withhold “a recusal application as a fall-back position in the 
event of adverse rulings on pending matters.” 447 These circuits have held that the 
timeliness requirement applies to § 455(b) as well, even though disqualification 
under that section cannot be waived. 448 “[A] party having information that raises 
a possible ground for disqualification cannot wait until after an unfavorable 
judgment before bringing the information to the court’s attention.” 449 The Fifth 
Circuit has said that “[t]he most egregious delay—the closest thing to per se 
untimeliness—occurs when a party already knows the facts purportedly showing 
an appearance of impropriety but waits until after an adverse decision has been 
made by the judge before raising the issue.” 450
The Ninth Circuit requires “reasonable promptness after the ground for such 
a motion is ascertained.” 451 The Second Circuit uses a four-factor analysis for 
determining the timeliness of a motion: (1) whether the movant has participated 
in a substantial manner in trial or pretrial proceedings; (2) whether granting the 
motion would waste judicial resources; (3) whether the motion was made after 
entry of judgment; and (4) whether the movant can show good cause for delay. 452
446. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Apple v. 
Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987). Accord United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 
951–52 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1071 (7th Cir. 1990); In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th 
Cir. 1988).
447. In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
867 F.2d 1415, 1418–21 (Fed. Cir. 1989). But see United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996) 
and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
448. See Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The policy considerations support-
ing a timeliness requirement are the same in each section: to conserve judicial resources and prevent 
a litigant from waiting until an adverse decision has been handed down before moving to disqualify 
the judge.”); In re Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996) (“While it is true that a 
§ 455(b)(1) objection cannot be waived, it is still subject to the timeliness requirement of our cases.”).
449. Nordbrock v. United States, 2 F. App’x 779, 779 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citing 
United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997)).
450. United States v. Vadner, 160 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1998). Accord Rabushka v. Crane Co., 122 
F.3d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1040 (1998); United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 
1382 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Stenzel, 
49 F.3d 658, 661 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990).
451. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991).
452. Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1987). See also United States v. 
Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that motion for disqualification—raised two years after 
judge’s impartiality was first questioned—made prior to entry of judgment and with demonstrated 
good cause for delay, not untimely).
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At the same time, the Third Circuit has held that where a judge has knowl-
edge of facts that lend themselves to an appearance of impropriety but fails to dis-
close this information, a party will not be charged with constructive or imputed 
knowledge of those facts when the court is determining whether the motion was 
made in a timely manner. 453 However, in a case in which a city board of education 
was charged with constructive knowledge of the facts it used as grounds for its 
disqualification motion, the district court held that by failing to file the motion 
in a timely manner “in the vain and remote hope that a jury would somehow rule 
in favor of the Board and against the Plaintiff,” the board waived its right to raise 
the disqualification issue. 454
The Second Circuit has said that untimeliness can “constitute the basis 
for finding an implied waiver. But the distinction is a critical one, because 
while waiver—whether express or implied—will preclude appellate [review], 
untimeliness need not do so.” 455 Assuming the defendant’s failure to move for 
disqualification until after the trial judge had ruled against her was a forfeiture 
and not an implied waiver, the Second Circuit could review the claim only for 
plain error, and it held that the judge’s decision not to disqualify himself sua 
sponte was not plain error.
 4. Evaluation of motion by merits judge
In a statutory scheme so committed to the appearance of impartial justice that 
it requires disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be 
questioned,” numerous commentators have found it problematic that the task of 
deciding whether a judge is (or appears to be) too biased or conflicted to decide a 
matter fairly is left to the judge who is allegedly too biased or conflicted to decide 
the matter fairly. 456 But given the presumption of impartiality to which a judge is 
453. In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004).
454. Drake v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (N.D. Ala. 2007).
455. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2000).
456. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler & Malia Reddick, Judicial Recusal Procedures p. 5 (June 2017), 
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judicial_recusal_procedures.pdf 
(“Allowing the judge who is the subject of the recusal motion to make a dispositive decision denying 
that motion flies in the face of the oft-invoked, age-old proposition that no person should be a judge in 
his own case.”); Matthew Menendez & Dorothy Samuels, Judicial Recusal Reform: Toward Independent 
Consideration of Disqualification p. 1 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/Judicial_Recusal_Reform.pdf (“challenged judges themselves determine whether there 
are adequate grounds to question their own impartiality—a task for which, research and common-
sense suggest, they are wholly unsuited”); Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. 
Again., 30 Rev. Litig. 671, 710 (2011) (“The majority rule in the state and federal courts continues to be 
that the presumption of impartiality judges enjoy justifies them deciding their own disqualification 
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entitled, and the inefficiency of calling on a second judge to resolve a preliminary 
motion, the practice in most federal courts has been for disqualification motions 
to be decided by the judge whose disqualification is sought.
The First Circuit observed that “[a]lthough a trial judge faced with a 
section 455(a) [disqualification] motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion 
to a different judge, no reported case or accepted principle of law compels her to 
do so.” 457 The weight of authority indicates that it is proper, indeed the norm, for 
the challenged judge to rule on a disqualification motion pursuant to § 455. 458 
Because § 455 contains no provision about the transfer of disqualification motions 
to another judge, a district judge in the Southern District of Illinois ruled that 
the motion to disqualify “must be decided by the judge whose disqualification 
is sought.” 459
 5. Postdisqualification procedure
Postdisqualification procedure involves two distinct issues: a) what further ac-
tions a judge may take in relation to the pending case after disqualification, and 
(b) what happens to rulings issued by the judge before disqualification.
 a. Postdisqualification actions
The Supreme Court has opined that after disqualification, the judge generally 
“simply steps aside and allows the normal administrative processes of the court 
to assign the case to another judge.” 460 Most courts of appeals have held that 
after disqualification, a judge must take no nonministerial actions with respect 
to the case. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits concur with the First and Ninth 
Circuits that judges can take no nonministerial actions after announcing their 
motions, while survey data shows that the vast majority of the public thinks that disqualification 
requests should be assigned to a different judge. In short, the prospects for an appearances-based 
disqualification regime to promote public confidence in the courts are undercut by recurrent 
divergence of public and judicial views over when a judge’s impartiality appears doubtful.”); Amanda 
Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan L. Rev. 531, 
571 (2005) (“The Catch-22 of the law of judicial disqualification is that the very judge being challenged 
for bias or interest is almost always the one who, at least in the first instance, decides whether she is 
too conflicted to sit on the case.”).
457. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Accord United States v. 
Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
458. See, e.g., Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992) (opinion of Posner, 
J., in chambers); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202–03 (7th Cir. 1985).
459. Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (emphasis added).
460. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980).
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intention to disqualify. 461 Ministerial actions are limited to performing duties 
incidental to transferring a case to a new judge. 462
A few litigants have objected to a disqualified judge transferring the case to 
another judge as an improper, nonministerial act. This claim has generally been 
rejected. 463 In McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 464 however, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that permitting a disqualified judge to reassign the case “would violate 
the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all par-
ticipation in the case” and might also “create suspicion that the disqualified judge 
will select a successor whose views are consonant with his.” 465
One lingering issue concerns whether judges may, after disqualifying them-
selves, reconsider or amend their rulings to disqualify. Although entertaining a 
motion to reconsider a disqualification order is clearly more than a ministerial 
task, there is a conflict among the circuit courts as to whether judges who disqual-
ify themselves may thereafter reconsider.
At least three circuits—the First, Ninth, and Fifth—have disallowed postdis-
qualification actions of this sort. In El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 466 
on motion from one party, the trial judge disqualified himself under § 455(a). 
When the other party moved for reconsideration, however, the judge listened to 
arguments and entered a reconsideration order vacating the disqualification or-
der. The First Circuit found this action improper: “[A] trial judge who has recused 
461. See Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143–44 (3d Cir. 1988) (after disqualification, judge 
is limited to “the ‘housekeeping’ duties necessary to transfer a case to another judge”); Arnold v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983) (“a judge who is disqualified from acting must 
not be able to affect the determination of any cause from which he is barred”); Doddy v. Oxy USA, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1996) (district judge erred in vacating her disqualification order after 
disqualifying herself); El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 1994) (“As 
a general rule, a trial judge who has recused himself ‘should take no other action in the case except the 
necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge.’”) (quoting 13A Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3550 (2d ed. 1984)); Stringer v. United 
States, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (judge’s nonministerial involvement in case after disqualifying 
himself for cause was an “incurable error”).
462. Moody, 858 F.2d at 143–44.
463. See United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (this judicial assignment “was 
a purely ministerial act, without any implications concerning the merits of the case”); In re Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990) (“even a judge who has recused himself ought to 
be permitted to perform the duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge”); In re Cement 
Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to construe “proceeding” to include 
“ministerial duties” like “assigning a case to another judge”).
464. 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983).
465. Id. at 1261.
466. 36 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1994).
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himself ‘should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial 
acts to have the case transferred to another judge.’” 467
In United States v. Feldman, 468 the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning when 
it reversed a district court order of partial disqualification. While the defendant’s 
appeal was pending, a corporate merger made the judge a stockholder in an in-
stitution to which the defendant had been ordered to pay restitution. On remand, 
the trial judge disqualified himself from presiding over restitution-related issues, 
but not others. In reversing, 469 the Ninth Circuit noted that § 455(d)(1) disqual-
ified the judge from a “proceeding,” and defined “proceeding” to include “pre-
trial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation.” Thus, “when a judge 
determines that recusal is appropriate, it is not within his discretion to recuse by 
subject matter or only as to certain issues and not others. Rather, recusal must be 
from a whole proceeding, an entire ‘stage of litigation.’” 470
In United States v. O’Keefe, 471 the judge granted a party’s motion for a new 
trial, then disqualified himself from further involvement. After the case was 
transferred to a new judge, the government moved for reconsideration of the or-
der granting a new trial. The new judge transferred the case back to the original 
judge to rule on the motion for reconsideration, which the judge did. The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that this was improper, rejecting the contention “that an exception 
from the bright-line rule for recusals . . . should be created for motions for re-
consideration because a [new] judge cannot reconsider what that judge has not 
considered previously.” 472 New judges often must act on motions for reconsider-
ation first heard by other judges who later died or became ill. 473 The Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged that its “ruling today may put one district court judge in the some-
what uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on the discretionary 
rulings of another judge” but found this circumstance was outweighed by “the 
values underlying 28 U.S.C. § 455,” which require that judges who have disquali-
fied themselves take no further action. 474
467. Id. at 141 (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3550 (2d ed. 1984)).
468. 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992).
469. Id. at 145. Accord Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (“once having 
disqualified himself for cause . . . it was incurable error for the district judge to resume full control and 
try the case”).
470. Feldman, 983 F.2d at 145.
471. 128 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1078 (1998).
472. Id. at 891.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 891–92 n.6.
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The Second Circuit, in contrast, has authorized district judges to reconsider 
their decisions to disqualify, at least when disqualification was unnecessary and 
the case had yet to be transferred. In Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd., 475 the 
trial judge concluded that disqualification was not legally required but disquali-
fied himself as a matter of prudence to avoid any possibility of reversal after pro-
longed proceedings. He chose, however, to make disqualification effective only 
after he ruled on a pending motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 
Second Circuit found that disqualification was indeed unnecessary and rejected 
the contention that, “once he decided to recuse himself as a matter of discretion, 
such recusal had to be total and immediate.” 476 The Second Circuit explained 
that it was “loath to articulate a rule that would frustrate or obviate the careful 
exercise of judicial discretion by district judges in responding to disqualification 
motions in unusual circumstances.” 477
In United States v. Lauersen, 478 the district judge owned an insubstantial 
amount of stock in a corporation that may have had a negligible restitution claim 
against the criminal defendant. The judge disqualified himself but later reversed 
his ruling. The Second Circuit agreed that disqualification was unnecessary and 
concluded that, “[t]here is no reason to prohibit a judge from reconsidering a re-
cusal decision, at least in the absence of transfer of the case to another judge.” 479 
The Second Circuit justified its conclusion by pointing to the example of a judge 
who disqualifies himself because his wife owns stock in one of the parties, only 
to learn later that day that his wife had sold that stock months before. “No one,” 
the court said, “could seriously maintain that the judge could not reconsider and 
revise his initial decision to recuse.” 480 The court cited, without discussing, prec-
edent in other circuits that placed greater weight on the judge’s duty to take no 
further action following disqualification and that forbade judges from engaging 
in postdisqualification activity of this sort.
 b. Predisqualification orders
A difficult question arises with respect to orders that a disqualified judge issued pri-
or to disqualification and whether such orders must be vacated. In cases where the 
grounds for disqualification do not come to light (and hence, disqualification is not 
sought or secured) until after judgment is entered, seeking relief from judgment is 
475. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
476. Id. at 84.
477. Id. at 84–85.
478. 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003).
479. Id. at 338.
480. Id.
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governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). In cases where the judge 
is disqualified under § 455(a), on the grounds that the judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned,” the operative analysis is Rule 60(b)(6), which entitles 
petitioners to relief from judgment “for any other reason that justifies relief.”
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 481 the Supreme Court observed 
that Rule 60(b)(6) authorized judges to “vacate judgments whenever such action 
is appropriate to accomplish justice” 482 but cautioned that it was reserved for 
“extraordinary circumstances” 483 and that “[a]s in other areas of the law, there 
is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently 
overlook a disqualifying circumstance.” 484 “[I]n determining whether a judgment 
should be vacated for a violation of § 455(a),” the Court introduced a three-factor 
analysis: “it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the 
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 
cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. 485
In Liljeberg, the district judge served on a university board of trustees and 
attended board meetings where the university’s interest in acquiring a hospital 
from Liljeberg, was discussed. Liljeberg, the petitioner, was a pharmacist, pro-
moter, and half-owner of a real estate brokerage firm. The meetings occurred 
amid litigation over which the district judge presided, where Liljeberg’s owner-
ship rights to the hospital (and hence his right to sell the hospital to the univer-
sity) were at issue—an issue the district judge resolved in Liljeberg’s favor. Of the 
three factors the Court identified, it focused here on the third: the adverse impact 
on public confidence in the judiciary. If the district court’s order were allowed to 
stand, it would create an understandable public perception that the judge was 
aware of the university’s interest in the proceeding and was acting on the univer-
sity’s behalf. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment.
The courts of appeals have applied Liljeberg to reach different conclusions 
in different cases. In United States v. Amico, 486 the Second Circuit ruled that the 
district judge’s previous business dealings with a key witness, coupled with his 
imprudent reactions to recusal, created an appearance of partiality that rendered 
vacatur advisable to discourage similar behavior in future cases and to preserve 
481. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
482. Id. at 864 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 355 U.S. 601, 614–15 (1994)).
483. Id. (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950)).
484. Id. at 862.
485. Id. at 864.
486. 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007).
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public perception. 487 Conversely, in In re Continental Airlines Corp., 488 the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that disqualification—but not vacatur—was warranted when 
the district judge accepted an offer of employment the day after awarding $700,000 
in legal fees to his future employer. It reasoned that disqualification, coupled with 
de novo review of the district judge’s order, was sufficient to ensure fairness, dis-
courage such judicial conduct in future cases, and protect public perception. 489
Liljeberg arose in the context of a case seeking relief from judgment under 
Rule 60(b)(6) for orders issued by judges who were later disqualified from 
the proceeding under § 455(a). The courts of appeals have applied the same 
Rule 60(b)(6) analysis to litigants seeking relief from judgment ordered by 
district judges disqualified under § 455(b). In some cases, they have ordered 
vacatur. 490 In other cases, they have deemed vacatur unnecessary. 491
Applying Rule 60(b)(6) and the Liljeberg factors when reviewing orders issued 
by judges subject to disqualification under § 455(b), however, warrants a caveat. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Liljeberg, judgments entered by judges whose 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) are not automati-
cally void but are voidable under Rule 60(b)(6) if the Court’s three-part analysis 
487. See also El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 954 F. Supp. 23 (D.P.R. 1996) (ordering 
vacatur of order issued by judge after he invited friend with knowledge of subject to watch proceedings 
and give advice; concluding that vacatur was necessary to avoid risk of injustice to losing party, and to 
preserve public perception of fair trial).
488. 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990).
489. Id. at 1263. See also United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1989) (magistrate 
judge’s review of ex parte police report required disqualification under § 455(a); vacatur unnecessary 
because report duplicated other testimony, so improper ex parte communication posed no risk of 
injustice to parties and minimal risk to public perception; ordering disqualification ensured more 
prudent judicial conduct in future cases).
490. See Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating judgment given 
district judge’s failure to disqualify under § 455(b)(4), citing risk of prejudice in ongoing related cases 
and impact of judge’s nondisqualification on the judiciary’s reputation); Preston v. United States, 
923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (vacating judgment because of district judge’s failure to disqualify under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and (b)(2) and the consequent damage to public’s perception of the judiciary).
491. See United States v. Robinson, 439 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006) (declining to vacate for violation 
of § 455(b)(5)(iv) because evidence in question would have been introduced by other means); 
Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to vacate summary judgment 
for nondisqualification under §§ 455(a) and (b)(2), reasoning that de novo review ensured fairness 
to appellant, that ordering disqualification will have sufficient salutary effect on future related 
litigation, and that enough time had passed to protect public perception without vacatur); Harris v. 
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining to vacate for nondisqualification under §§ 455(a) 
& 455(b)(5)(i) because doing so would result in adjudicatory delay for plaintiffs, there was no risk to 
other proceedings given the unique procedural posture, and disqualification alone was sufficient on 
its own to protect public perception).
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warrants vacatur. If, however, a judgment is “void,” it is subject to vacatur under 
Rule 60(b)(4) at any time, without recourse to the balancing of justice-related 
equities called for by Rule 60(b)(6) or Liljeberg. In New York Life Insurance Co. 
v. Brown, 492 the Fifth Circuit quoted a widely cited treatise on federal practice 
and procedure for the proposition that “[a] judgment is not void merely because 
it is erroneous.” 493 “A judgment “‘is void only if the court that rendered it lacked 
jurisdiction . . . or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’” 494
The Supreme Court has held that nondisqualification gives rise to due process 
problems when the judge has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” 
in a case 495 and when the judge exhibits a “probability of bias.” 496 As to the standard 
for “probability of bias,” the Supreme Court has referred to “judicial reforms” 
(reflected in § 455(a) and in state codes of conduct) that aim “to eliminate even 
the appearance of partiality,” 497 which the Court characterized as “more rigorous” 
than due process required. That is because appearance-based standards—such as 
when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned”—can be met when 
a reasonable person might doubt the judge’s impartiality, even if the likelihood 
of actual bias falls short of “probable.” “Because the codes of judicial conduct 
provide more protection than due process requires,” the Court concluded, “most 
disputes over disqualification will be resolved” 498 without recourse to the due 
process threshold. In other words, simple failure to disqualify under § 455(a), 
when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, does not give rise 
to a due process problem. Hence, orders issued under these circumstances are 
at most voidable, and the operative rule governing relief from judgment in such 
cases is Rule 60(b)(6), as interpreted by Liljeberg.
In some cases, however, nondisqualification under § 455(b), may need to be 
analyzed separately. If orders issued by judges subject to disqualification under 
§ 455(b) violate due process, then the resulting judgments are arguably void and 
492. 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996).
493. Id. at 143 (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2862 (1973 ed.)).
494. Id. (quoting Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973 
ed.))). This analysis is, of necessity, speculative as it applies to disqualification, insofar as the federal 
courts have not been called on to address whether orders of judgment entered by judges whose 
failure to disqualify is so egregious as to violate due process, are void, and thus subject to relief under 
Rule 60(b)(4).
495. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
496. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
497. Id. at 888.
498. Id. at 890.
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as such are eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)(4). The Supreme Court’s rulings 
to date indicate that nondisqualification can violate due process in at least three 
circumstances regulated by § 455(b). First, judgments entered by judges subject 
to disqualification for actual bias under § 455(b)(1) may be categorically void, 
insofar as the “probability of bias” threshold for due process violations logically 
includes within its scope all cases of actual bias. Second, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that a state judge who presided over a case in which he had participated 
actively as a public official before being appointed to the bench (conduct that 
subjects federal judges to disqualification under § 455(b)(3)) created a probabil-
ity of bias that violated due process. 499 Third, orders issued by judges subject to 
disqualification under § 455(b)(4) (or the state-rule corollary) for having a fi-
nancial interest in a proceeding violate due process if that financial interest rises 
to the level of “direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary.” 500
The foregoing analysis is necessarily speculative because cases in which the 
Supreme Court has held that nondisqualification violates due process have been 
limited to state judges whose nondisqualification violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal courts have little occasion to ad-
dress whether the nondisqualification of a federal judge violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the federal disqualification statute im-
poses disqualification standards more rigorous than due process requires. If fail-
ure to disqualify violates the statute, disqualification will be ordered without need 
for recourse to due process analysis. Conversely, if failure to disqualify does not 
violate the statute, nondisqualification is sure to satisfy less exacting due process 
scrutiny. Whether nondisqualification of a federal judge violates the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment becomes relevant only when seeking relief from 
judgment, where judgments rendered in violation of due process are arguably 
void and hence eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)(4). And cases addressing this 
issue are in short supply.
So far, our discussion has focused on vacatur in the context of cases in which 
a party seeks postjudgment relief under Rule 60(b). Courts of appeals, however, 
have also applied Liljeberg’s multifactor analysis to cases in which parties seek 
relief from orders issued by judges who are disqualified before judgment is 
entered—often in the context of mandamus proceedings.
In In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 501 for example, the D.C. Circuit ordered 
disqualification in light of the judge’s comments on the defendant’s guilt before 
being appointed as a judge, and vacated an order of the three-judge panel on 
499. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016).
500. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
501. 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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which the judge sat. 502 Similarly, in In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 503 the Sixth 
Circuit ordered disqualification under §§ 455(b)(4) and (b)(5)(ii) and vacated 
predisqualification orders. The district judge’s daughter had conducted deposi-
tions in the matter prior to the judge being assigned the case, leading the circuit 
court to conclude that vacatur was necessary to avoid a risk of injustice to par-
ties and damage to public perception of the courts. 504 In In re School Asbestos 
Litigation, 505 on the other hand, the Third Circuit declined to vacate orders that 
the district judge issued before being disqualified under §§ 455(a) and (b)(1) for 
disbursing litigation funds to sponsor a conference that the judge attended. In 
defense of its decision not to vacate predisqualification orders, the Third Circuit 
panel cited the high costs of duplicative proceedings and the low risk of harm to 
public perception given the court’s disqualification order. 506
502. Id. Recusal was required pursuant to Rule 902 of the Rules for Military Commissions 
which was modeled on § 455. Like § 455(b), Rule 902(b) is a strict provision specifying mandatory 
disqualification under its enumerated circumstances, one of which is where a military judge has 
“expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused.” R.M.C. 902(b)(3).
503. 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).
504. Id. at 1146.
505. 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
506. Id. at 787–88.
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IIIDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 144
 A. Overview
Section 144 of Title 28 states in its entirety:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files 
a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of 
any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but anoth-
er judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias 
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the be-
ginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause 
shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only 
one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of 
counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 507
By its terms, § 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to § 455, which 
applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States.” A literal 
reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force disqualification automatically, 
simply by filing an affidavit alleging that the judge is biased against the affiant or 
in favor of the affiant’s opponent. That interpretation would render § 144 akin to 
peremptory disqualification procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number 
of western states—and the legislative history of § 144 lends some support for this 
interpretation. 508
The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must step aside 
upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit, but they have been exacting in 
507. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the statute was recodified 
as § 144 in 1948 without significant change.
508. 46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Representative Cullop).
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their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit requires and of the 
procedural prerequisites to application of the statute. Thus, motions have been 
dismissed because of untimeliness, because the movant failed to submit an af-
fidavit or submitted more than one affidavit, because the attorney rather than a 
party submitted the affidavit, because the movant’s affidavit was unaccompanied 
by a certificate of counsel or failed to make allegations with particularity, and 
because the certificate of counsel certified only to the affiant’s—not counsel’s—
good faith. 509
As a consequence, § 144 has been rendered a much more cumbersome tool 
to obtain disqualification than § 455, even though the latter calls on judges to 
evaluate the merits of a movant’s allegations and not simply the facial sufficiency 
of those allegations. Despite criticism of the federal courts for what is seen as a 
“stingy” construction of § 144, it bears note that none of Congress’s bills to over-
ride federal court interpretation of § 144 have passed. 510
Another reason why § 144 has fallen into relative disuse is that it requires 
the more difficult showing of actual bias, whereas § 455(a) requires a mere ap-
pearance of bias. Section 455 thus subsumes § 144. As the Supreme Court has 
observed of § 144, it “seems to be properly invocable only when § 455(a) can be 
invoked anyway.” 511 Moreover, many of the circumstances that might qualify as 
actual bias under § 144 are specifically enumerated in § 455(b), which explicitly 
addresses various conflicts of interest, in addition to actual bias. 512 In short, while 
parties still file motions under § 144, they usually do so in tandem with § 455, with 
the latter section typically monopolizing the court’s attention.
509. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2015) (denying defendant’s 
pro se motion for recusal since it was not accompanied by good-faith certificate from his appointed 
counsel of record); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1072 (7th Cir. 1990) (counsel did not present 
certificate of good faith, “another requirement of section 144 with which Barnes failed to comply”); 
In re Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[N]o party filed an affidavit. . . . Rather the 
affidavit was filed by an attorney.”); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Elder’s 
affidavit violates the one-affidavit rule . . . and need not be considered.”); United States v. Balistrieri, 
779 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Because of the statutory limitation that a party may file only one 
affidavit in a case, we need consider only the affidavit filed with Balistrieri’s first motion.”); Roberts v. 
Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (motion rejected because counsel, not plaintiff, signed and filed 
affidavit); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973) (same); Morrison 
v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion rejected because there was no certificate 
of good faith by counsel); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1967) (same).
510. For a discussion of failed amendments, see Peter A. Galbraith, Comment, Disqualifying 
Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 109 (1974).
511. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
512. See id. (“section 455 is the more modern and complete recusal statute”).
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 B. Grounds for disqualification
 1. Bias or prejudice
As noted in the overview, under § 144, disqualification is triggered by an affi-
davit that alleges “the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal 
bias or prejudice either against [the affiant] or in favor of any adverse party.” 
Many courts of appeals have explained that “[t]o warrant recusal under § 144, 
the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that 
bias actually exists.” 513 In Liteky v. United States, 514 the Supreme Court noted that 
the standard for bias or prejudice under § 144 is identical to disqualification for 
bias and prejudice under § 455(b)(1). 515 In so stating, it distinguished § 455(a), 
which requires allegations of bias “to be evaluated on an objective basis, so that 
what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” 516 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, has imported § 455(a)’s objective standard into its § 144 
analysis (before and after Liteky), declaring that “[u]nder both recusal statutes, 
the substantive standard is ‘[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of 
all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.’” 517
 2. “Extrajudicial source” doctrine revisited
The “extrajudicial source” doctrine (discussed in section II, in connection with 
§ 455) likewise applies to § 144. Indeed, the doctrine was initially developed under 
§ 144. Thus, ordinarily, disqualifying bias will have an extrajudicial origin—
judges often acquire an unfavorable opinion of a party in light of what they learn 
in the course of judicial proceedings, but that will rarely warrant disqualification. 
It bears reemphasis, however, that in Liteky the Supreme Court took pains to 
emphasize that “there is not much doctrine to the doctrine” 518 and that sometimes 
a judge is subject to disqualification under §§ 144 and 455 for bias manifested in 
513. Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Phillips v. Joint Legislative 
Comm. on Performance & Expenditure Review, 637 F.2d 1014, 1019 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)). See also United 
States v. Farkas, 669 F. App’x 122, 123 (4th Cir. 2016); In re Yunik, 425 F. App’x 112, 113 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007); West v. Litscher, 209 F. App’x 
557, 559 (7th Cir. 2006).
514. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
515. Id. at 548 (“paragraph (b)(1) entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in § 144”).
516. Id.
517. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 
109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)).
518. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554.
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judicial proceedings if the “opinions formed . . . display a deep-seated favoritism 
or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” 519
To illustrate the disqualifying bias that can manifest itself in judicial pro-
ceedings, the Liteky Court pointed to an alleged comment of the district judge in 
the 1921 case of Berger v. United States: 520 “‘One must have a very judicial mind, 
indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their 
‘hearts are reeking with disloyalty.’” 521
Liteky rejected an additional argument in support of a rigid extrajudicial 
source rule under § 144. Section 144 requires disqualification for “personal bias 
or prejudice.” Limiting § 144 to “personal” bias arguably justifies the exclusion of 
official or “judicial” bias from its scope and so confines its application to allega-
tions of extrajudicial or personal bias. In Liteky, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that “a number of Courts of Appeals have relied upon the word ‘personal’ in re-
stricting § 144 to extrajudicial sources” but concluded that “that mistakes the basis 
for the ‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine.” 522 As Justice Scalia explained for the Court, 
“[b]ias and prejudice seem to us not divided into the ‘personal’ kind, which is of-
fensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right.” 523 To the contrary, bias 
and prejudice “are never appropriate.” 524 Moreover, the Court added, “interpret-
ing the term ‘personal’ to create a complete dichotomy between court-acquired 
and extrinsically acquired bias produces results so intolerable as to be absurd.” 525 
The Court illustrated disqualifying official bias with the example of “a lengthy 
trial in which the presiding judge for the first time learns of an obscure religious 
sect and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents.” 526
Some federal courts have since adopted Liteky’s more nuanced approach to 
§ 144 and analyze allegations of in-court bias to see if they meet the “high degree 
of favoritism or antagonism” standard. 527 Others, however, continue to use the 
pre-Liteky analysis by rejecting § 144 motions if the accompanying affidavit does 
519. Id. at 555.
520. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
521. Id. at 28 (quoted in Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
522. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548–49.
523. Id. at 549.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 550.
526. Id.
527. See, e.g., Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Liteky at length, 
noting allegations of bias were based on conduct in judicial proceedings, and upholding district court’s 
assessment that “Pesnell failed to ‘demonstrate any such “deep-seated favoritism that would make fair 
judgment impossible”’”); United States v. Jones, 294 F. App’x 624 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Liteky, and 
concluding that judge’s comment that defendant was “a violent person who does not deserve to be 
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not allege an “extrajudicial source” for the judge’s purported bias or fails to show 
that the bias was “personal,” as opposed to “judicial.” 528
 3. Bias toward counsel
Of the cases dealing primarily with § 144, a sizable percentage involve a judge’s 
alleged antipathy toward counsel. On its terms, § 144 requires bias against the 
party. Accordingly, a judge’s hostility toward counsel is generally an insufficient 
ground for disqualification. 529 Yet courts have held that “under specific circum-
stances bias against an attorney can reasonably be imputed to a party.” 530 As the 
Seventh Circuit explained, “the party seeking recusal on that theory must allege 
facts suggesting that the alleged bias against counsel might extend to the party.” 531 
The allegations to that effect cannot be “merely conclusory.” 532
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that a lawyer’s praise 
of the judge required disqualification. In Sullivan v. Conway, 533 the lawyer had 
written a letter to his client maintaining that, as a result of removal of the case 
to federal court, “we have a much better judge.” 534 By mistake, the letter ended 
a free person” did not rise to the level of deep-seated antagonism); LoCascio v. United States, 473 
F.3d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2007) (trial judge’s decision to hold federal criminal defendant in contempt, 
which was subsequently vacated, and judge’s denial of defendant’s various motions during and after 
trial did not rise to the level of deep-seated antagonism, citing Liteky); Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 
1324, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liteky and concluding that affiant’s allegations did not show 
extrajudicial source of bias or reflect improper hostility or partiality).
528. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Defendant’s allega-
tions concern judicial, non-personal matters and cannot properly be the basis of a motion for disqual-
ification.”); Young v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying on pre-Liteky cases for 
the propositions that the “alleged bias ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source’” and that “extrajudi-
cial conduct encompasses only ‘personal bias as distinguished from a judicial one,’” and concluding 
that “recusal is also unwarranted because Plaintiffs do not allege bias from extrajudicial sources”).
529. See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 
117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991); In re 
Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987).
530. Souder, 939 F.2d at 653. Accord Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339. See also United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 
652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ritter, 540 
F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1050–51 (5th Cir. 1975). 
And see Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Bias for 
or against an attorney, who is not a party, is not enough to require disqualification unless it can also 
be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate a bias for or against the party itself.”).
531. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339.
532. Id. at 1340. Accord Souder, 939 F.2d at 653 n.6.
533. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).
534. Id. at 1095.
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up in the hands of opposing counsel, who showed it to the judge and petitioned 
for disqualification. The Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the affidavit 
evinced alleged bias sufficient to require referral of the matter to another judge:
We can imagine, though only with great difficulty, a case in which pub-
lic praise of a judge by a lawyer was so fulsome as to call into question 
the judge’s psychological fortitude to rule against his encomiast. But here 
there was no public praise . . . and the praise would not have come to [the 
judge’s] attention, and so would never have threatened to turn his head, 
had not the lawyer wishing to disqualify him brought it to his attention. 535
 C. Disqualification procedure
Section  144 is triggered only by the submission of an affidavit and motion for 
disqualification (unlike § 455(a), which can be brought by motion but also re-
quires judges to disqualify sua sponte where appropriate). Absent an affidavit and 
motion, there is no basis for disqualification under § 144, and no appeal based on 
§ 144 will be heard. 536 Apart from meeting the substantive standard, § 144 sets 
forth several procedural requirements, and courts demand “strict compliance.” 537
 1. Timeliness
Section 144 raises issues of timing twice—in the first paragraph, when it calls for 
the filing of a “timely” affidavit, and again in the second paragraph, when it states 
that a motion for disqualification “shall be filed not less than ten days before the 
beginning of the term [session] at which the proceeding is to be heard.” With the 
abolition of terms of court in 1963, this latter provision no longer applies directly. 
Some federal courts have nonetheless required that the affidavit be filed within 
ten days of the beginning of the proceeding. 538 Other courts have determined 
timeliness on the basis of whether the affidavit was filed as soon as practicable 539 
or promptly “after the facts forming the basis of the disqualification became 
535. Id. at 1096.
536. See, e.g., United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1999).
537. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Medlock, 406 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th 
Cir. 2005).
538. See, e.g., Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co. Div. of Uniroyal, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
United States v. Iddeen, 854 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 710 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989).
539. Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home of Jefferson, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1986).
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known.” 540 Either way, numerous cases have involved rejection of § 144 motions 
because of untimely affidavits. 541
 2. Facially sufficient affidavit
Section 144 conditions disqualification on the moving party filing a sufficient af-
fidavit. If no affidavit is filed, disqualification will be denied. In the landmark case 
Berger v. United States, 542 the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory predeces-
sor to § 144 to require that the challenged judge accept all facts alleged in the affi-
davit as true and not pass on the truth of the alleged facts. Rather, the judge’s role 
was limited to evaluating the facial sufficiency of the affidavit for the purpose of 
determining whether a reasonable person could find “fair support” for the charge 
that the judge was biased against the movant or in favor of another party. 543 Many 
circuits have since reiterated this principle. 544
In Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 545 the Ninth Circuit departed from the 
prevailing view. The party had accused the judge of various improper ex parte 
communications. While acknowledging that judges are “generally required” to 
accept the allegations in a § 144 affidavit as true, the court made an exception be-
cause the allegation of bias “relates to facts that were peculiarly within the judge’s 
knowledge.” 546 The Ninth Circuit held that disqualification was unnecessary in 
part because the judge knew the allegations were false.
540. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 505, 510 (D. Del. 1981).
541. See, e.g., Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Young, 907 F.2d 
867, 868 (8th Cir. 1990); Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1357 (6th Cir. 1988). 
See also United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 538 (7th Cir. 2017) (upholding rejection of § 144 
motion on tardiness grounds where it was filed eleven days after issuance of an adverse opinion and 
sufficiency of affidavit was questionable).
542. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
543. Id. at 33–34.
544. See In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 
1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 653 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987); Albert v. United States Dist. Ct., 
283 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1960). See also United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting 
trial court felt “bound by statute and Supreme Court precedent to accept Rankin’s factual allegations 
as true”). But see Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(“the judge must pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, but may not pass on the truth of the 
matter alleged”) (quoting Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th 
Cir. 1975)).
545. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
546. Id. at 701.
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The prevailing view—that judges must accept all allegations in a § 144 affidavit 
as true—has prompted concern that judges are left helpless to stop parties from 
disqualifying judges by filing false affidavits. There are isolated cases in which 
disqualification on the basis of sham affidavits may have occurred. For example, 
in United States v. Rankin, 547 the defendant alleged that in a previous trial, the 
judge had chased the defendant around the courtroom and assaulted him. While 
denying the bizarre accusation, the trial judge nevertheless disqualified himself 
from the second trial on the ground that § 144 bound him to accept the allegations 
as true. 548 In an earlier, unrelated case, the Third Circuit had held a refusal to 
disqualify improper, even though “[p]robably the district court is right that there 
is no basis for the allegations” 549 that the judge made improper statements (e.g., 
“If I had anything to do with it you would have gone to the electric chair”). The 
court of appeals expressed “sympathy with district judges confronted with what 
they know to be groundless charges of personal bias” but held that § 144 requires 
acceptance of factual allegations as true. 550
Courts have, however, countered this potential problem by scrutinizing the 
facial sufficiency of § 144 affidavits. 551 As the First Circuit explained, “courts have 
responded to the draconian procedure—automatic transfer based solely on one 
side’s affidavit—by insisting on a firm showing in the affidavit that the judge does 
have a personal bias or prejudice toward a party.” 552
Virtually every circuit has therefore imposed some variation of the require-
ment that movants’ affidavits be sufficient to “convince a reasonable person” that 
their judge is biased. 553 In the Seventh Circuit,
the facts averred must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a 
reasonable person that bias exists; simple conclusions, opinions, or rumors 
547. 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989).
548. The second trial was reassigned. Then the government indicted the defendant for perjury 
arising out of the statements in his affidavit seeking the first judge’s disqualification. The Rankin 
opinion concerned issues relating to this indictment.
549. Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976).
550. Id.
551. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile a court must assume 
the truth of the factual assertions, it is not bound to accept the movant’s conclusions as to the facts’ 
significance”).
552. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).
553. See, e.g., United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1090 (6th Cir. 1983); Chitimacha Tribe v. Laws, 
690 F.2d 1157, 1167 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 858 (10th Cir. 1976); United States 
v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 53 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 
387, 388 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 686 
(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
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are insufficient. . . . Because the statute “is heavily weighed in favor of 
recusal,” its requirements are to be strictly construed to prevent abuse. 554
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit observed that § 144 creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the challenged judge is impartial, which imposes a burden on 
the affiant to demonstrate the judge’s partiality. 555 Several circuits have thus ruled 
that the movant’s affidavit must state with particularity material facts supporting 
allegations of the judge’s bias. 556 According to the D.C. Circuit, “stating the facts 
with particularity” means the affidavit “must be strictly construed [against the 
affiant]; it must be definite as to time, place, persons and circumstances.” 557 The 
Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. 558 By requiring that the challenging 
party state facts material to the allegations of the judge’s bias with particularity, 
the courts have excluded conclusory assertions, as well as opinions and rumors, 
from the realm of allegations that may support a judge’s disqualification. 559 Even 
if the affidavit is deemed facially sufficient and the case is transferred, the First 
Circuit has observed that “the possibility remains, although not developed in the 
statute, that the transferee judge might hold a hearing, conclude that the affidavit 
was false and transfer the action back to the original judge.” 560
 3. Counsel’s certificate of good faith
Section 144 states: “A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good 
faith.” 561 The question has arisen whether counsel’s certificate of good faith must 
assert that counsel believes the allegations to be true or whether counsel merely 
believes that his or her client is acting in good faith. The word “it” in the phrase 
quoted above seems to refer back to the party’s affidavit and thus to require that 
counsel vouch for the good faith of the party’s belief—not counsel’s own belief—
that the facts are true. But the two circuits that have addressed the question 
554. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
555. In re McCarthy, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 
1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992)).
556. Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000); Henderson v. Department of Pub. 
Safety & Corrs., 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
557. United States v. Miller, 355 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
558. Burger, 964 F.2d at 1070. See also Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th 
Cir. 1987).
559. See, e.g., Burger, 964 F.2d 1065; Weatherhead, 832 F.2d 1226.
560. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997).
561. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
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directly in modern times have held otherwise. The First Circuit held a §  144 
motion inadequate in part because counsel’s certificate of good faith asserted 
only that the party acted in good faith. 562 The court noted that “[i]f a certificate 
is to serve the purpose of shielding a court which cannot test the truth of claimed 
facts, it should at least carry the assertion that counsel believes the facts alleged 
to be accurate and correct.” 563 The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion. 564
562. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961).
563. Id. at 385.
564. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 380 F.2d 570, 577–78 & n.17 
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327 (1967). Cf. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 
1993) (certificate must “stat[e] that the affidavit is made in good faith”). But see Flegenheimer v. 
United States, 110 F.2d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 1936) (“As long as the [client] honestly believed that the Judge 
was biased and stated on what facts he based his opinion, it was his right to call on his counsel to give 
the certificate provided by the statute in order to have the question of bias determined.”)
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IVDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 47
A little-used disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no judge shall 
hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.” 565 
One reason the statute has barely surfaced in the case law is that its applicability 
is limited to cases in which a trial judge subsequently serves as an appellate judge 
in the same matter, which may occur when a district judge is appointed to the 
circuit court or sits on the circuit court by designation. Another reason § 47 is so 
rarely employed is that on those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqual-
ification, the same result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a). As an 
historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always so. When mem-
bers of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, it was not uncommon for them to hear appeals as Supreme Court jus-
tices from cases they decided as circuit court judges.
In Russell v. Lane, 566 the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision of 
a state appellate court in which the judge had been a member of the panel. The 
Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance of impropriety in violation 
of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however, the court cited the relevance of 
§ 47 and noted that it “is an express ground for recusal . . . in modern American 
law for a judge to sit on the appeal from his own case.” 567
In a Fourth Circuit opinion explaining his disqualification from a school de-
segregation case, Judge James Craven Jr. discussed § 47 more extensively. 568 As 
a district judge years earlier, he heard and decided a case involving the same 
565. For a rare usage, see United States v. Hudson, 685 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (disqualification 
of appellate judge who was formerly a district judge).
566. 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989).
567. Id. at 948.
568. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970).
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parties. Although the instant case was a separate lawsuit, it raised the identi-
cal “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the predecessor 
statute to § 47, Judge Craven held that the statute must be “strictly construed” to 
prevent judges from, in effect, sitting in appellate judgment of their own earlier 
decisions. 569
In Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 570 the Supreme Court observed 
that it makes no difference whether “the question may be easy of solution or that 
the parties may consent to the judge’s participation” because “the sole [statutory] 
criterion” is whether the case on appeal “involve[s] a question which the judge 
has tried or heard” in the proceedings below. 571 In Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine 
Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine Turbine Co., 572 the Supreme Court va-
cated an appellate decision notwithstanding the parties’ consent to the trial judge 
sitting on the appeal, holding that the appellate panel was “not organized in con-
formity to law.” 573
The Third Circuit, however, rejected without explanation the contention that 
a district judge, sitting by designation on the Third Circuit panel (and the author 
of the court opinion), should be disqualified pursuant to § 47. 574 In his capacity as 
trial judge, he had accepted the defendant’s conditional plea of guilt. On appeal, 
the defendant argued that his guilty plea should be vacated because the indict-
ment against him resulted from prosecutorial vindictiveness. At oral argument, 
the judge informed counsel of his involvement in the case. Counsel did not object, 
and disqualification was waived. In a footnote, the Third Circuit, after “[h]aving 
independently considered this matter, . . . conclude[d] that there is no basis for 
recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 47.” 575 The court’s reasoning may have been based on 
the nature of the defendant’s appeal, which did not claim any impropriety in the 
plea agreement or challenge any action taken by the judge. Rather, the defendant 
objected to the bringing of the indictment in the first place.
569. Id. at 136. See also Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899). And see Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 
F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2013).
570. 228 U.S. 339 (1913).
571. Id. at 344.
572. 228 U.S. 645 (1913).
573. Id. at 652.
574. United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983).
575. Id. at 801 n.1.
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VDisqualification on Appeal 
 A. Routes of appellate review
Aggrieved parties often challenge a judge’s refusal to disqualify. In general, par-
ties may seek review of a district judge’s decision not to disqualify via one of two 
routes. First, they may seek review via postjudgment appeal. Second, they may 
seek prejudgment review via a petition for writ of mandamus filed with the court 
of appeals, subject to the “extraordinary” circumstances needed to invoke the 
writ. Other means of interlocutory appeal have largely proved unsuccessful. Re-
view under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), interlocutory decisions, is ordinarily unavailing. 
The statute limits interlocutory appeals to matters that concern a “controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion.” 576 Disqualification will rarely meet that test. Review under the collateral or-
der doctrine has likewise failed, given the availability of postjudgment appeal as a 
means to vindicate the movant’s right to challenge the judge’s nondisqualification 
(to obtain interlocutory review of review of a collateral order, the order must be 
“effectively unreviewable” later).
All courts of appeals allow a party to seek interlocutory review via manda-
mus, 577 reasoning that, at least in some cases, the damage to public confidence in 
576. Jeffrey Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 589, 635 (1987).
577. See, e.g., In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976). A motion for mandamus 
was brought under § 1292(b). The motion involved a “controlling question of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of opinion” as to how the recently amended § 455 should be 
applied to the facts. Id. at 363 (quoting § 1292(b)). Although the decision against disqualification 
is not ordinarily appealable under § 1292(b), this case presented an exception because the trial 
judge’s decision effectively meant that no judge residing in the state of Virginia could preside over 
the case, even though the lawsuit was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 364. See also In re 
Arunachalam, 812 F.3d 290, 292–94 (3d Cir. 2016).
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the justice system (or perhaps to the litigants) would not be undone by postjudg-
ment appeal. 578 The Third and Seventh Circuits have said that while petitioning 
for a writ of mandamus is a proper means for appellate review of a district court’s 
refusal to disqualify pursuant to § 455(a), it is unavailable for a challenge under 
§ 144. 579 The reasoning is that § 144, which addresses actual bias, protects liti-
gants but that § 455, which concerns whether a judge’s impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned, also protects public confidence in the judiciary. “While review 
after final judgment can (at a cost) cure the harm to a litigant, it cannot cure the 
additional, separable harm to public confidence that section 455 is designed to 
prevent.” 580
Most circuits apply their usual standard for mandamus—often placing a 
heavy burden on the movant. 581 Allocating the burden to the movant serves a 
“strong judicial policy” that disfavors piecemeal appeals. 582 After all, the movant 
has the opportunity to appeal the disqualification decision after the case has been 
decided on the merits 583 and a full “contextual assessment” can be done for alle-
gations of partiality. 584
578. In re Vazquez-Botet, 464 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 
2008); In re Briggs, No. 00-1434, 2000 WL 961881, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000); In re Cameron Int’l 
Corp., 393 F. App’x 133, 134 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1139–43 (6th Cir. 
1990); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 643 (8th 
Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1982); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 
937, 938 (10th Cir. 1987) (dealing with § 144) (citing Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978) 
(dealing with § 455)); In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913, 915 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991); In re Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 166 F. App’x 490, 491 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
579. See School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 774–78; SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th 
Cir. 1977).
580. School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 776.
581. See, e.g., Mischler v. Bevin, 887 F.3d 271, 272 (6th Cir. 2018) (available only when “petitioner 
alleges that delay will cause irreparable harm”); In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1994) (petitioner 
must establish “clear and indisputable right” to disqualification); In re McCarthy, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 
(10th Cir. 2004) (where party “lacks an adequate factual basis for disqualification,” court of appeals 
will not issue mandamus).
582. Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 709 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1983).
583. See, e.g., In re Vazquez-Botet, 464 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (where motion for mandamus 
denied because of lack of “clear and indisputable” entitlement to relief, court did not have to address 
whether judge should have disqualified; so defendant was still free to raise denial of motion for 
disqualification on appeal after final judgment).
584. Alexander, 709 F.2d at 471. See also Scenic Holding, LLC v. New Bd. of Tr. of the Tabernacle 
Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 665 (8th Cir. 2007) (although judge improperly injected 
his religious beliefs into proceedings, a reasonable person looking at totality of circumstances would 
not conclude religious favoritism on judge’s part; thus refusing to disqualify not abuse of discretion).
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The First Circuit, however, has adopted a separate standard for entertaining 
a mandamus action seeking disqualification: “[w]hen the issue of partiality has 
been broadly publicized, and the claim of bias cannot be labeled as frivolous.” 585 It 
has also stated that the standard for granting mandamus should be relaxed “in a 
criminal case in which the government seeks the judge’s recusal, for a defendant’s 
verdict will terminate the case, thereby rendering the usual remedy, end-of-case 
appeal, illusory.” 586 Where the government seeks disqualification in a criminal 
case, “the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard rather than the more exacting 
standard usually applicable to petitions for mandamus” should be used. 587
In the Seventh Circuit, the sole route to review a refusal to disqualify pur-
suant to § 455(a) had long been a writ of mandamus, although appeal after fi-
nal judgment was available to challenge refusals to disqualify under § 144 and 
§ 455(b). 588 A party that failed to seek mandamus forfeited its right to raise the 
issue in a postjudgment appeal, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, because if a party 
waited until judgment was entered it was too late to avoid the damage to public 
confidence that § 455(a) sought to prevent. In 2016, however, the Seventh Circuit 
reconsidered, concluding that because § 455(a) directs judges to disqualify on 
their own initiative, litigants should not be penalized for failing to seek prejudg-
ment review of disqualification via mandamus. 589
 B. Standards of review
When reviewing a trial judge’s disqualification, every court of appeals—with 
the occasional exception of the Seventh Circuit—uses a deferential, “abuse 
of discretion” standard in which findings of fact are typically accepted unless 
585. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). See 
also In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 167 (1st Cir. 2001) (where question of judge’s partiality 
was highly publicized, writ of disqualification issued where it may not have been under normal 
circumstances) (citing In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1997)).
586. United States, 158 F.3d at 30.
587. Id. at 31.
588. See, e.g., United States v. Farrington, 27 F. App’x 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Cf. United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (urging Seventh 
Circuit to join rest of courts of appeals in permitting appellate review of failure to disqualify under 
§ 455(a)).
589. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2016).
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“clearly erroneous.” 590 The Seventh Circuit sometimes applies a de novo standard 
of review. 591
There are sometimes ad hoc variations. In Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. v. AT&T, 592 for example, the D.C. Circuit used a stricter standard in reviewing 
a judge’s factual findings that gave rise to Southern Pacific’s claim that it was 
denied a fair trial because of the judge’s legal and policy bias. Southern Pacific 
asked the court to remand the case for a new trial or, in the alternative, to aban-
don the “clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing the district court’s factu-
al findings. Although the court declined to abandon the standard, it “reviewed 
the District Court’s findings against the record with particular, even painstaking, 
care” in view of the judicial misconduct allegations. 593
In SEC v. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 594 the D.C. Circuit adopted the “abuse 
of discretion” standard for disqualification under § 455 but did not articulate a 
binding standard of review for § 144, finding that it “need not decide which stan-
dard to adopt, for even reviewing de novo we can easily sustain [the trial judge’s] 
decision.” 595 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 596 however, the D.C. Circuit reject-
ed greater scrutiny of the judge’s fact findings because, absent evidence of actual 
bias, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) “mandates clearly erroneous review of 
all district court factfindings.” 597
When applying the “abuse of discretion” standard, the appellate courts rec-
ognize that “there will be occasions in which [it] affirm[s] the district court 
even though [it] would have gone the other way” had the standard been de novo 
590. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Morrison, 
833 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Torres-Estrada, 817 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Apple Inc., 787 F.3d 131, 
138 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015); Decker v. GE Healthcare 
Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Marshall, 721 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013); Central Tel. 
Co. of Va. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. of Va., 715 F.3d 501, 515 (4th Cir. 2013).
591. See United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying de novo standard 
of review to motions brought under both §§ 144 and 455). See also Sac & Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 
1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo standard where district judge “did not create a record or 
document her decision not to recuse”). But see Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 716 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(applying “abuse of discretion” standard).
592. 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
593. Id. at 984.
594. 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
595. Id. at 492.
596. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
597. Id. at 117.
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review. 598 Factors that may be used to assess whether trial judges have abused 
their discretion include whether a trial judge “engaged in measured and consid-
ered deliberations” before handing down a ruling; 599 whether a judge’s ruling was 
“well-reasoned”; 600 whether, after declining to disqualify, a judge’s rulings and 
conduct called the judge’s impartiality into question; 601 whether the judge pro-
vided the appellant an opportunity to argue and brief the appellant’s positions; 602 
and whether the judge fully considered the appellant’s motions. 603
In Moran v. Clarke, 604 the plaintiff moved to disqualify the judge after a de-
fendant revealed at her deposition that she had known the judge socially for over 
twenty years. The district judge declined to disqualify himself without comment, 
and the Eighth Circuit, faced with a record insufficient to apply the “abuse of 
discretion” standard to the case before it, remanded to the same judge for further 
proceedings, with the following explanation and instructions:
The district judge’s appearances at the same social events as Clarke and 
Smith brooks [sic] little mention. Judges, attorneys and public officials 
will often share public appearances. This does little to create the appear-
ance of impropriety. The social relationship, however, invites more scruti-
ny. The image of one sitting in judgment over a friend’s affairs would likely 
cause the average person in the street to pause. That the judge and Clarke 
enjoyed a friendship of sufficient depth and duration as to warrant several 
reciprocal visits to one another’s homes only exacerbates the problem. 
We find particularly worrisome the district court’s failure to disclose this 
conflict himself, as permitted by section 455(e). Moreover, the record sug-
gests a fractious relationship between the district court and Moran’s attor-
neys. We do, however, have the utmost faith in the district court’s ability to 
rule impartially, and have imposed on ourselves an obligation to reverse 
a district court only where we can say with certainty that it has abused its 
discretion. Accordingly, rather than remand to a different judge, we re-
mand this question to the district court with the suggestion that it revisit 
and more thoroughly consider and respond to Moran’s recusal request. 605
598. Alloco v. City of Coral Gables, 159 F. App’x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
599. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Dixon v. Clem, 492 
F.3d 665, 679 (6th Cir. 2007) (judge didn’t abuse discretion by writing “lengthy and meticulous legal 
analysis” as to why he refused to disqualify himself, and by imposing sanctions against plaintiff ’s 
attorney).
600. Alloco, 159 F. App’x at 923.
601. In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 
775 (2d Cir. 2007)).
602. Lewin v. Cooke, 28 F. App’x 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2002).
603. Id.
604. 296 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2002).
605. Id. at 649.
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A party’s motion must be timely. A few appellate courts are willing to enter-
tain an argument about disqualification that was not raised in a timely manner 
but apply a “plain error” standard. 606
 C. Issues on appeal
 1. Harmless error
Section 455 tells judges when disqualification is required but does not spell out 
the appropriate remedy for a failure to disqualify. In Liljeberg v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp., 607 the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b), authorizing relief from a final judgment, is an appropriate remedy for a tri-
al court’s improper failure to disqualify. The Court cautioned that Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief is “neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all 
§ 455(a) violations.” 608 Rather, “there is surely room for harmless error commit-
ted by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.” 609
In spelling out the factors to be considered in determining whether a new 
trial is the appropriate remedy, the Court cautioned against too casual a finding 
of harmless error:
[I]t is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the par-
ticular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other 
cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judi-
cial process. We must continuously bear in mind that “to perform its high 
function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” 610
Heeding the Court’s warning, courts of appeals have been slow to deem a 
failure to disqualify harmless error. A few exceptions are instructive.
In Harris v. Champion, 611 a judge in a habeas case failed to disqualify himself 
even though his uncle had been a judge in some of the state cases challenged on 
606. See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1276 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Arache, 
946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 1991); Osei-Afriyie v. Medical Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 886 (3d Cir. 1991). See 
also United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 968 (5th Cir. 1997).
607. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
608. Id. at 864.
609. Id. at 862. Courts have also applied the harmless error standard to § 455(b) violations. See 
Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1571 (10th Cir. 1994); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 
1415, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988).
610. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citation omitted)). 
For more on Liljeberg—and the circumstances in which predisqualification orders should be vacated 
under Rule 60(b)(6) and possibly 60(b)(4)—see section II.C.5.b.
611. 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
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appeal. The Tenth Circuit found that disqualification was required under both 
§ 455(a) and § 455(b)(5)(i). But the “case presented [a] very unusual situation 
[in] that . . . [the judge] did not act alone, but rather as one member of a three-
judge panel that ruled unanimously.” 612 In part for that reason, the court opted not 
to vacate the rulings. (The viability of the Harris analysis is in doubt, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, 613 where the Court re-
jected the argument that a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice’s nondisqualifica-
tion was harmless error because the justice did not cast a decisive vote, reasoning 
that the disqualified justice could have influenced the views of his colleagues.) 614 
In Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 615 the judge disqualified herself based on inaccu-
rate information, then vacated her disqualification order when she realized the 
mistake. The Fifth Circuit held that it was error to vacate the disqualification 
order. The error was harmless, however, because:
[R]ecusal was sua sponte, and based on incomplete and incorrect infor-
mation. . . . [N]one of the parties ever moved to have the judge step aside, 
and none has suggested any actual bias or prejudice. . . . [T]here is no 
risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. In-
deed, overturning the many decisions [the judge] made after vacating her 
recusal order—simply because she recused herself too hastily and in er-
ror—would be wasteful and unnecessary. 616
The Fifth Circuit also found harmless error in an improper failure to disqual-
ify in United States v. Jordan. 617 It concluded that the defendant’s well-known, 
extremely antagonistic relationship with a close personal friend of the judge cre-
ated an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a). The Fifth Circuit vacated the 
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing by a different judge. But, under 
the circumstances, it found that upholding the conviction would not undermine 
the public’s confidence in the judicial process and would not be unjust to the ap-
pellant, who “never contend[ed] that she suffered any harm during trial because 
of any alleged bias or prejudice.” 618
Faced with a mandamus action seeking mistrial in the midst of complex 
mass tort litigation, the First Circuit, in In re Allied-Signal Inc., 619 noted that while 
the Liljeberg analysis arose in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion, “we believe it 
612. Id. at 1572.
613. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
614. Id. at 1903.
615. 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996).
616. Id. at 459.
617. 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995).
618. Id. at 158.
619. 891 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1989).
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should apply as well to present circumstances, where ‘mistrial’ . . . would threaten 
to undo matters of considerable importance previously decided.” 620 Thus, even 
assuming arguendo that disqualification was improperly denied, the court never-
theless denied the requested relief because it would mean retrying complex and 
costly litigation and reopening settlement agreements. 621 Moreover, no future in-
justice would result because there were no allegations of actual bias infecting 
any findings or rulings, and no rulings had been made that were “incurable or 
could have preclusive effect in some other action.” 622 Finally, because the alleged 
appearance of impropriety—brothers of the judge’s law clerks were among the 
attorneys in the case—was not egregious, the court did “not believe . . . that the 
relevant public’s confidence in the judiciary would be seriously undermined were 
no mistrial declared.” 623
 2. Reviewability of lower court decisions to disqualify
The majority of disqualification appeals concern a judge’s refusal to disqualify. 
The courts of appeals are split as to whether a judge’s decision to disqualify is 
reviewable. 
Holding that a decision to disqualify is unreviewable, the Seventh Circuit 
explained its rationale:
[W]e fail to conceive of any interest which the plaintiffs have as litigants 
for review of [the judge’s] recusal order. The effect of his decision to step 
aside is merely to have the case reassigned to another judge of the district 
court. The order does not strip plaintiffs of a fair forum in which they can 
pursue their claim. . . . [T]hey have no protectable interest in the contin-
ued exercise of jurisdiction by a particular judge. 624
The court held that the order to disqualify is not a final order and, because 
a party lacks a claim of right to the original judge, the collateral order doctrine 
does not apply. 625 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have taken the same position. 626
The Ninth Circuit has allowed a party to seek a writ of mandamus to review a 
decision to disqualify in “exceptional situations in which the costs of familiarizing 
a new judge, in terms of delay, will prove to be very great” and the litigation is 




624. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478, 479 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
625. Id. at 479–80.
626. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 644 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust 
Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 1982).
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“greatly disrupted.” 627 The First Circuit addressed the reviewability of sua sponte 
disqualifications in United States v. Snyder. 628 The district court judge had exhibit-
ed pervasive hostility toward a federal prosecutor for what the judge perceived to 
be a selective and “grossly disparate” sentencing request. 629 The district judge dis-
qualified himself sua sponte, and the defendant appealed the decision claiming 
the judge had a duty to sit. 630 The First Circuit held that a sua sponte disqualifica-
tion must be examined in light of both the duty to sit and the duty to disqualify:
[W]e have recognized that the duty to recuse and the duty to sit do not 
exert equal pull; in close cases, “doubts ordinarily ought to be resolved 
in favor of recusal.” No one suggests that different principles of review 
apply here, where a judge has recused himself sua sponte. Hence, our re-
view in this case, as in our prior cases, is both deferential and weighted: 
we inquire whether, in light of the policy favoring recusal in close cases, 
[the trial judge] abused his discretion in finding that he had a duty to 
recuse himself. 631
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have been willing to review orders by 
judges disqualifying themselves, at least in some circumstances. 632
 3. Mootness of underlying dispute
A claim for disqualification, like any other claim, cannot be adjudicated absent 
a live dispute between the parties. Courts have implicitly or explicitly rejected 
disqualification requests as moot in a variety of circumstances. 633 In Pontarelli 
627. Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1025.
628. 235 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2000).
629. Id. at 47.
630. The “duty to sit,” as used here, should not be misunderstood. As discussed in Section I.A, the 
traditional duty to sit ended in 1974. But federal judges nonetheless remain subject to an ethical duty 
to hear the cases they are assigned except when disqualification is necessary, which is at issue here.
631. Snyder, 235 F.3d at 46 (citation and footnote omitted).
632. See In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363–65 (4th Cir. 1976) (decision to disqualify 
reviewable by mandamus, and as collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), where it raises important 
legal issue that would otherwise escape review); Kelley v. Metropolitan Cty. Bd., 479 F.2d 810, 811 
n.1 (6th Cir. 1973) (decision to disqualify reviewable, apparently immediately, though court did 
not clarify).
633. See, e.g., In re Starr, 152 F.3d 741, 751 n.23 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding party moving for 
disqualification lacked standing to bring underlying action); United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 
452 (7th Cir. 1998) (violation of Rule 11 required remand to a different judge anyway); Reynolds v. 
International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1121 (6th Cir. 1994) (trial court’s judgment reversed 
on substantive grounds unrelated to disqualification); United States v. Ahmed, 980 F.2d 161, 163 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (trial judge had already directed clerk of court to reassign case to a different judge); Mallory 
v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) (trial judge had already withdrawn from case).
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v. Stone, 634 after all the parties had settled the merits of the underlying disputes, 
one of the lawyers appealed the denial of attorney fees. The focus of the claim, 
however, was that the judge should have disqualified himself pursuant to § 455(a). 
The First Circuit found the issue moot.
[B]efore an appellate court can make a ruling on the appropriateness of 
disqualification by a district judge . . . the underlying dispute as to which 
the district court ruling is relevant must still remain a live controversy. . . . 
If a trial judge has wrongly failed to disqualify him or herself, the remedy 
. . . is for the appellate court to reverse the decision . . . on the merits and 
to order a new trial before a different judge. 635
Where, as here, the underlying case had settled, and no party challenged 
the settlement, the issue of disqualification was moot. The court noted that the 
lawyer’s recourse was to file a disciplinary complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351. 636
 4. Impact of guilty plea on reviewability of 
nondisqualification
The courts of appeals differ as to whether a defendant who pleads guilty waives 
the challenge to the trial judge’s denial of a motion to disqualify. In the First and 
Second Circuits, a guilty plea does not waive a § 455 challenge. In United States v. 
Chantal, 637 a defendant was charged with, and pled guilty to, various drug-related 
offenses. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made critical comments about 
the defendant. It was later discovered that the defendant engaged in further drug-
related activity while free on bond pending sentencing that resulted in a second 
indictment. The new case was assigned to the same judge, and the defendant 
moved to disqualify, but the judge refused. The defendant pled guilty to that 
charge as well. On appeal, when the defendant challenged the judge’s refusal to 
disqualify himself with respect to the second indictment, the government argued 
that a guilty plea waives all but jurisdictional defenses and therefore waived the 
defendant’s § 455(a) challenge. The First Circuit disagreed, reasoning that, “It is 
plain that Congress would never have thought its purpose to assure actions by 
judges who are not only impartial but appear to be, could be . . . eradicated by a plea 
engendered by the immediate prospect of a trial/decision by a biased judge.” 638
634. 978 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1992).
635. Id. at 775.
636. Id. at 776.
637. 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).
638. Id. at 1021. Accord United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995) (endorsing First 
Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion).
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The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have taken the opposite approach, holding that 
an unconditional guilty plea waives appeal of a §  455(a) disqualification mo-
tion. 639 They reason that since § 455(e) permits waiver of disqualification when 
a judge is faced with an appearance of impropriety under § 455(a) but makes full 
disclosure, waiver may also be found when a party enters a guilty plea without 
specifically preserving the issue for appeal. 640
 5. Jurisdiction
Courts of appeals have sometimes found that they have jurisdiction to review a 
refusal to disqualify—for example, on a habeas petition—even though they lack 
jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of the trial court’s decision on the 
issue in the case. 641
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “an order remanding a case to the State court from 
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Yet the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the district court abused 
its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify. It reasoned that because a trial 
judge who has disqualified himself from a case may take no further action (ex-
cept transferring the case to another federal judge), if the judge should have dis-
qualified himself, then any orders entered after denying the motion to disqualify 
were improper. 642 Therefore, reviewing the refusal to disqualify would not really 
be reviewing the order of remand, even though a finding that disqualification was 
required would lead to vacating the remand order. “[W]e would be performing 
an essentially ministerial task of vacating an order that the district court had no 
authority to enter into for reasons unrelated to the order of remand itself.” 643
 D. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 2106
In addition to the explicitly iterated disqualification statutes, appellate courts 
have used 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to disqualify judges on appeal. In Liteky v. United 
States, 644 the Supreme Court recognized this practice and acknowledged that 
639. United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506, 507 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 
1324 (10th Cir. 1988).
640. Hoctel, 154 F.3d at 508 (citing Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325).
641. See Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 
1989); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978).
642. Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1998).
643. Id. at 1028.
644. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
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“Federal appellate courts’ ability to assign a case to a different judge on remand 
rests not on the recusal statutes alone, but on the appellate courts’ statutory 
power . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2106.” 645
Section 2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may af-
firm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or or-
der of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the 
cause and direct entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, 
or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the cir-
cumstances. 646
Appellate courts have interpreted this statute to require reassignment to a 
different judge on remand when “removal is essential to ‘preserve[ ] both the ap-
pearance and reality of fairness.’” 647 Reassignment should only be used in “rare 
and extraordinary circumstances,” 648 including but not necessarily limited to cir-
cumstances manifesting personal bias. 649
The presence of personal bias will warrant reassignment to a different judge 
on remand. In determining whether personal bias is evident, courts often rely on 
the framework set forth in § 455 and interpreted by Liteky. 650 For example, the 
First Circuit has held that when the district judge’s views—even if arguably incen-
diary—were grounded entirely on information acquired at trial, there was no ev-
idence of personal bias sufficient to require reassignment. 651 Likewise, the Ninth 
645. Id. at 554.
646. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (emphasis added).
647. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
648. See, e.g., Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Reassignment is ‘an exceptional remedy, one that we weigh seriously and order sparingly.’”) 
(citing United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012)); Villegas v. Metropolitan Gov’t of 
Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 580 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[r]eassignment . . . is an extraordinary power and should 
be rarely invoked. Reassignments should be made infrequently and with the greatest reluctance.”) 
(quoting Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006)). See also Candelario Del Moral 
v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of Puerto Rico, 699 F.3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 2012); Mustang Mktg., Inc. v. Chevron 
Prods. Co., 406 F.3d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir. 1997).
649. See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
650. See, e.g., id. at 562 (determining that “[r]emand to a different trial judge is appropriate under 
a demonstration of personal bias”). See also Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics 
in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189, 204 (2007) (highlighting 
appellate courts’ use of § 2106 as “a device for enforcing an ethical standard almost identical to that of 
§ 455(a)”).
651. Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding, as in Liteky, that 
“views formed by a judge in considering a case are normally not a sound basis either for required 
recusal or for directing that a different judge be assigned on remand” (citing Liteky v. United States, 
510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)).
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Circuit has ruled that even though adopting a party’s findings in their entirety is 
a “disfavored practice,” this action does not meet the standard for personal bias 
necessary to require reassignment. 652
Absent personal bias, the courts of appeals require a showing of “unusual 
circumstances” in order for reassignment on remand to be warranted. 653 They 
use two different tests to determine whether unusual circumstances exist: a 
three-factor test and an “objective observer” test.
The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply the three-factor test to determine 
whether unusual circumstances exist that would merit reassignment: “(1) wheth-
er on remand the district judge can be expected to follow [the appellate] court’s 
dictates; (2) whether reassignment is advisable to maintain the appearance of 
justice; and (3) whether reassignment risks undue waste and duplication.” 654 In 
weighing these factors, “[t]he first two factors are considered to be of equal im-
portance and a finding of either one will support a remand to a different judge.” 655
This test has been used most often by the Ninth Circuit where question-
able judicial tactics have compromised the appearance of justice. For example, 
in Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 656 the district court had adopted a 
party’s summary judgment order wholesale with only minor changes, directed 
publication of the ghost-written order, and reversed a previously entered certi-
fication sub silento. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even though the district 
judge’s impartiality was arguably still intact, his actions gave rise to the unusu-
al circumstances necessary to require reassignment on remand. 657 Similarly, in 
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 658 the district judge had dis-
played blatant disregard for the appellate court’s mandates (by reaffirming his 
prior ruling without addressing or attempting to distinguish the appellate court’s 
652. See Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young, 644 F.2d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 1981).
653. See, e.g., Mustang Mktg., 406 F.3d at 610, discussing the two inquiries that must be made in 
applying § 2106 to decide whether reassignment is appropriate. Did the district court exhibit “personal 
bias requiring recusal from a case”? Id. (citing United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 
779–80 (9th Cir. 1986)). If not, are there “unusual circumstances” that merit reassignment? Id. 
(quoting Sears, Roebuck, 785 F.2d at 780).
654. United States v. Lyons, 472 F.3d 1055, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Solomon v. United States, 
467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
655. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Sys., Inc., Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18166, at *13 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000) (unpublished table opinion). See also Living Designs v. E.I. Dupont 
de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 2005).
656. 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005).
657. Id. at 372.
658. Nos. 99-55111 & 55453, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18166 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000) (unpublished 
table opinion).
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determination) and overt animosity (by denying the party’s motions without re-
view). The Ninth Circuit ordered reassignment on remand. 659
The Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted 
the more lenient, “objective observer” standard to determine whether unusual 
circumstances that would merit reassignment on remand are present. 660 This test 
requires reassignment when “facts ‘might reasonably cause an objective observer 
to question [the judge’s] impartiality.’” 661 In this way, the appellate courts can 
combat not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias by remanding to a 
different judge when “reasonable observers could believe that a judicial decision 
flowed from the judge’s animus toward a party rather than from the judge’s 
application of law to fact.” 662
In applying the objective observer test, courts of appeals have typically found 
reassignment necessary when judicial conduct exceeds the bounds of unques-
tioned impartiality. In Cobell v. Kempthorne, 663 the D.C. Circuit heard the ninth 
appeal in six years of a case involving a dispute between the beneficiaries of In-
dian land trusts and their trustee, the United States. Although the district judge’s 
conduct had not met the Liteky standard for personal bias, 664 the harsh language 
in all eight of the judge’s prior opinions, coupled with a string of reversals by the 
D.C. Circuit, required reassignment. 665 The D.C. Circuit concluded that, taken to-
gether, these facts would leave “‘an objective observer . . . with the overall impres-
sion’ 666 that the district court’s professed hostility to [the defendant] has become 
‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.’” 667
659. Id. at *14.
660. The Fifth Circuit uses both the “objective observer” test and the three-factor test, declining to 
specifically adopt either. In re DaimlerChrysler Corp., 294 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2002).
661. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)). See also Haines v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 93 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th 
Cir. 1989).
662. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
663. 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
664. Id. at 332 (noting that it is a “rare case that meets the Liteky standard” for disqualification, 
in which “the judge’s views have become ‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair 
judgment’”) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)).
665. Id. at 333–35.
666. Id. at 335 (quoting Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at 1463).
667. Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551). See also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 
1992). Although not citing to § 2106 explicitly, the Third Circuit found that the district judge’s use of 
inflammatory language threatened the “appearance of impartiality.” To preserve this impartiality, the 
court exercised its “supervisory powers” and remanded the case to a different judge. Id. at 98.
Disqualification on Appeal 
113fjc.dcn • fjc.gov
Similarly, in United States v. Tucker, 668 the Office of Independent Counsel 
(OIC) sought disqualification of the district judge because of “reported connec-
tions among Judge Woods, the Clintons, and [defendant] Tucker”—connections 
it chronicled with various newspaper articles. 669 Although none of the articles di-
rectly linked the judge to the defendant, the Eighth Circuit ordered remand of the 
case to a different judge under § 2106, noting that the judge had worked with and 
admired Hillary Clinton and had spent a night in the White House. The court fur-
ther noted that “President and Mrs. Clinton have been reported to have expressed 
continued support for Tucker since his indictment by the grand jury” 670 and at-
tended a fundraising luncheon for him. In the court’s view, reassignment was nec-
essary because of the “risk of a perception of judicial bias or partiality” 671 “[g]iven 
the high profile” 672 of the OIC’s work and the widely reported connections.
The decision in Tucker also involved the use of an unusual procedure for re-
questing disqualification of the district judge. Instead of presenting the issue to 
the judge directly, the appellant presented the request for the first time on appeal. 
The Eighth Circuit held that it was empowered, pursuant to § 2106, to direct the 
entry of any order “as may be just under the circumstances,” including the reas-
signment of the case to a different district judge where, under § 455(a), the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 673
The D.C. Circuit, in “a departure from [its] usual practice of declining to 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal,” 674 considered the appellant’s 
request for disqualification of the trial judge where “the full extent of [the judge’s] 
actions [were] not . . . revealed until this case was on appeal.” 675 
668. 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996).
669. Id. at 1325.
670. Id. at 1323.
671. Id. at 1324.
672. Id. at 1325.
673. Id. at 1324.
674. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2001).




Code of Conduct for United States Judges
(Effective March 12, 2019)
Canons 3C and 3D
Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, 
Impartially and Diligently
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances in which:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding;
(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer 
with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such 
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or lawyer 
has been a material witness;
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the 
judge’s spouse or minor child residing in the judge’s household, has 
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party 
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected sub-
stantially by the outcome of the proceeding;
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(d) the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person related to either within 
the third degree of relationship, or the spouse of such a person is:
(i) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party;
(ii) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or
(iv) to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 
proceeding;
(e) the judge has served in governmental employment and in that ca-
pacity participated as a judge (in a previous judicial position), coun-
sel, advisor, or material witness concerning the proceeding or has 
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in 
controversy.
(2) A judge should keep informed about the judge’s personal and fiduciary 
financial interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about 
the personal financial interests of the judge’s spouse and minor children 
residing in the judge’s household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law 
system; the following relatives are within the third degree of rela-
tionship: parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, great grandparent, 
great grandchild, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew; the 
listed relatives include whole and half blood relatives and most step 
relatives;
(b) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, 
trustee, and guardian;
(c) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 
however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active 
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds 
securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless 
the judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or 
civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held 
by the organization;
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(iii) the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance 
company, or a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a 
similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the or-
ganization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substan-
tially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in 
the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substan-
tially affect the value of the securities;
(d) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stag-
es of litigation.
(4) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Canon, if a judge would 
be disqualified because of a financial interest in a party (other than an 
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualifi-
cation is not required if the judge (or the judge’s spouse or minor child) 
divests the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.
D. Remittal of Disqualification. Instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, a 
judge disqualified by Canon 3C(1) may, except in the circumstances specifi-
cally set out in subsections (a) through (e), disclose on the record the basis 
of disqualification. The judge may participate in the proceeding if, after that 
disclosure, the parties and their lawyers have an opportunity to confer out-
side the presence of the judge, all agree in writing or on the record that the 
judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate. 
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